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Robert L. Peabody in his article "Party Leadership
Change in the
United States House of Representatives" hypothesizes that
the Republicans in the House of Representatives were more prone to
conflict be-

tween 1955 and 1966 than the Democrats because they were

1)

the minor-

ity party, 2) had suffered a series of election defeats culminating
in

the 1958 and 1964 losses, 3) were a junior party, 4) were highly co-

hesive in terms of region and ideology and therefore could afford the
luxury of a leadership fight without sacrificing their unity on roll
call votes, and 5) their leaders were not as skilled as Sam Rayburn
and John McCorniack in keeping in touch with the rank-and-file.

Other

observers, however, have offered different hypotheses and variables
to explain leadership change and conflict in Congress.

Barbara A.

Hinckley suggests that extensive membership turnover and changes in
the regional and ideological composition of a party bring pressure
for leadership change.

Randall B. Ripley hypothesizes that party is

a more important variable than majority or minority status because

the Republicans have been rocked by more revolts than the Democrats

since the 1910 power struggle over
Speaker Joe Cannon.

Charles 0.

Jones thinks that the size of the
Congressional party and the nuni^er
of freshmen are important variables,
and finally former Speaker Joe

Martin argues that Presidential intervention
can encourage leadership fights.

This dissertation tests these hypotheses by
examining intra-

party leadership conflict in the House of
Representatives from 1895
to 1955.

Because the historical information about the
contests is

widely scattered and even believed lost by some
political scientists,
the fights have been recounted in detail and heavily
footnoted for

others doing research on past Congresses.

The rest of the disserta-

tion systematically analyzes the composition of each
Congressional

party in terms of

1)

majority-minority status, 2) size,

3)

election

results, 4) membership turnover, 5) the number of freshmen,

6)

proportion of members with at least ten years seniority,

regional

factions, and 8) where possible ideological factions.

7)

the

An important

point is that all Congressional parties from 1895 to 1955 have been

reconstructed regardless of whether a fight occurred in order to see
if stable parties had different characteristics from combative parties

The skill of the leaders and Presidential intervention have been considered i.esidual variables that were used to explain deviant cases,
but the accounts of the fights do discuss the President, lobbyists,
and the personality of the competitors when relevant.
Briefly, the findings show that in the Democratic party extensive

membership turnover and changes in the regional and ideological

vi

alignments that bolstered the faction underrepresented
in the leadership were most conducive to conflict.

In the Republican party before

1933 ideological cleavages produced conflict.

Afterward, rapid mem-

bership turnover seemed most important in predicting a leadership
clash.

Two conditions that were not determinants of leadership con-

flict between 1895 and 1955 were party and majority-minority status.

vil
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Who leads the House of Representatives
is important.

House leaders

play a major role in the formation of
public policy by controlling debate, lining-up votes, influencing committee
assignments, and co-

ordinating information.

Tliey

also exert considerable influence over

the careers of their colleagues through committee
selection, recognition
for floor debate, and election help.

Changes in the leadership-both

inter-party changes and changes within a party hierarchy-will affect
legislative outcomes by altering the distribution of power
and influence in a party as different individuals and factions
gain greater access to the leaders and others fall out of favor.

Yet, compared with

the President, little is known about the selection of the
House leadership.

Since the late 1930

's

Democrats and Republicans in the House have

followed different patterns in choosing their leaders.

The Democrats,

despite the public image of a brawling, quarrelsome, divided party,
have had remarkably stable leadership in the last thirty- five years.
Since 1940 when Sam Rayburn and John McCormack began their long
tenures as Speaker and Majority Leader, the Democrats have evolved a

system of routine promotion and advancement within the leadership
hierarchy.

Upon Rayburn 's death, McCormack moved up to the Speaker-

ship and Carl Albert, Whip since 1955, became Majority Leader.

When

McCormack retired, this orderly succession continued with Albert's

elevation to the Speakership and Hale Boggs

Majority Leader,

^'hen Boggs died,

'

promction from Whip to

Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, who had been

appointed Whip only two years earlier, advanced
to Majority Leader.

Although some of the promotions were challenged,
none of the contests
overturned or altered the arranged succession.

This step-by-step pro-

gression to the top of the leadership ladder seems even
more striking

when one realizes that in the Democratic party the Whip

is

appointed

by the other party leaders, particularly the Speaker,
and not elected
by the merabership-at-large as in the Republican party.

Thus, the

Democratic rank-and-file continually ratified the choices of the highest party leaders.
In contrast, the Republicans, who perhaps more typically project
a public image of stability, conservatism, and unity, have engaged in

a series of internal fights over the party leadership in the House of

Representatives.

Between Joe Martin's selection as Minority Leader

in 1939 and John Rhodes' election in 1973, no Republican had become

Minority Leader without

a caucus fight.

Unlike the Democrats who com-

peted over vacancies, the Republican leadership was buffeted by two
successful revolts.

In 1959 Charles Halleck deposed Martin as Minor-

ity Leader only to be overthrown himself six years later by Gerald
Ford.

The one element of stability within the Republican hierarchy

was Leslie Arends

even his

1*.

vig

,

who served as Whip from 1943 through 1974.

reign did not escape challenge.

Yet

In 1965 Arends was

barely able to beat back an attempt to dump him along with Halleck.
Why have the two parties behaved so differently?

Robert L.

Peabody in his groundbreaking article "Party Leadership Change in

the United States House of Representatives^'
theorizes that majority-

minority status, election returns, the structure
of the House party in
terms of junior and senior members and regional
and ideological factions,
and the skill of the incumbent leaders were the
key variables explaining contested leadership change in the House of
Representatives.

He

concludes that the Democrats' stability between 1955 and
1966 resulted
from majority status, the long string of victories, the
large body of

experienced members, the continuing regional and ideological division
in the party that forced the competing wings to compromise on middle

of the road leaders, and the skill of the leaders themselves in keeping in touch with the membership.

He attributes the Republicans' re-

volts to prolonged minority status and successive election defeats,

which caused frustrated members to search for

a scapegoat;

to the

lack of a large group of senior representatives to balance the junior
classes; to strong voting cohesiveness which seemed to permit the party

almost the luxury of skirmishing over leadership positions without

sacrificing unity on major roll call votes; and to the inability of
the leaders to cultivate strong ties with the rapidly changing member1

.

ship.

Peabody's study is limited by his time period, 1955 to 1966, because the conditions under which each party operated
st;iD.t.

pa;.M:y,

vrere

fairly con-

For the entire twelve years the Democrats were the majority
suc:;sssful at the polls, and divided deeply by region and

Robert L. Peabody, "Party Leadership Change in the United States
House of Representatives," America n Political Science Review, LXI
(September, 1967), pp. 687-690, 692-693).

ideology whereas the Republicans were always in
the minority, losing
elections, and dominated by Midwestern conservatives.

Thus, the

"variables" Peabody suggests as facilitr.ting or
inhibiting the chances
for conflict do not really vary much at all and

ir^y

simply be character-

istics of the parties during this particular era rather
than causative

influences.

A related problem

is

that since there is little variation

it was impossible for Peabody to control for one
variable to see the

effect of another.

Perhaps only one or some of Peabody 's attributes

accounted for the difference in parties.

In order to test the validity

of Peabody 's explanatory scheme, it would be necessary to examine the

parties' behavior under different circumstances.

A study of the Re-

publicans as a majority party and the Democrats as a minority party,
for instance, might yield valuable information about whether the Re-

publicans historically were a more combative party than the Democrats
or whether minority status is usually associated with greater intra-

party competition.

Another problem is that Peabody has not systematically looked at
his variables in each Congress between 1955 and 19&6 to see whether
the stable years within this time period differ from the contested

years.

He does analyze such relationships occasionally--for example,

he notes with election returns that the 1959 and 1965 Republican re-

volts follow election disasters, but he usually correlates the

variables with specific years sporadically.

Peabody is more inter-

ested in the aggregate differences between the parties over time

rather than in the differences within each party from Congress to

Congress.

To be able to predict more accurately under
what conditions

a leadership fight is likely to develop, it would
seem necessary to

dwell on th*ise biennial fluctuations within the party.
Furthermore, in order to assess whether other variables
and ex-

planations for leadership conflict are possible, the contributions
of
other political scientists and politicians to leadership
selection

must be reviewed.

Majority - minority status

.

Randall

B.

Ripley in Party Leaders

the House of Representatives agrees with Peabody that prolonged minority status can produce frustration and upheaval, but he differs from

Peabody by stressing the impact on the leaders rather than on the
rank-and-file.

Not only are Minority Leaders more likely to be ousted

than Majority Leaders, but they also voluntarily leave their posts

more often in order to seek more rewarding careers outside the House.
This higlier rate of leadership turnover, by creating more openings
than a majority party would ordinarily have to fill, increases the

opportunities for conflict in the minority party.
In contrast to Peabody and Ripley, Charles 0. Jones suggests

that a lengthy period of minority status may produce an entrenched

leadership and stagnation in the party rather than rapid turnover and

more frequent leadership contests.

Jones maintains that over time a

minority party will be led by those representatives who are elected
from the saiest districts and are most acept at surviving party
losses.

Leadership change would be difficult, in his view, unless

2

Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives
Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 32.
(Washington, D.C.
:

,

there is a large influx of freshmen
connnitted to altering the direction

of the party by recruiting more innovative
leaders.^
Jones also contends that the size
an important influence on its behavior.
a minority that is small in

of=.

the minority party may be

He offers the hypothesis that

size-he was referring

to House Republicans

in the 1930's-will act differently from a
minority party that may be

.larger but is divided by ideology-here he is
thinking of the Republi-

cans during the New Freedom.'^

Jones, however, does not predict how

these two theoretically distinguishable minorities will act.

Election trends

.

Like Peabody, Martin in his own analysis of his

ouster as Minority Leader, cites the 1958 election results, which
were

disastrous for Congressional Republicans, as a major reason for the
revolt to unseat him.

Young Republicans, especially, were afraid that

the 1958 losses forecast doom for the party in the 1960 presidential

election and wanted to change the Republicans' image before then.^
Si££2££llZ'

Jones, while in agreement with Peabody that young

members are an important element in changing the leadership of a party,
stresses the role of freshmen whereas Peabody places his emphasis on
junior members (those with less than ten years service)

,

particularly

the disproportionate balance between junior and senior members.

^Charles 0. Jones, The Minority Party in Congress
Brown and Company, 1970), pp. 16-18.
4

Ibid

.

,

p

.

,

Jones

(Boston: Little,

34.

^Joe Martin, My First Fifty Years in Politics
Hill, 1960), pp. 4-9.

,

(New York: McGraw

thinks that freshmen are the key to change because
the socializati on

process in Congress quickly begins to erode the differences
between
old and new meinbers.

Barbara A. Hinckley in "Congressional Leadership Selection
and
Support:

A Comparative Analysis" hypothesizes that the more senior

and stable the membership of a party is, the more senior and stable
the leadership will

be/

Her analysis of leadership selection con-

verges with Peabody in underlining the importance of seniority, but
she adds the concept of membership stability.

Stability or its con-

verse membership change raises interesting possibilities.

Peabody

has theorized that election defeats of thirty to fifty seats are an
Important cause of leadership contests, but an election victory of

landslide proportions, which would also bring about major shifts in
the composition of the party, might be as unsettling to the leader-

ship as an election defeat.

Furthermore, Hinckley's idea would take

into account new members who are not freshmen, such as former Con-

gressmen and party switchers.

For example, in 1915 a high percentage

of the new Republicans were actually returning representatives who

had been defeated in the 1912 fratricide.

Likewise, in the Democratic

party, many of the victims of the Harding landslide regained their
seats in the 1922 election and made up a large segment of the new

members in 1923.

^Jones

,

p.

Party switchers, although never a major element

18.

^Barbara A. Hinckley, "Congressional Leadership Selection and
Support: A Comparative Analysis," Journal of Politics XXXII
(May, 1970), p. 270.
,

•

in altering the structure of either party, were
a much more frequent

phenomenon in the 1890 's than today when silver
Republicans, gold
Democrats, ?ud Populists were in the process of
realigning their

party allegiance.

Following the 1912 Republican split, party switch-

ing again increased.

Factionali^.

Ripley concurs with Peabody that ideological unity-

or at least the desire for cohesion- -within the Republican
party has

been a primary reason for the internal crises.

Ripley argues that

ideological unity has been much more important to Republican House
leaders than to their Democratic counterparts.

The Republican hier-

archy has been more willing to discipline mavericks through committee
assignments than the Democratic leaders, who have been wary that a

move to punish dissenters might only widen the ideological cleavage

within the party.

Consequently, the Republican membership has or-

ganized revolts and tinkered with the institutional arrangements for

choosing leaders more often than the Democrats because "they realize
that party leaders exercise considerable power over their careers

and futures in the House.

Thus, they constantly seek a greater voice
8

in internal party decisions as a means of self-protection."

Demo-

crats, instead, knowing that their careers are safe, have given their

leaders greater security.

Ripley contends that this difference be-

tween the parties has existed since 1910, a product of the fight over
9

"Cannonism.

Ripley's thesis, if correct, would undercut Peabody 's

"

^Ripley, the direct quote in from p. 192; otherwise, pp. 191-192.
^Ibid.

,

p.

190.

notion that minority status is an important
variable in explaining
leadership fights and majority status for maintaining
stability.

In-

stead, Ripley suggests that intra-party fighting
has been common to

Republican behavior in both majority and minority years
because of
the tension within the party over dissent.

Hinckley has theorized that no Congressional party majority or
clearly predominant faction--in terms of region and ideology--will
over time be without at least proportionate representation among the

leadership.

The time lag is important because an aspiring faction

must wait until its seniority catches up with its growing

numbers.''"^

Hinckley's research suggests that if an imbalance persists,

a

contest

might be expected as the under-represented faction seeks its share of
power.

Compared with Peabody, who was dealing with fairly stable

blocs, Hinckley's formulation stresses how change in the composition
of the party will bring pressure to change the leadership.

A Con-

gressional party that is more receptive to accommodating shifting
alignments will perhaps be less susceptible to revolts and internal
conflict than a party that resists or is slow to make the leadership

congruent with the changing membership.
David Mayhew, in studying roll call voting on selected domestic
issues, has observed that between 1947 and 1962 House Democrats were

more skilled at inclusive compromise than Republicans.

Democrats

generally voted for legislation that benefited other Democrats' constituents although of no particular interest in their ovm districts.

Hinckley, p. 270.

10

Republicans, however, tended to oppose bills that would
help only one

wing of the party and were called the party of exclusive
compromise.

Mayhew

is not sure

whether this behavior was related to majority stat;as

or to differences in the parties

.''^

On leadership selection, do

parties that are rocked by contests also exclude major factions from

leadership posts whereas parties that have more peaceful patterns of

leadership change make an effort to bring members from competing wings
into the leadership or at least select moderates who can appeal to

more than one group?
Skill of the incumbent

.

Martin concurs with Peabody that

a

leader's talent in communicating with the rank-and-file is important
for staying in office.

Martin believes his inability to forge strong

bonds with the junior members

V7as

one reason for his defeat.

The toll of the years had removed a number
of my staunchest old supporters from the
House, and in the press of affairs, I had
never become as close to various of the
younger and newer members as they and I
might have wished. 12
Jones also believes that for a leader to maintain power over time, he

must be "adaptive, communicative, accommodating, and accountable."

13

This argument is somewhat troublesome because in both examples a

The Differ
David R. Mayhew, Party Loyalty among Congressmen
(Cambridge:
ences between Dem ocrat s and Republican s 1947 1962
Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 149-159.
:

,

^^artin,

p.

,

8.

Charles 0. Jones, "Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: An
Essay in the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives,"
Journal of Politics, XXX (August, 1968), p. 618.

-

,

inajor transformation in the party
structure preceded the leader's com-

munication problems.

Martin had to contend with rapid membership

turnover while Cannon's reputation for arbitrary
tactics coincided

with the growth of the Progressive wing of the
Republican party.

2l

iiesident.

Finally, Martin would add the role of the

President or the administration to Peabody's list of
key variables.

Martin thinks that Eisenhower's neutrality in 1959
in contrast

to his

hostility in earlier years and Nixon's probable encouragement
of the
California delegation to round up votes for Halleck were
decisive in
the formation of the revolt to dump

him.'^'^

Thus, an analysis of the literature on leadership selection
shows
that Peabody's thesis can be challenged on several points and that'

other interpretations are suggested.

The major points of contention

are summarized below.
1)

Party may be a more important determinant of conflict than majority-minority status.

2)

Minority status is more likely to produce stability than conflict.

3)

Freshmen as opposed to junior members are critical
to the formation of leadership fights.

4)

The amount of membership turnover may be more conducive to conflict than the size of the election
defeat

5)

Changes in the regional- ideological composition of
a party are more likely to bring pressure for
leadership change than extensive regional or

ideological unity.

Martin, pp. 4-9.

.
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6)

.

The size of the party and the attitude of
the President may also contribute to leadership
conflict
and should be added to Peabody's original
list of
variables

Because there is substantial disagreement about
the causes of Congressional leadership fights and because no one has
done the historical

research necessary to pick intelligently among these
alternative hypotheses, an examination of the disputed variables over
time seems needed.

This study will analyze leadership contests in the House
of Repre-

sentatives from 1895 to 1955 for the offices of Speaker, Majority
Leader, Majority Whip, Minority Leader, and Minority Whip to
determine
which, if any, of the hypothesized conditions can account for the
pat-

tern of conflict.

The years 1895 to 1955 have been selected because

the variables do vary considerably in this sixty year time span.

The

Republicans were the majority party for thirty-two years and the Democrats for twenty-eight years, an almost even balance.

Each party suf-

fered massive defeats and won handsome victories, with 1894, 1912,
1920, 1932, and 1936 standing out as important milestones.

Member-

ship turnover fluctuated enormously from the very high levels of new

members at the turn of the century to the high levels of incumbents
in the last two or three decades.

early 1930

's

Additionally, from 1901 until the

the Republicans were severely split into two persistent

factions, the regulars and the insurgents or Progressives, which con-

trasts sharply with the united, homogeneous Republican party Peabody

describes.

The Democrats during most of their minority years were

predomiinantly a Southern party, which is very different from the more

even distribution of seats between the North and South that characterizes the Democrats when in the majority.

6
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The leadership posts to be studied have
been selected for their
visibility.

One of the drawbacks with historical
research is that

the data needed are not always available or
recorded in full detail.

In fact, Peabody cautioned that

Newspaper accounts of all but the most recent
contests are likely to be fragmentary and superficial.
Biographies rarely describe leadership
contests in any detail and usually these accounts
are anecdotal and one-sided.
Despite Peabody 's doubts, the historical material exists--the
New York
T^^^QS is the single

1

most reliable source- -but the accounts of the con-

tests are naturally fuller and more complete for the most important

and visible leadership offices.

A contest has been defined

as being under way when there were

at least two publicly declared contenders for the job.

If a candi-

date contemplated running, made a few soundings, but then dropped

•

the idea before announcing his intentions to run, no contest was deemed
to have occurred.

Moreover, rivalries or changes that were decided

by appointment rather than election were not counted as contests.
Since definitions of this type are to a certain extent judgment calls,
the contests have been recounted in some detail both so the reader

can make his own decision but also to pull this widely scattered

^^Peabody, p. 676.
16

Memoirs and biographies of House leaders and Presidents, histories of Congress, and the reports on Congress published regularly
in the American Political Science Review until 1951 also provided
valuable insights into some of the contests and helped fill out and
balance the New York Times' accounts.
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infonnation together in a single volume.
Between 1895 and 1955 there were twenty-eight
leadership fights,
but in

soD.e

Congresses a party competed over more than
one office.

Therefore, there were only twenty- three Congressional
parties that
fought.

Because the focus of this research will be the
conditions

that encouraged conflict, "N" will be considered
as twenty- three or

the number of Congressional parties that skirmished over
the leader-

ship rather than twenty-eight or the number of contests.

Although

twenty- three may seem like a relatively small number of examples,

there are two important points to keep in mind.

First, the cases

under investigation represent the total population and are not a
sample from which generalizations about the whole will be inferred.
Second, the Congresses in which no contests developed are also of

interest for comparative purposes.

The thirty-seven Congressional

parties that did not fight will be examined to see if there are different correlates of stability.

If the same conditions shox7 up re-

gardless of whether or not a contest took place, then we can safely

conclude that the variable hypothesized as stimulating conflict was

coincidentally present rather than one of the causes of conflict.

In

other words, there are sixty Congressional parties that will be studied,

with twenty-three examples of leadership conflict and thirty-seven
examples of leadership stability.

The specific variables to be analyzed are defined below.
1.

Ma j or i ty - minor i ty status

.

The number of Congresses a party

stayed as the majority or minority and the number of partisans in each

majority or minority party will be checked as well as which party organized the House.

15

2.

Election returns

The number of seats a party gained or lost

.

since the last election will be examined,
3.

Membership turnover

Membership turnover will be measured in

.

terms of the percentage of new members, who will be
defined as freshmen

plus party switchers plus returning Congressmen who did
not serve in the

immediately preceding Congress.
4.

Hierarchy

.

Freshmen, sophomores and third termers will be

Congressmen elected for the first, second, and third time respectively
whereas senior members will be defined as those who have served at
least ten, but not necessarily continuous, years in the House. ''"^

xhe

rationale for counting total years rather than continuous service

is

that seniority for party leadership is not calculated by Congressmen
in the same manner as seniority for committee rank.

Despite breaks

in service. Cannon and Nicholas Longworth for the Republicans and

Henry Rainey and Champ Clark on the Democratic side

v/ere not

handi-

capped in their bids for office.
5.

Regional fa ctions

.

Republicans will be divided into four

regional categories--East , Midwest, West, or South-Border State--whereas the Democrats will be classified as representing a constituency in

the North, South, or Border States.

The different classification scheme

for each party seenis justified by history and follows the research of

Gerald Marwell who indicates that the regional division that

is

most

important among Republicans is the East-VJcst one while the North-South

in "The Aging of the House," Politi cal Science
(December,
Quarterly XXIX
1964), pp. 526-541, also counts total rather
than continuous service.
T. Richard Witmer
,

,

cleavage is the most critical in Democratic
politics/^
Ideological factions

6.

.

For the Republicans, because the Pro-

gressives were so widely known in their own day and
have received so

much attention from historians, it is possible
to compile a list of
their names

and then to construct a rough index of insurgent
strength

for nearly three decades.

In defining insurgency within the Republican

party, both Midwestern Progressives as exemplified by
Senator Robert

LaFollette of Wisconsin and Bull Moosers, who preferred the
leadership
18 Gerald

Harwell, "Party, Region and the Dimension of Conflict in
the House of Representatives, 1949-1954," American Political Science
Review, LXI (June, 1967), pp. 380-399. For the purposes of this paper
for the Democratic party, the South will be defined as the eleven
states of the Confederacy— Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, and Virginia.
Border States will be Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia.
The North will be all
other states unless otherwise noted. For the Republicans, the East
will be considered the six New England states- -Maine New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut--plus New York,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The Midwest will consist of Ohio,
Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas. The West will be defined as
Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah,
Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico. The South-Border States will be
defined in the same way as for the Democrats.
,

l^otis L. Graham, Jr. in An En core for Reform
The Old Progres sives and th e New Deal
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1967),
used a more elaborate version of this method for locating Progressives
in all levels of government.
The main sources used for Progressive
names were the New York Times; Russel B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive
Politics
A Historical S tudy of Its Origins and Dev elopmen t 1870 1958 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959); Kenneth
Hechler, Insurgency
Personalities and Politics of the Taf t Era
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1940); and Graham's study mentioned earlier.
In addition, studies of the Progressives in individual states such as Carl H. Chrislock's The Progressive Era in
Minnesota 1899-1918, (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1971),
and George Mowry's The California Progressives (Berkeley: University
One last source was
of California Press, 1950), were also helpful.
Robert M. LaFollette 's political organ, LaFollette' s Weekly
;

,

:

,

,

:

,

,

,

.

.

of Theodore Roosevelt to William Howard Taft, have been
counted.

For the Democrats, it is impossible to apply the same
technique
to measure the size of various factions over time because
so little

information is available about the ideological preference of most
individtial Democratic Congressmen.

Therefore, in order to get some

idea of the size of the competing blocs in the Democratic party in
the House, roll call studies and the estimates and comments of con-

temporary newspaper reporters and politicians will be presented when
available.
7.

Congruence.

The regional and ideological characteristics

of the leaders will be compared with the rank-and-file to see if any

major faction is over or under -repre s ent ed

20

^Among the best roll call studies for both parties were David
Brady, Congressional Voting in a Partisan Era
A S tu dy of the
Mc Ki nley Ho uses and a Comparison to the Modern House of Re presenta tives
(Lavjrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1973); George
L. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Con'j ress on Foreign P olicy
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951); and Julius Turner, Party and Constituen cy
Pressure s on Congress (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951). Especially
useful for the Democrats were Edward M. Silbert, "Support for Reform
among Congressional Democrats, 1897-1913," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Northwestern University, 1965); Anne Firor Scott, "Progressive Wind from the South, 1906-1913," Journa l o_f Southern History
XXIX (February, 1963), pp. 53-70; David Burner" The Politics of Provincialism; The Democra tijc Part^r in Tran s it ion, 1918 - 1932 (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); James Patterson, C ongressiona l Con(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press,
s ervatism and the New De al
Souther
n Politics in State and Nation
and
Key,
Jr.
V.
0.
1967)
Studies helpful for the Republi(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956.
Insurgents and the P arty System
Congressional
Holt,
cans were James
1909- 1916 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); John D.
Hicks, Republican Ascendancy 1921 -1933, (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1960); Harry W. Morris, "The Republicans in a Minority
Role, 1933-1938," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University
of Iowa, 1960).
W.

:

,

^

,

,

,

,

,

;

,

,

,

,

,
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This list of variables includes all of Peabody's
conditions,
except the skill of the incumbent leader, plus the
additions and modifications suggested by his critics, except for the
role of the President.

The President's attitude and the ability of the
House leaders

will be considered as a residual category that will be
referred to
only if the other variables fail to provide an adequate
explanation
of leadership conflict.
To reconstruct the conditions for each Congressional party be-

tween 1895 and 1955, the following items were collected from the

Biographical Directory of the American Congress

,

1774 -1971 for every

Congressman serving in the House between 1895 and 1955:
fication, dates of House service, and state represented.

party identi-

From these

facts the composition of each party for every Congress was calculated
for the day Congress opened.

Tliis

date was chosen since most leader-

ship contests took place shortly before the opening of the new Congress,

next four chapters will describe the leadership contests and

Tl-ie

examine the circumstances under which they formed.

Chapter II will

focus on leadership conflict in the Democratic party from 1895 to
1931.

Chapter III will compare the Republican contests for the same

Congresses to see whether a different set of conditions produced the
conflict.

Chapter IV continues the Democratic story from 1931 to

1955 and Chapter V follows the minority Republicans during the same

years.

In Chapter VI the findings from the four historical chapters

will be aggregated and analyzed to decide which of the variables and

hypotheses discussed in this chapter seem valid for the entire sixty
year period and which should be modified or discarded.

19

The main contribution of this topic will
be the testing of some

recent theories about leadership conflict
in the House of Representatives, but the historical approach also makes
it possible to observe

leadership selection as part of a long range,
ongoing process.
any trends developing?
or is it diminishing?

Are

Is leadership conflict becoming more
common

Are the phenomena of bureaucratization and

institutionalization, evident in the development of coinrdttee
leadership selection, also influencing party leadership
selection?

Finally,

the historical perspective should add to our knowledge of
earlier
Congresses.

Although a great deal has been learned about the post-

World War II Congresses, other Congresses, especially those of the
1920

's

and 1930'

s,

have been badly neglected.

A by-product of this

study should be some new information about the leaders, factions,

membership, and quarrels of those little studied Congresses.

CHAPTER II

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP CONTESTS, 1895 to 1931
Leadership C ontests

American political history
politics.

is

,

1895 to 1911

customarily taught as Presidential

As every American school child well knows, the Republican

party dominated Presidential politics from the Civil War
until the de-

pression but what

is

not nearly so well known is that the Democratic

party was alive and healthy at other levels of government.

In the House

of Representatives the Democratic party was usually the majority party

between 1871 and 1895.

The 1894 election, rather than the elections im-

mediately following the Civil War, established firm Republican control
in the House that was not broken until 1931 except -for the brief Demo-

cratic interlude during the Taft and Wilson administrations.
As the 1394 election approached, Grover Cleveland was entering the
last two years of his final term and the Democrats controlled both houses

of Congress, with an especially commanding and impressive margin in the
House:

218 Democrats to only 126 Republicans and 11 Populists and other

third party members.

Depression and agrarian unrest, however, were sweep

ing the nation and combined to give the Democratic party a resounding defeat, its worst since 1866.

Both the Senate and the House returned

Republican majorities, but the Democrats' defeat in the House was particularly spectacular.
a mere 105 members.

The House Democratic contingent was reduced to

Arthur W. Dunn, a contemporary journalist, described

the Democrats' plight:

"Only the rock-ribbed solid South--which was not

^

)

quite solid--resisted the Republican sweep.
The tiny band of Democrats that regrouped
to select a Minority Leader

was almost leaderless.

William Wilson of West Virginia, the
party's

Majority Leader, had been defeated; so had Richard
"Silver Dick" Bland of
Missouri, the great silver spokesman in the House.
showed leadership potential, such as

Jam.es

Younger members who

Beauchamp "Champ" Clark and

David DeArmond, both of Missouri, had also lost their
seats in the
2

debacle.

The only prominent leader to survive was Charles Crisp
of

Georgia, Speaker of the House for the last four years and
former Minority

Leader from 1890 to 1891.
chosen Minority Leader.

At the Democratic caucus Crisp was easily
The only dissenting voice came from William H.

Grain of Texas, who disregarded the caucus action to vote for his fellow
Texan, David

B.

Culberson, for Speaker on the floor of the House.

During Crisp's tenure as Minority Leader, rumors began circulating
that Crisp was making plans to run for the Senate,

The speculation was

confirmed when Crisp told his colleague, Joseph W. Bailey of Texas:

Nobody can lead this wrangling, quarrelsome,
factionalized Democratic minority.
I do not
intend to return to the House.
I am going
home to stand for the Senate. If I lose that,
I will quit public life forever.

•^Arthur W.

Putnam's, 1922),

Dunn, From Harrison to Harding

,

(2 vols.;

New York:

I, 141.

^Ibid.

^ew York Times Dec. 1, 1895, p. 2; Dec.
the New York Times will be referred to as NYT
,

3,

1895, p. 2.

(Hereafter

.

Champ Clark, M^ Quarter Century of American Politics
York: Harper, 1920) II, 10

,

(2 vols.

;

New
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When Congress reconvened after
the 1896 election,- the
Democrats faced
the prospect of choosing a new
Minority Leader in an uncertain
'situation,
crisp, victorious in his Senate
primary race, had died on the
eve of the
1896 election; there was no heir apparent
to be elevated to the
vacancy;
and William Jennings Bryan's
defeat had left the direction
of the national
party hazy.
this vacuum a contest quickly
developed.
By 1896 House

m

Democrats were "practically all
anti-Cleveland men"^ in the sense they
represented mainly Southern and Western
constituencies that had fiercely
opposed Cleveland's gold policies. Yet
many of these anti-Cleveland
representatives, while aligned with Bryan on
silver, cannot be counted as
pro-Bryan.

Many of them were more conservative than
Bryan on other issues,

The contest for Minority Leader not only
involved policy differences
but also foreshadowed the jockeying for
the 1900 Presidential nomination.

The more conservative^ wing of the party presented
two candidates:
of Texas and James Richardson of Tennessee.

Bailey

Bailey was bright, able, and

magnetic, but he was only thirty-four years old with
six years service in
the House and "a Bryan man under protest."'^

The contemporary view of

^Dunn, II, 230.
^In labeling party factions, I have followed the usage of the times
as closely as possible rather than try to impose our own terminology
on
groups that were dealing with completely different issues. Thus, no
one should infer that a political faction that is called conservative or
radical actually or necessarily advocated such policies. Perhaps the
best way to understand these terms is to consider the conservative bloc
as the more conservative wing in the party or the radicals as the more
radical facti-)a of the party.
7

NYT, Mar. 14, 1897, p.

2;

Dunn, I, 218.
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Bailey was -To 'boom' Bailey is to 'down'
Bryan.
faction in the party thought one way to block

by Bryan was to groom Bailey as his rival.

The anti-Bryanite

a second

Presidential try

Richardson, the other con-

servative candidate, was a more expected and
logical nominee.

He was a

senior man, one of the ablest parliamentarians on
the Democratic side, and

had served as the temporary chairman of the Democratic
National Convention.
He carried a serious handicap into the fight, however.

His o^m Tennessee

delegation was not united behind him because of the candidacy
of Benton
McMillin, also from Tennessee.
McMillin, who was from the Bryan wing of the party, ^ campaigned
hard
for the leadership post.

Because of his high rank on the Ways and Means

and Rules Committees, McMillin was looked to for guidance by several
of
his colleagues, but his abrasive personality irritated another bloc of

members who "refused to be led by

him."'''^

Bland of Missouri, also from

the more radical wing of the party, was something of a dark horse candidate.

The New York Times believed that if Bland wanted the post enough

to campaign energetically for it, his popularity would carry him into

office.

But Bland had Presidential ambitions--he had polled 291

votes''''''

— and

was re-

at the 1896 Democratic convention before the Bryan stampede

luctant to engage in any armtwisting that might hurt his chances for

^ Ibid

-Mar.

1.

,

.

,

Mar. 14, 1897, p. 2.

^^Ibid.

,

Mar. 12, 1897, p. 1.

^

Ibid

^^ichard
D.C.

12, 1897, p.

.

:

C. Bain, Convention Decisions and Voting Records
The Brookings Institution, 1960), Appendix D.

,

(Washington,
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another Presidential bid.

1

2

The more conservative faction, apparently to
narrow the contest to
a clear-cut choice between Bailey and
McMillin,

struck a compromise.

Shortly before the caucus met, Richardson withdrew
to become the permanent

chairman of the caucus.

At the caucus Bailey's victory was quickly
as-

sured when Bland was nominated.

With the radical vote split, Bailey won

with fifty-six ballots as opposed to McMillin with
thirty ballots and
Bland with twenty- two.

Bailey's votes came "principally from the South"

plus four of New York's five votes.

"^^

Dissatisfaction with Bailey's leadership began almost immediately
after his election as Minority Leader.

Within six weeks of his selection,

DeArmond publicly called on Bailey to provide more effective leadership
and to pay more attention to the Populists.

In December, 1896, dissatis-

faction with Bailey surfaced again when McMillin demanded his resignation

because of his stand on the tariff on raw materials.

The New York Journal,

owned by William Randolph Hearst, echoed McMillin 's call, but Senator

George

G.

Vest of Missouri, the state most likely to put forward a candi-

date to oppose Bailey, came to his rescue by praising his anti-imperialist
14

views.

Despite Vest's support. Bailey's leadership continued to be

marked by a series of crises followed by votes of confidence in caucus.

^^NYT, Mar. 12, 1897, p. 1.
^^

Ibid

.

,

Mar.

14,

1897, p. 2.

Ibid.
Apr. 15, 1897, p. 3; Sara H. Acheson, Joe Bailey
(New York: MacMillan Co,, 1932), pp. 124-12*5.
,

Democrat

,

:

The Last
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The climax occurred in March, 1899, when
Bailey wanted the Democrats to
support his resolution declaring the seats
of all Congressmen serving in
the Spanish-American war vacant.

When his colleagues balked, Bailey

announced he would not serve as Minority Leader
in the next Congress/^

House Democrats once again rallied to assure
Bailey that their differences

were over issues rather than a repudiation of his
leadership, but Bailey
characterized his decision as "irrevocable

"''^
.

Finding a new Minority Leader proved to be difficult
because there
was still some doubt that Bailey's decision was really
final.

In the nine

months between Bailey's withdrawal in early March and the
Democratic
caucus in early December, only two candidates stepped forward:

Bailey's conservative rival in 1897, and DeArmond

,

Richardson,

who had pushed Bailey

to be more responsive to the Populists and was the candidate
of the silver

wing in the Rouse.
At the caucus, the Democrats tried to head off the brewing leadership
fight between Richardson and DeArmond by drafting Bailey.

Bailey, how-

ever, begged off by pleading that he would need all his time for campaign-

ing in Texas for the Senate.

'^^

With Bailey definitely removed from con-

sideration, four candidates were nominated:

Richardson, DeArmond, John

Bankhead of Alabama, who, like Richardson, was a member of the party's

more conservative wing but had two years less seniority than Richardson:

15

Achesou, pp. 128-129.

^^r,

Mar. 4, 1899, p. 2.

^^Acheson, p. 133.
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and William Sulzer of New York,
whose candidacy may have been more
of a

bargaining wedge for Tammany than a serious
try for the Minority Leadership.

Sulzer was young and inexperienced, but
Tammany had elected

eighteen representatives in 1898 to make it
the largest Democratic dele-

gation in the House.
On the first ballot Richardson led the voting
with forty-three votes,

followed by DeArmond with thirty-nine, Bankhead
with thirty-four and
Sulzer with twenty-four.

The next four ballots showed little change.

At the end of the fifth ballot, Oscar Underwood of
Alabama moved to break
the deadlock by withdrawing Bankhead 's name.

On the sixth ballot the

tally was Richardson sixty-five votes, DeArmond fortyfive, and Sulzer

twenty as two-thirds of Bankhead 's votes switched to Richardson.

With

the trend clear, Sulzer withdrew and threw his support to
Richardson.

The final count gave Richardson ninety votes, DeArmond forty-seven, and
Sulzer two.

The Sulzer maneuver was probably pre-arranged.

His votes, the bulk

coming from his fellow Tammany representatives, had been held in

until the trend to Richardson appeared.

a

bloc

Then, as planned, they were

quickly released to give Richardson a clear-cut victory. 19

There is no

evidence of a deal beyond the pre-arranged aspect and there may not be
anything especially sinister in Tammany's support of Richardson.

Given

the final choice of a Southern conservative or a Border State Bryanite,

^"NYT, Dec. 3, 1899, p. 2.

l^lbid.
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it is not surprising that Tammany
would side with the conservative.

other machine Congressmen from the
Northeast,

vehemently opposed Bryanism.

Like

the Tammany delegates

Their intensity can be felt in a
resolution

New York introduced at the 1901 Democratic
caucus:

New York "wants the

country to know that the Democrats of the
East are tired of Bryanism and

Populism and will have no more of

it."^'''

In 1901, after Bryan's second defeat and
another setback for House

Democrats, Richardson was unanimously re-elected
Minority Leader.

only post to change hands was the Whip.
the Whip as a formal position.

The

In 1900 the Democrats had created

Underwood, the chief sponsor of the motion,

had been appointed by Richardson to fill the spot.^^

replaced Underwood with James Lloyd of Missouri.

In 1901, Richardson

It is a matter of debate

whether this change should be construed as a demotion for
Underwood.
Burton Hendrick believes that Richardson promoted Underwood to
serve informally as his first lieutenant during the last part of Richardson's
tenure, presumably 1901 to 1903, but he does not distinguish these duties

from those of the Whip.

23

20

Russell B. Nye, Midwes tern Progressive Politics
A Historical
Study of Its Origins and Development 1870 -1958, (East Lansing: Michigan
State University Press, 1959), 226.
See also Geoffrey Blodgett, The
Gentle Reformers
Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland Era (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1966)
:

,

:

,

.

^^NYT, Dec. 1, 1901, p. 2.
^^andal'j. B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of R epresentatives
The Brook ings~TjnstTtutTon7~ly 6 / } p TT.

(Washington, D.C.

:

,

23

-^Burton J. Hendrick,

South,

"

McClure's Magazine

,

.

"Oscar W. Underwood, a New Leader from the
XXXVIII (February, 1912), p. 414.

,
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In 1903, Richardson retired from politics
unexpectedly to become

Grand Commander of the Scottish Rites Masons even
though he had been

elected to serve another term in the Hou^.e.

Some of his peers suspected

that the real reason for his rather sudden retirement
was that he could

not be re-elected Minority Leader without a fight.

Although there is

no hard proof for these assertions, there were calls for
stronger

leadership.

The Democrats had picked up seats in the last election but

felt hard pressed by the positive and activist image of Theodore

Roosevelt.

There was concern that during Richardson's four years as

Minority Leader the Democrats had not compiled a strong legislative
record to present the country and had been unable to overcome their
public image as an unruly lot, difficult to lead, and united only on

River and Harbor bills, the traditional pork bari^el legislation.

The

only specific piece of information attached to these fairly nebulotis
rumors was that the dissatisfied element in the party was focusing on

John Sharp Williams of Mississippi to oppose R.ichardson. 25

With Richardson's retirement three candidates were mentioned as
possible successors:

Williams, DeArmond, and Clark.

Williams was re-

puted to be the House Democrats' ablest debater and one of their best

parliamentarians.

Ideologically he is hard to classify.

He was

probably a conservative but had enough reform tendencies to make him
acceptable to a broad spectrum of the party.

For example, he supported

2A

Charles W. Thompson, Party L eader s of the Times
G. W. Dillingham Co., 1906), pp. 184-185.
^^NYT, Jan. 10, 1903, p. 8.

,

(New York:
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the direct election of Senators, an
income tax, pure food legislation,
free rural mail delivery, and strengthening
the Interstate Commerce

Commission.

On the other hand, Tom Watson, the Georgia
Populist,

"wrote letters to the Mississippi press
saying that Williams' election

would mean that 'corporations would have just
one more doodle-bug in the
United States Senate. '"^^

At the opposite end of the ideological scale

was DeArmond, who had lost to Richardson in 1899
and was now the most

senior Democrat among non- Southerners

.

His radicalism, partisanship

(he did not befriend colleagues with opposing points
of view)

tation for sarcasm had not mellowed with age.

,

and repu-

Clark was closer to the

Bryan wing of the party than Williams but more of a moderate
than
DeArmond.

Some observers thought Clark with his persuasive, concilia-

tory personality might well have beaten Williams for Minority Leader
if DeArmond had not also been a candidate.

All three candidates began campaigning intensely but the battle
was resolved quickly.

With two candidates from Missouri, "the Missouri

delegation," according to Clark's Memoirs
I know,

,

"of its own motion, so far as

took the matter of our candidacy into its own hands, and

DeArmond prevailed by one majority."
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DeArmond

's

one vote victory

^"George G. Osborn, John Sharp Williams
Planter - Statesman of the
(reprinted; Glouster, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964), pp. 142-143.
S outh
:

Deep

,

27

Albert D. Kirwan, Revolt of the Rednecks
Mississippi Politics,
1876 -1925
(reprinted; Glouster, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964), p. 180.
:

,

^^Dunn, I, 388.
Clark, II, 28.
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has usually been attributed to his
seniority.

With Clark eliminated

from the race, opinion quickly crystallized
behind Williams, who was

unanimously selected Minority Leader at the
Democratic caucus.
Williams re-appointed Lloyd as Whip, likely an
astute political decision
since both of his opponents were from Missouri.
In 1905 Williams was re-elected Minority Leader
without opposition

although there were rumors of a possible revolt.

DeArmond's name was

linked to the stories but nothing seems to have developed
beyond "the
loud talk

/_tha_t/

always ended at the caucus door."

In 1907, new rumors of a revolt against Williams began
circulating,
but this time the revolt was more organized, more open, and had
more

substance to it than the loud talk of 1905.

The revolt was led by

Lloyd, the Democratic Whip; Ollie James of Kentucky; James Hay of

Virginia; and William Lamar of Florida.

Others who participated were

DeArmond and Dorsey Shackelford of Missouri.

A number of ingredients were involved in the revolt.
Williams because he was not enough of a Bryanite.

James opposed
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Lamar, DeArmond,

Hay, Shackelford, and possibly Lloyd probably shared James' sentiment.

Another element was the attitude of newspaper publisher Hearst, who had
served in Congress from 1903 to 1907 as a Democrat.

When Williams

denied Hearst a seat on the Labor Committee, Hearst had gone behind

^%YT, Nov.
^^

Ibid

.

,

8,

1903, p. 1.

Feb. 25, 1907, p. 5.
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Ibid., Jan. 12, 1907, p. 2; William R. Gwinn, Uncle Joe Cannon
Archf oe of Insurgency
A His tory of the Rise and Fall or Cannonism,
(New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), p. 97^
:

,
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Williams' back to line up support from labor leaders.

He eventually

got the assignment he wanted, but Williams blocked
legislation he in-

troduced.

33
By 1907 the Hearst newspapers were criticizing
Williams'

leadership.

In addition, during the 1904-1905 session, the
Democratic

caucus instructed members on the Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Com-

mittee to back a moderate bill on railroad regulation rather than
Hearst's more stringent measure.

Two Democrats on the Committee,

Shackelford and Lamar, flouted the caucus decision to vote for the
Hearst bill, which Lamar contended had not received a fair hearing at
the caucus.

In retaliation, at the start of the 1905 session, Williams

had removed them from the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and
had transferred them to "inferior committee assignments.""^'^

Afterwards,

the disciplined twosome worked to overthrow Williams as much from

grudge and personal animosity as from policy differences.

The major problem confronting the anti-Williams faction was to
find a candidate.

Their first choice was Clark, whose popularity made

him the only candidate with

a

real chance of upsetting Williams but

Clark was ambivalent about the approaches.

A.
p.

Swanberg, Citizen Hearst

,

In his Memoirs he acknowledges

(New York: Scribner's, 1961),

209.
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Shackelford was
Osborn, pp. 124-125; NYT, Feb. 25, 1907, p. 5.
placed on the District of Columbia and Claims Committees whereas Lamar
was demoted to the Foreign Affairs and Pacific Railroad Committees.
Speaker Camion, in an interesting departire from customary procedure,
had given Minority Leader Williams the right to make Democratic committee assignments. The Speaker normally held this power, but Cannon
decided to permit Williams to assume this responsibility because of
their strong, personal friendship and in hopes of sowing dissension
and discord in Democratic ranks. Although Cannon's strategy worked
beautifully, he never granted Clark similar power.

32

his leadership ambitions, 35 but he
also recognized Williams' ability
and believed he was sympathetic to
Clark's leadership aspirations.

On January 11, 1907, Clark announced he
would
public within twenty-four hours.

m.ake his

decision

Meanwhile, Williams told the press

he thought Clark would refuse to run and that
the opposition had over-

estimated its strength.

The betting was that Clark would not run.

January 12, as predicted, Clark declined to be
the challenger.
anti-Williams faction felt Clark had let them down.

On

The

According to

their scenario, Clark privately agreed to run on
the 11th, then met

with Williams, who asked him not to be a candidate
because a contest
would be embarrassing to Williams during his campaign for
the Senate.

The insurgents placed Clark's refusal to run following his
meeting with
Williams.

Williams denied that he asked Clark to drop out of the
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race

but later developments indicate that Williams and Clark may
well

have struck a deal:

Clark would pull back and Williams, if victorious

in his Senate battle, would help Clark become the new leader.

The revolt was expected to collapse because the only other possible
contender, Albert Burleson of Texas, also rebuffed the insurgents' approaches.

The next day, however, ten to twelve of the dissidents asked

Clark to reconsider his decision.

They assured him that their oppo-

sition to Williams was based entirely on his methods of leadership on
the floor and not on his committee assignments.

They predicted that

^^Clark, II, 27.
^^NYT, Jan. 12, 1907, p. 2; Jan. 13, 1907, p. 1.

:

.

they could deliver seventy votes at the
caucus whereas Williams was

certain of only sixty-one.

Eighty-three votes would be needed to
win.^^

Clark again refused to run.

After Clark 'r final refusal, the in-

surgents turned to DeArmond, who as always was
ready to take on a

leadership fight.

With DeArmond as the candidate, the anti-Williams

faction claimed to be only seven votes short of victory,

a figure

which seems inflated since Clark, their first choice,
was considered
thirteen votes short.

After DeArmond

's

entrance into the race, Robert Henry of Texas,

the caucus chairman and staunch Bryanite, declared his
candidacy while

John A. Moon of Tennessee was rumored to be getting ready to make
an
announcement.

DeArmond

's

backers were enraged with the appearance of

new candidates
Inasmuch as it is a man's job to beat Williams
under the most favorable circumstances, the opposition looks with dismay on the possibility
that its strength will be scattered among a lot
of candidates

Nevertheless, despite all the announcements, speculation, charges, and
countercharges, the only serious candidacy was DeArmond

's.

Yet even

his candidacy, after the initial ballyhoo, quietly faded away.

By

the time the new Congress convened in December, 1907, the Democrats

,

Jan. 13, 1907, p. 1; Jan. 14, 1907, p. 1.

.

,

Feb. 25, 1907, p. 5.

^^Ibid.

,

Feb. 24, 1907, p. 4.

^^Ibid.
Ibid
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had rallied around Williams, whose
leadership had been given
by his Senate victory.'^^ A few days

a boost

before the caucus met, DeArmond

withdrew.

There were at least two reasons for DeArmond
's withdrawal.
was that the insurgents had simply
exaggerated their strength.

One

The

other was that after Williams' election to the
Senate DeArmond possibly thought he had a good chance of succeeding
Williams as Minority
^
41
Leader.
Rather than risk alienating future votes in a
brawl that he

might easily lose, DeArmond seemed to prefer bowing
out gracefully
in order to increase the likelihood of his winning
when Williams re-

tired.

Shortly after the 60th Congress opened, the long standing
resent-

ment between Williams and DeArmond erupted in a fist fight on
the floor
of the House.

After the fight, Williams proceeded to make two moves to

insure DeArmond would not follow him as Minority Leader.

lieved that DeArmond

's

Williams be-

most likely competitor would be Clark.

To

aid Clark's prospects, Williams resigned from the Ways and Means Com-

mittee which left Clark as the senior Democrat.

Since it was

customary for the Minority Leader to also serve as the ranking

minority member on Ways and Means, Clark gained

a great deal of prestige

and became something of an heir apparent by this move.

In June, 1908,

Senate elections were often held several years in advance. When
Williams beat Vardaman, his Senate term would not begin until 1911.
Williams took two years off from public life to study issues and political theory.
^^NYT, Dec. 20, 1907, p. 1.

Osborn, pp. 137-138.

Williams privately notified Clark that he
was going to resign shortly
as Minority Leader.

This decision would surprise DeArmond
since no

one expected Williams to retire as Minority
Leader until March, 1909,

when his term as a representative expired.

When Clark received W

Williams' letter. Congress was in recess, but
Clark quickly began

rounding up commitments.

As he later recalled, "I acted on his hint,

and immediately wrote to every Democratic member
except Judge DeArmond

and one other, stating that

leader."

I

would be a candidate for the minority

When "Williams' resignation was publicly known, Clark
had

been pledged the support of a majority of minority members. "^^

De-

Armond had been completely outflanked and at the December,
1908,
caucus Clark was elected unanimously.
In 1908 Lloyd resigned as Whip to become Chairman of the Con-

gressional Campaign Committee.

The post remained vacant until 1913.

Clark sometimes acted as his own Whip; at other times, Underwood or

John Nance Garner of Texas performed the duties of Whip, but not in
an official or full time capacity.
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In 1909, as the Democrats began their last two years as the minor-

ity party in this time period, Clark was unanimously re-elected Minority

^^Clark, II, 28.
44

Osborn, p. 138.

45

Ripley, p. 37; George W. Norris, Fighting L iberal (New York:
MacMillan Co., 1945), p. 117; Bascora N. Timmons, Garner of Texas
A
Personal History (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 60.
,

:

,
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Leader.

There were no rumors or hints of
discord-perhaps because the

pereimial anti-leadership organizer, DeArmond,
died shortly before the

new Congress opened.

Summary of the 1895 to 1911 Contests

During the Democrats' sixteen years as the minority
party, three
characteristics stand out about the pattern of leadership
change.
First, there was frequent leadership turnover.

Between 1895 and 1911

five different Congressmen served as Minority Leader,
with tenures

ranging from two years for Crisp and Bailey to five for
Williams.

In

the shorter time span of 1900 to 1908 there were two Whips
with

Underwood serving one year and Lloyd for seven years, the longest term
for any of the Democratic leaders.

Except for Clark, who went on to

the Speakership when the Democrats became the majority party in 1911,

the other Minority Leaders retired from politics or resigned because

they were ambitious to advance to the Senate.

As for the Whips,

Underwood was not re-appointed and Lloyd becacne Chairman of the Congressional Campaign Committee.
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Second, when compared to the modern Democratic party in the House

of Representatives, the number of leadership contests seems high.

Between 1895 and 1911, the Democrats waged four battles--in 1897, 1899
1903, and 1907 over the Minority Leadership.

Aside from the abortive
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These findings are compatible with the career patterns of the
Speaker and the membership at large at the turn of the century. See
Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of
Representatives," American Political Science Review LXII (March,
1958), pp. 144-168.
,
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uprising against Williams, incumbents
were not challenged but every
time a vacancy occurred from Crisp's
easy resumption of the Minority

Leadership in 1895 to Clark's unanimous
selection in 1908 a contest
developed,

m

1908 a fight over Williams' vacancy was
probably avoided

only because Williams adroitly timed his
resignation.

Table

1

sum-

marizes the Democratic contests.
Third, there is little evidence of the highly
structured pattern
of routine advancement and promotion in the
leadership hierarchy as
one would find today in the Democratic party
in the House,

Between

1895 and 1911 only two contenders may have had a special
claim to the

leadership.

In 1895 when Crisp moved from the Speakership to the

Minority Leadership, he was following the precedent set by
John

G.

Carlisle, Democrat from Kentucky, who served as Speaker from
1883 to
1889.

When the Democrats became the minority party in 1889, Carlisle

had also stepped down to be Minority Leader. '^'^

The vicissitudes of

Crisp's career, building from the Carlisle example, may mark the start

of the leadership ladder that now operates among House Democrats.

The

Whip had clearly not been built into any formal succession at this
stage.

In every case where the Minority Leadership was vacant, the

Whip was bypassed as a potential candidate.

Even in 1907 when Lloyd

was leading the revolt against Williams, he was never mentioned as an

eligible contender even though almost every other outspoken dissident
was openly discussed as a possibility.

Ripley, pp. 14 and 30,

"le second example of a

.

.
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TABLE

1

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1895-1911

Minority Leader
Year

Status of Post

What Happened

Vacant
(Party became
Minority)

No contest

Crisp elected

1897

Vacant
(Crisp retired)

Contest--4 candidates;
1 ballot.

Bailey elected

1899

Vacant
(Bailey declined
to run again)

Contest--4 candidates;
7 ballots.

Richardson
elected

1901

No vacancy

No contest

Richardson
re-elected

1903

Vacant

Contest--3 candidates;
all but 1 withdrew
before caucus

Williams
elected

1905

No vacancy

No contest- -rumors of a
revolt but no action.

Williams
re-elected

1907

No vacancy

Contest--revolt organized;
candidate withdrew before
caucus

Williams
re-elected

No contest

Clark elected

No contest

Clark
re-elected

1895

1908

1909

Vacant
(Williams
resigned)
No vacancy

Outcome

Whip
1900

Vacant

Richardson

nam.es 1st

Whip.

Underwood
appointed

1901

No vacancy

Underwood replaced

Lloyd named

1903

No vacancy

Status quo

Lloyd renamed
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TABLE 1- -Continued

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1895-1911

Whip

Year

1905

1907

1908

1909

Status of Post

What Happened

Outcome

No vacancy-

Status Quo

Lloyd renamed

No vacancy

Status Quo

Lloyd renamed

No appointment

Left vacant

No appointment

Left vacant

Vacant
(Lloyd resigned)

Vacant

special claim to a leadership post is Clark's becoming
the senior Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee by virtue of
Williams' resignation.

The DeArmond forces thought this move gave Clark an unfair
advantage
because traditionally the Minority Leader also acted as the ranking

minority member on Ways and Means.

What cannot be over -emphasized is

that the usual procedure was for the new Minority Leader to be elevated
to this rank only after his election as Minority Leader.

In the 1895-

1908 time span there is no example of the senior Democrat on Ways and

Means automatically or necessarily moving up to the Minority Leadership when the previous leader retired.

For instance, in the 54th Con-

gress, Crisp ranked first among the Democrats on both the Ways and

Means and Rules Committees.

Next in line on both committees was

McMillin, who did indeed run for Minority Leader in 1897 and lost to
Bailey, the low man in seniority on the Elections Committee, of
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middling rank on the Judiciary Conmdttee,
and second highest on Law
Revisions, a minor assignment.

After Bailey's election, McMillin con-

tinued as the Democrats number two man op
Rules and Ways and Means,
right behind Bailey, who before his victory
had not even been a member of either committee.

Before Richardson won the Minority Leader-

ship, his committee assignments in the immediately
preceding session

had been limited to the Printing and District of
Columbia Committees
and Williams, prior to his election as Minority
Leader, had served on
the Agriculture and Insular Affairs Committees .^^

In sum, the only

possible case of an heir apparent between 1895 and 1911 was
Crisp's
stepping down from the Speakership to the Minority Leadership
when the

Democrats lost control of the House in 1895.

succession via committee assignments existed.

No alternate route of

Without an heir ap-

parent arrangement or a formal set of expectations about the succession,
free-for-all contests easily flourished.

Analysis of the Variables 1895 - 1911

Ha j or i ty -mino r i ty status.

As a minority party, the Democrats fre-

quently skirmished over the leadership.

In their first eight years as

the minority party, they settled two of the three Minority Leadership

vacancies through caucus votes.

In their last eight years as the

minority, one of the two Minority Leadership openings was fought over
and a revolt was organized to dump the incumbent Minority Leader.
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See the Congressional Directory for the 54th, 55th, and 57th
Congresses.

If
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any trend is discernible overtime, the
Democrats may have become less
combative.

Tenures for both Minority Leader and I^ip
began to

lengthen, contests were resolved at an earlier
stage, and Williams

helped pave the way for a smooth transition by
grooming Clark as his
replacement.

What seems more important than the length of time
as the minority

party is the size of the minority party.

As the Democrats increased

in size and began to near the 50 per cent mark of majority
status, the

number of leadership contests also rose.

As Table

2

shows, in the

three instances in which the Democrats held under 40 per
cent of the

House seats, only one fight took place.

In the five cases in which

the Democrats controlled 40 per cent or more of the seats, three
contests occurred.

When the 40.0 to 49.9 per cent category is further

sub-

divided, one can see that each time the party's proportion of the seats

reached 45 per cent a fight developed.

TABLE 2

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND SIZE OF PARTY, 1895-1911

% of Democratic seats
Under 30
30 to 39.9

# of Congresses

.2
1

0=

of contests

Q
1

40 to 44.9

3

1

45 to 49.9

2

2

'
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Election trends.

Because the size of the House
of Representatives

was rapidly changing during the
time span under consideration,
both the
raw election statistics and the
percentage of Democratic seats at
the

opening of each new Congress are presented
in Table

3.

As the chart

indicates. Democratic leadership fights
between 1895 and 1911 always

followed an election upsurge and election
defeats consistently coincided

with leadership stability, which is, of
course, the reverse of the
TABLE 3

DEMOCRATIC ELECTION RESULTS, 1895-1909

Year

of House
Seats Won

Change from
Previous Election

ir

% of Democratic

Seats when Congress
Opened

ioy J

104

-109

29.5

1897

126

+ 22

35.3

1899

163

+ 37

45.4

1901

154

-

42.9

1903

175

+ 21*

46.1

1905

136

-

39

35.5

1907

163

+ 27

43.3

1909

172

+

9

9*

43.8

indicates a contest
* If the 1903 results are adjusted using 1901 as the
base figure then the Democrats gain is reduced
to +9 seats
if the 1909 results are adjusted using
1907 as the base year, then the Democrats won only
7 seats.
,

;
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recent Republican pattern.
coiT,.anied

Specifically, the 1895 beatin
g

was ac-

by Crisp's harmonious election to
the Minority Leadership;

in 1897 the party picked up twenty-two
scats and faced a divisive

battle over the vacant Minority Leadership;
in 1899 there was further
improvement and a four way struggle developed
to fill the opening
caused by Bailey's resignation; the 1901
downturn coincided with a
quiet caucus; a three way contest followed
the 1903 upsurge; the 1905
loss of thirty-nine seats accompanied talk
of revolt but no action;
in 1907 the Democrats added twenty-seven seats
and were confronted

with an attempted revolt; in 1909 the Democrats
showed a small gain
but had no contest.

Only 1909 deviates from the general pattern.

It

is the single instance when an increase was not
followed by a leader-

ship fight.

Of all the upward shifts, the 1909 results altered
the

party alignments the least.

By the time Congress met the Democrats

had improved their share of the seats by only half a percentage
point
for deaths, resignations, and special elections had whittled the Demo-

cratic pickup to a mere four seats.

Thus, leadership competition in

the Democratic party between 1895 and 1911 seems directly related to

election victories, and leadership stability to election losses or
situations in which the upward trend is so slight that there is vir-

tually no change in the division between the two parties.
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The elections, of course, took place in even numbered years,
but they are labeled here wi.th odd numbers so that they are uniform
with the rest of the data. Otherwise, it can become quite confusing
to keep track of contest years, election years, and the opening dates
of the first session of Congress.
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Men^ership Chan^.
.

As Table 4 shows, leadership
conflict in the

Democratic party clearly correlates
with high n.e:*ership turnover.
the start of each Congress in
which new meinbers accounted
for more

At

than one-third (and incmnbents for
less than two-thirds) of the
Democratic seats, a fight ensued, when
the composition of the House
party
underwent less change, the Democrats
were free from internal strife.
In these Congresses, new members ranged
from a low of 15.3 per cent
in 1905 to a high of 28.1 per cent
in 1901.

TABLE 4

DmOCRATIC CONTESTS AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1895-1911

7o

New Members

^ Incumbents

1895

26.7

73.3

1897

61.9

38.1

1899

37.0

63.0

1901

28.1

71.9

1903

38.6

61.4

1905

15.3

84.7

1907

37.1

62.9

1909

21.1

78.9

______ indicates a contest

Hierarchy o
in the contests.

A large freshman class regularly appears as an element
As Table 5 shows, every time the Democrats faced a
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leadership fight, the ratio of freshmen was over
30 per cent.

The

range was from 30.5 per cent in 1907 to 54.8 per cent
in 1897.

When

there was nc contest the proportion of freshmen was
always below 30
per cent, ranging from 14.6 per cent in 1905 to 25.7 per
cent in 1895.

When second term or sophomore members are added to freshmen, the
relationship between low seniority and conflict is not as strong as

with freshmen alone.

Throughout the 1895 to 1911 era, the combined

proportion of first and second members in the Democratic party was
strikingly high, encompassing nearly two- thirds of the membership before 1900.

Although contests do occur in the years with the very high-

est levels of freshmen and sophomores as in 1897 and 1899, the combined

freshmen- sophomore figure was lowest in 1907 when the dissidents moved
to overthrow Williams.

One reason the correlation between freshmen and

conflict becomes muddied when sophomores are included is that two di-

verse groups are being lumped together.

Between 1895 and 1911 large

freshman classes on the Democratic side--usually elected in off years-consisted mostly of Northerners whereas Southerners dominated the sopho-

more classes,

originally chosen in Presidential years when the coat-

tails of Republican Presidents were hurting Northern Democrats.

There is a tendency for the proportion of senior Democrats to rise
in years in which no contests develop and to decline in Congresses

marked by leadership conflict, as Table
should be mentioned.

5

indicates.

Two caveats

First, the pool of senior members before 1907 was

^^The method for counting sophomores was to include every second
term representative no matter how many years earlier he had been first
elected. Most sophomores, hov/ever, had been elected for the first time
in the immediately preceding election.
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TABLE

5

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND SENIORITY,
1895-1911

Year

1895

1897
.1899

1901

1903
1905
1907

1909

% Freshmen

lo

Sophoinores

X Seniors

25.7

30.5

13.3

54.8

11.1

10.3

34.6

36.4

5.6

24.8

9.8

35.4

16.3

8.4

14,6

30.7

10.9

30.5

12.6

19.2

21.1

22.2

19.3

indicates a contest

small, averaging around

9

to 10 per cent of the Democratic membership,

and the magnitude of the fluctuations was also
small, usually amounting
to only a few percentage points.

the pattern described above.

Second, there is a major exception to

In 1907 the proportion of senior Demo-

crats jumped from 10.9 per cent to 19.2 per cent.

Yet this much larger

reservoir of senior members was not able to prevent a revolt from
forming against Williams.

In short, between 1895 and 1911 a large freshman

class was a constant ingredient in the fights but an enlarging body of

senior representatives was not necessarily associated with stability.

Re^onal FacUonallsa.

Democratic leadership fights
followed shift

in regional alignments very
closely.

Between 1895 and 1911 the
proper-

tion of Border State delegates
was fairly stable, usually 14
to 15 per
cent of the Democratic membership,
so the regional variation
critical
for understanding leadership
conflict is the comparative sizes
of the

Northern and Southern delegations.

As Table 6 shows, except for
1909.

whenever the Northern contingent became
larger, a fight developed and
each time the Northern share of seats
declined, vacancies went uncontested and incumbents unchallenged.

For the Southerners the pat-

tern is the mirror image of the Northern
one.

Except for 1909

,

when-

ever the proportion of Southerners rose, no
contest occurred, but in

TABLE

6

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND REGIONAL FACTIONS, 1895-1911

Year

% North

"L

Border States

7o

South

1895

16.2

10.5

73.3

1897

24.6

15.1

60.3

1899

33.3

14.8

51.9

1901

29.4

14.4

56.2

1903

30.9

15.7

53.4

1905

16.8

14.6

68.6

1907

27.5

15.6

56.9

1909

33.3

13.5

53.2

indicates a contest
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each election in which the Southerners
lost ground, there was a fight.

Ideological Factionalism.

The consensus of contemporary
journal-

ists and politicians was that House
Democrats were deeply divided during the minority years.

For example, a newspaper reporter
thought the

Democrats were "a nerveless, wrangling,
disorganized, undisciplined
mob"

and Clark believed he had been lucky
to lose the Minority Leader-

ship in 1903 because his colleagues were
"so thoroughly factionalized
that it may well be doubted whether any man
could have led them in four
"^^
Congresses without making enemies enough to defeat
him for Speaker.

The three great issues that divided the party were
silver, tariff reform, and imperialism.

Silver split the party regionally.

Most

Southern and Western Democrats belonged to the silver
wing whereas
most Easterners backed Cleveland's preference

for' gold.

What is often

overlooked, however, is that the silver wing had deep cleavages
of
own.

'its

The more progressive element, which included Bryan, Bland,

DeArmond, McMillin, and probably Clark, used silver as a rallying de-

vice for other reforms, such as an income tax and railroad regulation.

The more conservative faction consisted of Southerners, such as Bailey
and Williams, who had converted to silver "to take the wind out of the
53
Populist sails"
in the South but were less interested in pushing hard

^^Thompson, pp. 184-185.
^^Clark, II, 27.
53

J. Rogers Hollingsworth
The Whirlagig of Politics
The Democ racy of Cleveland and Bryan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963),
p. 56 for the direct quotation; otherwise, pp. 56, 194-195, and 240.
,

,
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for reform.

On the tariff, the Democratic party
favored levying the

tariff for revenue only but on key
votes Democrats who wanted
protect ion
for a local product frequently
strayed.
For example, during the debat.
on rules reform in 1909 Speaker Joseph
Cannon convinced twenty-three

Democrats, mainly from Georgia, Louisiana,
and New York, to support the
status quo by pledging to protect sugar,
lumber, oil, and gloves.

Imperialism was an issue that cut across the
Bryanite-Cleveland di-

vision in the party.

Bryan, Cleveland, Bailey, Clark, and
Williams

were staunch anti-imperialists while Sulzer and
Hearst ar-ued for expans ion.
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Roll call studies by David W. Brady and Edward
M. Silbert do not
bear out the observation that House Democrats
were deeply factionalized

Their research, instead, shows that the Democrats were
highly unified

between 1897 and 1911.

Roll call analyses may not reflect the full

extent of factionalism inside a party in an age where party
leaders

used caucuses to hammer out the party stand.

Furthermore, the more

radical members such as DeArm.ond or Hearst often had no place to bolt
on roll calls since the Republicans usually adopted more conservative

positions than the Democrats.

Despite these drawbacks, the Brady and Silbert roll call studies
do show in a limited way that ideological differences tended to widen
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Claude E. Barfield, Jr., "The Democratic Party in Congress,
1909-1913," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University,
1965), pp. 32-46.
'Hollingsworth, chaps.

7

and 8.
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in the years of leadership conflict.

Brady found that between 1897

and 1901 Democrats from the safest
districts, generally in the South,
had higher party support scores
than Democrats representing the
most

competitive districts, usually in the East
and Midwest,

m

1899 when
the proportion of Northerners increased,
voting cohesion dropped on

tariff, currency, and defense bills.

on five broad reform issues overtime.

Silbert examined party voting
He discovered that there were

only four Congresses between 1897 and 1911
in which more than onefifth of the Democratic votes cast on a
particular topic disagreed

with the party's majority position.

In 1897, 21 per cent of the Demo-

cratic votes on the direct election of Senators and
27 per cent of the

votes on railroad regulation opposed the party's stand;
in 1899, 21

'

per cent of the votes on railroad regulation and
in 1903, 25 per cent
of the votes on trust regulation opposed the Democratic
position; and
in 1909, 29 per cent of the votes on railroad legislation
were recorded against the party majority.

What is interesting about this pat-

tern is that in three of the Congresses in which Brady and Silbert observed less cohesion--1897, 1899, and 1903--the Democrats battled over
the party leadership.

Congruence

.

Aside from Clark, the Democrats elected a string of

Southern conservatives to be Minority Leader during this period.

The

^^David W. Brady, Congressional Voting in a Partisan Era (Lawrence,
Kansas: Th2 University Press of Kansas, 1 973), pp. 120-142 and 182-193.
,

^^Edward M. Silbert, "Support for Reform among Congressional Democrats, 1897-1913," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of
Florida, 1966), pp. 298-304.
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membership was also predominantly
Southern and probably conservative,
particularly when the Democrats were
losing seats nationally.
,^en the
Democrats were improving their margin
in the
House, the Bryanite or

more radical wing of the party picked
up momentum.

Although never a

majority, the radicals were persistent
and vocal and for a decade1897 to 1907-challenged the conservative
leadership in the upward

years.

After Alton Parker's defeat as President
in 1904, the Demo-

cratic party began to move to the left,

m

1906 and 1908 progressive

Democrats belonging to neither the old Cleveland
nor old Bryanite

wmg
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of the party started to be elected to
Congress.

The influx of

these young reformers, when combined with the
veteran Bryanites, brought

increased pressure for leadership change as seen in
the revolt against

Williams and then the selection of Clark, who
nor a conservative.

was'

neither a Southerner

Clark liked to identify Missouri with the West

and at this stage of his career was called a moderate
and "a politician
of the Bryan type

Mio7

had accumulated a consistent progressive record

over the years."
As for the Whips, Underwood in geography and philosophy reinforced
the leadership dominance of the Southern conservatives, but his successor, Lloyd of Missouri, with ties to the more radical bloc, brought

balance to the Democratic Leadership between 1901 and 1908.

58

Ibid,, p. 20; Hollingsworth

,
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Summary of the Variables. 1895
-1911

The conditions associated with
the Democratic contests
between
1895 and 1911 were 1) election upswings,
2) extensive membership turnover (over 35 per cent of the
Democrats were newcomers),
3) a high
proportion of freshmen (a minimum of
30 per cent), 4) low seniority,
and 5) rising Northern representation.

In sharp contrast. Congresses

free of leadership conflict were
usually characterized by 1) election

defeats, 2) lower percentages of new
members and freshmen, 3) in-

creased seniority, and 4) expanding
Southern membership;

common factor was minority status.

The only

As a minority party the Democrats

were overwhelmingly a Southern party with
a broad consensus on policy.

An election reverse-contrary to Robert Peabody's
expectations-did
not lead to conflict because in defeat an
increasingly bigger share

of the Democratic Congressional delegation
came from the South.

This

basic political fact m.eant that the House Democratic
Minority Leaders,
also recruited from the South until 1908, better
mirrored the rank-

and-file after a defeat than after a victory.

What forecast trouble

for the established leadership coterie were large-scale
membership

changes and greater regional and ideological diversity produced
both
by election victories and by the escalating size of the House.

Such

membership changes repeatedly galvanized the Bryanites, who in the
House were led by the large and senior Missouri contingent, into action
and occasioi.ally propelled the Tammany delegates into the midst of the
fray.

One suspects that Tammany itched to play a greater role in the

contests but was prevented in this period from capitalizing on its
size because its representatives usually had little seniority--partly
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because of the intense coB^etition
between Republicans and Democrat
s
in New York City and partly
because Tanunany deliberately
rotated it s
politicians between Congress and local
office.

The Southern cons erva-

tive leadership was able to withstand
the successive assaults of
the
Bryanites because they retained a majority
within the Democratic caucus
and also because their opposition
was usually divided. Nevertheless,
the Bryanite bloc was enough of a thorn
that Southern Minority Leaders

made sure a Bryanite served as Whip
between 1901 and 1908 in hopes of

deflecting some of the discontent.
The only Congress which does not fit neatly
into the pattern is
1909, which resembles the other stable Congresses
except that there

was an increase in Northern representatives.

Despite the Northern ad-"

vances, there was no leadership fight probably
because the leadership

had already changed to reflect a more moderate
viewpoint with Clark's

election in 1908.

The regional-ideological membership changes of 1909

simply reinforced Clark's position in the party just as
the previous

Northern influxes had undercut the more conservative leadership.

Leadership Contests

,

1911 to 1919

With "Cannonism" dividing the Republican party into Progressive
and regular camps, the Democrats staged a comeback in 1910 and won

enough seats to capture control of the House of Representatives, the
only branch of government under Democratic rule.
the natural choice for Speaker.

Clark seemed like

He had served for three years as

Minority Leader, his moderate voting record and Border State background could serve as a bridge between the North and the South, and he
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had carnpaigned actively, along with
Bryan and Parker, for Congressional
candidates in 1910. No Democrat, however,
had previously been elevated to th. Speakership without a
struggle.

Another contest seemed

possible in the first few weeks after the
election.

As soon as the

election results were tabulated, Clark forinally
announced his candidacy for the Speakership, but Henry of Texas
and Hay of Virginia
served notice that Clark's promotion would not go
unchallenged.

The

New York Times wondered if their opposition might be
more for tactical
purposes than a real effort to derail Clark.

Not only did the Demo-

crats have the normal task of choosing a Speaker and
Majority Leader
but, in the aftermath of the revolt against Cannon,
they also planned
to restructure the method of making committee
assignments in order to

distribute the Speaker's power more widely.

With so much power at

stake, there may have been quite a lot for an opponent to gain by

forcing Clark to bargain for the Speakership.

Not long after the

November election. Hay and Henry began to take soundings in Washington
and soon decided not to pursue a fight,

When no other rival ap-

peared, Clark won unanimous backing.

Underwood of Alabama, who had served as Clark's chief lieutenant
in an informal capacity in the last session and was the second ranking

Democrat on Ways and Means (right behind Clark), was the only candidate

^^Clark, I, 308; Bar field, p. 268.
^^NYT, Nov. 9, 1910, p. 4 and NTT, Nov. 10, 1910, p. 1.

^^Barfield, p. 273.

mentioned for Majority Leader.

Long before the caucus .et,
it became

widely assumed and understood inside
the party that Clark and
Undervood
would be the Deniocratic leaders
in the next Congress/^
In 1912, with the Republicans badly
split between Taft and

Roosevelt, the Democrats swept to a
landslide victory in the House
and regained control of the Senate and
the White House for the first

time since 1892.

Some of Wilson's supporters were
disconcerted when

they realized that the House would be
led by two of Wilson's defeated

convention rivals.

Underwood had been the favorite Presidential
can-

didate of the conservatives but had polled
only 130 votes at the convention.

Clark, however, had

v7on

over a majority but not the two

thirds plurality needed for nomination when Bryan
denounced him on the
floor of the convention for accepting Tammany
support.
speech, the tide turned to Wilson.

After Bryan's

Nevertheless, there was no attempt

by the Wilson forces to change the House leadership.

In an atmosphere

of "harmony and good f ellowship"^^ the Democrats renominated
Clark for

Speaker and Underwood for Majority Leader.

Thomas Bell of Georgia was

appointed Whip, the first time the post had been officially filled
since 1908.
In 1915 Clark was unanimously nominated for Speaker by the caucus

but Underwood had been elected to the Senate.

The leading contender

for Majority Leader was Claude Kitchin of North Carolina, the second
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Dunn, II, 148.
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NYT, Mar. 6, 1913, p. 2.

ranking Democrat on Ways and Means
during the last session and
one of
the few House Democrats who still
retained close ties to Bryan.
As

Majority Leader, Underwood had probably
been the person most responsible for passing Wilson's New Freedom
legislation in the House, but
Kitchin had followed a much more independent
course of the administration.

Compared with Wilson, Kitchin was "too
much of a free trader,

too much of an agrarian, and too
anti-militaristic."^^

Publications

such as the Saturday Evening Post began
speculating that the adminis-

tration would fight Kitchin's election.

Although the White House im-

mediately denied the story-Joseph Tumulty,
Wilson's secretary, labeled
the rumor "'a lie which had no foundation
in fact,'"^^ the New York
Times_ reported that a movement was brewing to
make Finis Garrett of

Tennessee the Majority Leader, with administration
backing.
gossip died when Garrett refused to run.^^

The

At the caucus Kitchin was

unanimously elected.
Bell was not reappointed Whip.

He had not played a prominent

role in the last Congress when he had been overshadowed by Underwood,

who used the binding caucus to marshal Democratic votes, and Wilson,

who sometimes went to the Capitol to do his own lobbying and arm.

.

twisting.
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No one was named to replace Bell and the office remained

^Alex M. Arnett C laude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1937), p. 42.
,
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,

Arthur _S. Link, Wilson
Confusions and Crises 1915 - 1916
(Princeton, N.J.
Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 34; Arnett,
pp. 43 and 46.
;

,
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:

^^NYT, Dec. 20, 1914, II, p. 1.
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James M. Leake, "Four Years of Congress," American Political
Science Review, XI (May 1917), p. 262.
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vacant until 1921.
As Wilson became more concerned with
military preparedness,
tension began to mount between Kitchin
and the administration.

In

a letter to Victor Murdock, the
former Republican Progressive Con-

gressman from Kansas, Kitchin confided his
'"many misgivings as to
the success of my leadership in the coming
Congress. "^^
'

In February,

.1916, one year after Kitchin's election, rumors
appeared in the press

that Kitchin might be forced out as Majority
Leader if he did not be-

come more congenial to the administration's
military policy,

men

Wilson let his militant Secretary of War Lindley
Garrison resign, the

New York Times believed a compromise was underway
between the administration and the House leadership.

The administration had gotten rid

of Garrison so now it was Kitchin's turn "to fall in
line or step
,,70

aside."

Kitchin, however, stood fast and no concrete steps were

taken to oust him.

The 1916 election deadlocked the House of Representatives with
five independents holding the balance of power between the Democrats

and Republicans.

With the Democrats fighting to retain control of

the House, there was little time for intra-party conflict.

Despite

the tension between Kitchin and the Wilson administration, Clark and

Kitchin were unanimously re-elected at the caucus.

Arnett, p. 69.
'ibid., p. 88.
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In April, 1917. the differences
between Kltchln and the administration intensified when Kitchin
voted against declaring war
on Germany.

Wdiately

after Kitchen spoke in opposition
to the war resolution,

Thomas Heflin of Alabama rose to
the floor of the House to
demand
Kitchin 's resignation as Majority
Leader. Newspaper editorials
began

anticipating or calling for Kitchin's
removal but House Democrats
seemed reluctant to act.

One or two members tried to convene
the

caucus to replace Kitchin but the move
found little support.

The

caucus never met.^^

Kitchin's hostility to the war became a
serious problem for Wilson.
Clark was not a strong leader and without
a Whip the chore of lining up
votes on key bills fell to the Majority
Leader.

When Kitchin objected"

to an administration measure, he would
turn the floor leadership over
to a Democrat friendly to the legislation
and oppose the bill as an

individual Congressman rather than as Majority Leader.

But this con-

cession did not really minimize the dilemma of keeping
track of waver-

mg
.

Democrats.
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Furthermore, Tumulty recognized that Kitchin was becoming
a lia-

bility for the party, especially in the East and West.

In these regions

Kitchin was unpopular because of his role as Chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee in levying the heavy wartime taxes.

In the East the

excess profit taxes hit hardest whereas in the West wheat had to be

71

Arnett, pp. 236-268.

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

71-72 and 178.

"
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sold under a price set by Congress.

The price of cotton, however,

operated without restraint because Southern
Democrats had blocked
the legislation designed to hold down cotton
prices.

"Kitchinism,

much like Cannonism in 1910, was shaping up
as an important campaign
issue.

Eastern Republican newspapers hammered away at
the theme that

another Democratic victory would mean that Kitchin
would continue as
the Ways and Means Chairman and Majority Leader
since he would certain

ly be returned by his constituents.'^^

Among the Wilson manuscripts is an "unsigned memorandum
'Analysis
of Democrats in the 65th Congress . '"^^

Wilson wanted to replace

Kitchin and Clark, who Wilson thought acted as Kitchin 's
"unfailing
ally,"

and asked one of his advisers to undertake the above
report.

The conclusion was that it was "'hopeless'" to locate new leadership

because "the few able northern Democrats were no match for the experienced Southerners as floor managers or debaters. "^^

Wilson abandoned

the idea of formally trying to replace Clark and Kitchin and instead
set up an informal liaison arrangement with Garner, who was on the

Ways and Means Committee and who had been recoinmended to the President by Postmaster General Burleson, also from Texas.

Beginning in

mid -April, 1917, Garner met confidentially with Wilson twice each
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week,

but Garner never f orally
supplanted Kitchin as Majority
Leader
and the leadership impasse continued
to the end of the 65th
Congress.
^^SEiaiZ 2l the 1911 to

191_9

Contests

Con^ared with rapid turnover of the
minority years, the Democratic
leadership was much more stable between
1911 and 1919.
Clark served
the full eight years as Speaker and there
were only two Majority
•Leaders, Underwood and Kitchin, who each
served four years.

The of-

fice of Whip was vacant for six of the
eight years with Bell filling
the only two year term.

There were no leadership fights between 1911
and 1919 (see Table
7), which is a second contrast with the minority period.

Each time a

vacancy occurred-the Speakership in 1911 and the
Majority Leadership
in 1911 and 1915, a consensus choice emerged at a
very early stage.

In 1911 Clark was the clear frontrunner as soon as the
November elec-

tion results were tallied and all ideas of challenging his
advancement

had been dropped by the end of the month.

With Underwood no other nominee

was even suggested for Majority Leader in 1911 and in 1915 Kitchin was
the only candidate who actively sought the Majority Leadership.

The

speed and unequivocal manner in which Garret denied the hints that

he might enter the race against Kitchin raise the possibility that
the rumors about his candidacy did not originate with him but may have

been a trial balloon launched by the administration.

In addition.

^'^Timmons, pp. 28-83; Marquis James, Mr. Garner of Texas
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1939), p. 72.
,

,
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TABLE

7

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION,
1911-1919

Speaker

Year
1911

1913

1915

1917

Status of Post

Vacant

What Happened

Outcome

No contest--Minority
Leader agreed upon at
early date.

No vacancy

No contest

No vacancy

No contest

No vacancy

No contest

Clark
elected

Clark reelected

Clark reelected
Clark reelected

Majority Leader

—

1911

Vacant

No contest consensus
choice quickly emerged

Underwood
elected

1913

No vacancy

No contest

Underwood reelected

1915

Vacant

No contest only one
candidate despite gossip
that the administration was
looking for an alternative.

Kitchen
elected

1917

No vacancy

No contest

Kitchin reelected

—

^

Whip
1911

Vacant

No appointment

Left vacant

Clark appoints first
Majority Whip

Bell named

No appointment

Left vacant

No appointment

Left vacant

(No Whip since
1908)

1913

Vacant

1915

Vacant
(Btll not renamed)

1917

Vacant
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no revolts were threatened or
organized against the leadership.

P^"^^

°f succession seeins to have
been slowly evolving for
the speakership. Although
Clark's experience as Minority
Leader ..de
him the most logical candidate for
Speaker, nobody argued that
Clark':'s

H--rr^

previous service entitled him to the
Speakership or that he should b.
promoted. Clark's election may have had
the effect of strengthening
the precedent set by Crisp of moving
up to the Speakership from the

Minority Leadership in 1891.

Crisp won the Speakership only after
a

wild battle that included trading the
Chairmanship of the Ways and
Means Comraittee for a bloc of votes at a
crucial stage in the caucus

balloting whereas Clark's elevation was easy
and harmonious
-

With the Majority Leader, the Democrats seemed
to have had a firmer

set of expectations about the succession between
1911 and 1919.

Tra-

ditionally, the chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee had concur-

rently served as floor leader in both parties because
of the critical
in^ortance of the tariff in an era without an income tax.

The posts

had been officially separated at the turn of the century
but the close

connection between the two jobs remained.

As has been stressed

earlier, the ranking Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee
in the

minority years did not automatically advance to the Minority Leadership, but during the majority years the senior Democrat on the commit-

tee did regularly move up to the Majority Leadership.

Clark, I, 273.

Underwood
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progressed from being the second ranking
Democrat on Ways and Means
to Chairman and Majority Leader.

When he retired, Kitchin, the second

ranking Denocrat on Ways and Means, also
became Chairman and Majority
Leader.

.

A final contrast between the periods
tration in leadership selection.

is the role of the adminis-

As a minority party, there were only

a few isolated examples of minor outside
interference-Senator Vest's

defense of Bailey in 1898 is typical.

There is no evidence that

Cleveland intervened during the last two years of his
Presidency or
that Bryan participated in the leadership fights
although he frequently

skirmished with House Democrats over legislation.

Following Under-

wood's retirement Wilson seems to have repeatedly wanted
to restrict

Kitchin 's influence although he was never able to rally much support
from rank-and-file Democrats or find a strong opponent.

Cleveland'

also is reported to have intervened in House leadership disputes
when
the Democrats were the majority party.

In 1893 Cleveland supposedly

warned Speaker Crisp to replace the chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee or face an opponent endorsed by the administration.

Although

Clark, who relates this story, tends to minimize Cleveland's influence,
it is worth noting that Crisp did change the chairman of the Ways and

Means Committee and was re-elected Speaker without opposition.

Analysis of the
Majority - minority status

Ibid., 327.

.

Variab!' es

,

79

1911- 1919

Majority status is clearly associated
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with the absence of leadership
conflict between 1911 and
1919.

The

size of the inajority was not
inrportant since the DenK^crats
organized
the House with a bare plurality
in 1917 and had a lopsided
margin in
1913.

The length of time as the inajority
party also was not relevant.

Election trends.

There is no correlation between
the lack of

fights and the election returns during
the majority interlude.

As

Table 8 shows, in 1911 the Democratic
share of House seats jumped

nearly 15 percentage points from 43.8
per cent in 1909 to 58.2 per
cent in 1911; in 1913, the Democratic
margin increased to 66.4 per
cent; in 1915, the downward slide to
minority status began as the

TABLE 8

DEMOCRATIC ELECTION RESULTS, 1911-1919

Year

# of House Seats

Change from Previous Election

.

% of Democratic
Seats When House
Met

1911

228

+56

58.2

1913

291

+63*

66.4

1915

230

-61

52.4

1917

216

-14

49.0

*
When the 1913 figures are adjusted to compensate for the
rapid growth of the House, then the Democratic pick up,
based on the 1909 House size, would amount to only 33
seats.
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DenK^cratic proportion of seats
fell to 52.4 per cent and
in 1917

sloped further

to 49.0 per cent.

Despite the large shifts in
seats,

no contests occurred either
when the lar.e gains of 1911
opened up the
Speakership and the Majority Leadership
(as one would expect from
the

pattern in the Democratic minority
years) or when the major off-year
losses of 1915 coincided with the
Majority Leader vacancy created by

Unden^od's election to the Senate

(as one would predict from the
Re-

publican example between 1955 and
1966).

Membership Change.
,

The proportion of new members is
lower through

out the 1911 to 1919 period than in
any Congress in which a contest

developed during the minority era.

As Table 9 indicates, in 1911 and

1913 new members composed 35.2 per cent and
35.0 per cent of the Demo-

cratic membership in the House, figures just
sligiitly below the 37.0
per cent level characteristic of the contest
years between 1895 and
1911.

The low membership change of 1915 and 1917 is
similar to the

turnover for the stable years between 1895 and 1911.
TABLE

MEMBERSHIP

Year

CHAInIGE

9

IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1911-1919

% New Members

% Incumbents

1911

35.2

64.8

1913

35.0

65.0

1915

16.2

83.8

1917

18.8

81.2
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Hierarchy,

when the aggregate figures for
freshman members for

1895 to 1911 are compared with those for
1911 to 1919 (see Table 10),
the proportion of freshman within the
Democratic party dropped during
the majority interval.

These findings would seem to support
the hy-

pothesis that conflict is more likely with
a large freshnian class.

TABLE 10

COMPARISON OF FRESHMEN MEMBERS IN
DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1895 - 1911

1895 to 1911

1911 to 1919

% Freshmen
average
range

30.2%
54.8 to 14.6%

24.2%
33.2 to 15.0%

However, when the data from the individual Congresses between 1911 and
1919 are examined, the level of freshmen in both 1911 and 1913 was over
30 per cent, which is the figure that in the earlier period had con-

sistently been identified with leadership conflict.

In 1915 and 1917

the proportion of freshmen (see Table 11) is low, just as in the Con-

gresses with no leadership fights between 1895 and 1911.

Thus, in the

majority years leadership stability occurred regardless of the size of
the 'reshman class.

The number of Democrats with at least ten years experience was
rising, as Table 11 illustrates.

This growing body of senior members
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TABLE 11

SENIORITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY,
1911-1919

Year

7o

1911

Freshmen

33.0

17.6

1913

33.2

15.5

1915

15.4

20.2

1917

15.0

24.4

tends to correlate with the leadership stability
evident between 1911
and 1919.

For instance, the average number of senior Deicocrats
between

1911 and 1919 was 19.4 per cent; for the stable years between
1895 and
1911 13.3 per cent; and for the contest years in the identical
tine

span 10.9 per cent.

Moreover, the figures for individual Congresses

indicate that the proportion of senior Democrats in 1915 and 1917 was

higher than in any minority Congress and that the 1911 and 1913 percentages were higher than for any of the contested years between 1895
and 1911 except 1907.

Regional factionalism

.

Table 12 shows that in contrast to the

minority years the South never held a majority of the seats between
1911 and 1919 although the South remained the dominant regional faction
in 1915 and 1917.

Unlike the minority phase where conflict developed

80 per cent of the time the Northern share of seats was expanding, no

contests were fought in 1911 or 1913 even though the Northern wing of

party was sharply increasing in size.
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TABLE 12

REGIONALISM WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC
PARTY, 1911-1919

Year

% from South

1911
1913
1915
1917

% from Border States

% from North

41.9

15.0

43.2

34.6

13.1

52.2

43.0

16.7

40.3

46.9

16.9

36.2

Although regionalism showed no important
relation to leadership
stability in this period, the regional distribution
of senior members

may be of significance in understanding the
process of leadership
selection.

As Table 13 indicates, Democrats with ten or
more years

of experience overvzhelmingly came from the South.

Only a handful of

the members with the longest service were Northerners.

In 1911 all

four senior Northerners were from New York and three of
these Con-

gressmen—John Fitzgerald, Henry Goldfogle, and George Lindsay- -had
deserted the binding caucus decision on rules reform in 1909 to side

with Cannon.

Afterwards, this trio had been among those threatened

with discipline by the caucus.

Of the Northern senior representatives

only Sulzer had remained loyal to the party in the 1909 fracas, but by
1912 he had resigned from the House to become Governor of New York.
In 1913 two of the three Northerners were again 1909 bolters from New

York and the third was Henry Rainey of Illinois, who during the New
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TABLE 13

SENIOR DEMOCRATS CLASSIFIED BY REGION,
1911-1919

Year

# of Senior

# from South

# from Border
States

Democra ^ q
1911

40

1913

46

1915

46

1917

52

# from North

31

5

4

36

7

3

34

7

5

30

12

10

Deal would become the first Northern Democrat
to be elected Speaker in
over fifty years.
include a

fev;

By 1915 and 1917 the Northern contingent
began to

more Midwesterners among its senior members.

These data

illustrate why Wilson had difficulty locating suitable
Northern leadership to challenge Clark and Kitchin.

In 1913 when the Northern faction

obviously had the votes to make a change in the leadership, the
Northern
membership in the House, still reflecting the party's long minority
status, was young with most of its senior people ideologically out
of

step with the rest of the party.

In 1915 and 1917 when the Northerners

began to produce a larger pool of potential leaders, the South had reverted to its dominant position in the House.
Ideological Factions

.

In ideological terms the Democrats were a

hodgepodge of contrasting groups.

James >IacGregor Burns has described

them as "a patchwork of old Cleveland Democrats, urban bosses, Bryan
Populists, conservative Southerners, /and/ urban middle-class
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progressives."

80

m

1911 this jumble of factions
produced a liberal

or refonn-oriented majority
that clashed with the
conservatives as
soon as the Democrats began
to organize the House.
The reformers op-

posed placing any conservative
Democrat on the Ways and Means
Committee
or as committee chairmen.
Robert Broussard of Louisiana was
forced

off the Ways and Means Committee
because he had voted too often
with
the Republicans; Edward Pou of
North Carolina was pushed aside for

Kitchin because he was not enough of a
free trader.

Fitzgerald of

New York, slated to become Chairman of
the Appropriations Committee,
was opposed because he had helped
Cannon in the struggle over rules

reform in the previous Congress.

Fitzgerald decided to fight.

Knowing
"

he was outnumbered if he fought along
ideological lines, he sought to
turn the issue into a regional one in
order to rally his fellow

Northerners.
chairmen.

Only three Northern Democrats stood to become
committee

With the reshuffling of committee members, Sulzer
of New

York had been denied the Chairmanship of Military
Affairs and had been

given Foreign Affairs instead.

Fitzgerald argued

You have deposed one northern Democrat, Sulzer, from
his rights in order to give his place to a southerner.
Now, if you want to, go ahead and take the only important chairmanship that goes to a northern Democrat
and give it to a southerner. You won't get away with
it without a fight in caucus and another on the floor
of the House. And I'm not sure you'll be able to
organize the House after the fight is made.^^

80 James

MacGregor Burns The Deadlock of Democracy
Four - Party
Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
,

,

1963), p. 131.
81
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Barfield, pp. 275-76.
Dunn, II, 150-51.

:
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The outcome was that Fitzgerald
assumed the chair^nship of
a carefully
stacked coH^ittee. The Democrats'
deep cleavages flared on
other
issues, too, such as child labor,
merchant marine legislation,
Panama
canal shipping tolls, and campaign
publicity restrictions .^^ Nevertheless, despite these divisions.
Underwood used the binding caucus
to

meld these disparate factions into
an exceptionally unified voting
bloc
that built a progressive record on
tariff reform between 1911 and
1913
and passed the New Freedom legislation
between 1913 and 1915.

After 1915 the Democrats' remarkable
solidarity began to crumble.
Since Kitchin opposed much of Wilson's
military program, he did not use
the caucus to build a consensus.

Even on domestic matters as the focus

shifted from reforms long advocated by the
Bryanite and agrarian wing
of the party to urban industrial problems
the party's factions began
84
to reappear on roll call votes.
The movement from unusually high

voting cohesion to greater heterogeneity was not
associated with leadership conflict as was usually the case during the
minority period.

Congruence.

In terms of region, the leadership did not reflect
the

North's growing numbers, but it also should be stressed
that the North

held a majority of the seats only in 1913; in 1911 there
were more Con-

gressmen from the North than from any other section but the South and
Border States together accounted for 56.8 per cent of the representatives;
in 1915 and 1917 the South was the largest region and when combined
with

the Border Suates held 59.7 and 63.8 per cent of the seats respectively.

^^Silbert, p. 296; Ripley, pp. 97-98.
^'^ipley, pp. 42 and 95-98; Burns, pp. 143-45.
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Thus, the leadership, while not
responsive to short-term changes
in the
party's membership, did reflect the
strongest and most stal^le regional
groups within the party over the long
haul.

With ideology it is harder to judge
whether the leaders reflect
the rank and file because most
academicians have concentrated on the

gulf between Wilson and the House leaders
rather than on the degree of

congruence between the hierarchy and membership
in the House.

Clark

probably stood in the middle of the House
membership whereas Underwood,
although a conservative, should not be lumped
with the standpat Republi
can leadership.

For instance, during the 62nd Congress he
compiled an

impressive reform record by voting for the establishment
of the

Children's Bureau, for workmen's compensation for
railroad employees,
and for the Clayton Ant i- In junction Act. 85

real question marks.

Kitchin and Bell are the

Kitchin 's opposition to the war and his leader-

ship of the pacifist band in the party, which consisted of
some "thirty

odd Democratic representatives from rural districts in the
South and

West--inheritors of Populist traditions and prejudices and followers
.

of

.

.

.

record.

Bryan,"
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may distort the public image of the rest of his

Only a detailed roll call voting study that pays special at-

tention to domestic legislation will reveal whether Kitchin was as out
of step with the party membership as he was with the President.

As for

Bell there is no information available about his ideological ties.
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Anne Firor Scott, "A Progressive Wind from the South," Journal
of Southern History XXIX (February, 1963), p. 68.
,

^ink, Wilson:

Confusion and Crises, 1915-1916,

p.

28.
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Sungnary of the Variables

Aside from majority status and to

.

1911 -1919

a limited extent more
senior

members, there is no clear pattern that
characterizes the four stable

Congresses between 1911 and 1919.

Based on the pattern from the

minority years, one would expect a
contest in two of the Congresses
in this period,

m

1911 and 1913 the Democrats had won
significant

victories, had a large body of new members
and freshmen, and had

become more Northern and reform oriented
in composition.

Yet no

fight was organized even though the North was
excluded from the
leadership.
stability.

There are at least two plausible explanations
for this
As noted earlier, there were few Northerners
eligible for

a leadership post, but perhaps the better
explanation is that idealog-"

ically there was no reason to rebel against Clark and
Underwood's
leadership, which had been effective and progressive.

The cleavage

between the House leaders on one side and the administration
and the

Northern wing of the party on the other side developed over Wilson's
foreign policy and the war.

By the time the Northern Wilsonians

strenuously objected to the House leadership, the South and the Border
States had the votes to dominate the caucus so no change was possible.

Leadership Contests

,

1919 to 1931

The 1918 election results gave the Republicans a comfortable majority in the House of Representatives and returned the Democrats to

minority status.

Shortly after the election Kitchin announced that

Clark would be the Minority Leader while he (Kitchin) would remain on
the Ways and Means Committee as the ranking Democrat.

The purpose of

Kitchin's early statement was to
forestall gossip that he would
be
unwilling to step down as floor leader
and would instead challenge
Clark for the post.
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*

Administration loyalists, however, had other
ideas about the House
leadership. For months Northern
Congressmen had been chaffing about
the South -s domination of the party.

Tumulty was also concerned that

the leadership of the party was reverting
to the South and wanted "to

remedy the situation" before the 1920
election "by bolstering the Democratic organization with Northern Wilsonians,
by taking the President
to the hustings, and by removing Clark and
Kitchin from leadership in
88
Congress."
By January, 1919, even Wilson was believed ready
to cur-

tail Southern influence in his administration by
restricting the number
of future Southern appointments.

89

In March, 1919, the rumblings of discontented Democrats
became

more specific.

A group of eighteen House Democrats, generally thought

to be loyal to Wilson, formed a reorganization committee.

The re-

organization committee, composed mostly of Northerners, called for the
establishment of a steering committee representative of all sections
in the country.

The most controversial aspect of the plan was that

the chairman of the steering committee, who would be elected by the

committee, .would be the Democratic floor leader.

In other words, the

Minority Leader would no longer be elected by the membership at large

^^NYT, Nov. 13, 1918, p. 5.
88

Blum, p. 168, for both quotations in paragraph.

^^NYT, Jan. 27, 1919, p. 8.

but by the representatives on
the steering coBn^ittee.

The real goal
of the reorganization conimittee
was to depose Clark as the
Democratic
leader and to replace him with Rainey
of Illinois', who was close
to

both Wilson and Bryan and the second
ranking Democrat on Ways and

Means.

It was widely believed in the
party and the press that the

concept of a steering committee was a
device to broaden the insurgents'

base of support beyond those who wanted
to oust Clark because of his
reputed opposition to the League of Nations
in its original form and
nis past opposition to the draft. 90

,

.

Clark and his friends were not fooled by the
smokescreen of a

steering committee and attacked the reorganization
committee for trying to undermine Clark's national reputation.

There may be a grain

of truth to this charge because the reorganization
committee appeared

one week after Clark announced that he would be
willing to accept the

Democratic Presidential nomination in 1920.

Clark's camp also argued

that Clark deserved to be the Minority Leader because of
his seniority
or what they called seniority succession.

After two days of recruiting, Jared Sanders of Louisiana, the
chairman of the reorganization committee, said that sixty- four out of
the eighty-seven Democrats needed to control the caucus had joined the

movement to create a steering committee but denied that there was any
agreement to install Rainey as the next Minority Leader.

Cordell Hull

of Tennessee was also reported to be under consideration as the steering committee chairman.
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Ibid
Mar. 5, 1919, p. 9; Mar. 10, 1919, p. 2; Richard Boiling,
Power in the House
A History of the Leadership of the House of Repre sentatives
(New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1968), p. 99.
.

,

:

,
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The reorganization committee had strong
ties to several cabinet
officers, especially Postmaster General
Burleson.
edge Burleson as the chief instigator.

Both sides acknowl-

Secretary of Labor William

Wilson and Attorney General A. M. Palmer
also participated.

Josephus

Daniels, the Secretary of Navy, was believed
ready to become involved
if his influence was needed.

Burleson's support was considered es-

sential because of the lack of enthusiasm for
a steering committee in
the Texas, Georgia, and Alabama delegations,
which were large and in-

fluential in the Democratic caucus.

The dissidents hoped that

Burleson would be able to convince a sizeable portion
of the Texas

delegation to back the idea.
During the latter half of March, 1919, the reorganizers seemed
to be picking up votes, despite Clark's estimate of only
twenty-five

likely insurgents.

Asbury Lever of South Carolina sided with the re-

organization committee because he thought the Minority Leader must
support the President.

Richard Whaley also of South Carolina en-

dorsed the steering committee and attacked Clark for giving comfort
to the Republican party by not fully supporting the President.

Rainey

said a pro-administration Minority Leader was needed and that a steering committee could help offset the identification of the Democratic

party with the South.

^•'•NYT,

92

Mar. 5, 1919, p. 9; Mar. 7, 1919, p. 12; Mar. 10, 1919, p. 22

Mar. 17, 1919, p. 15; Mar. 19, 1919, p. 10; Mar. 21, 1919,
1919, p. 7; Robert A. Waller, "Congressman Henry T.
Rainey of Illinois: His Rise to the Speakership, 1903-1934," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Illinois, 1963), p. 205.

^^Ibid.

p.

12; Mar.

,

31,
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But by May, 1919, it was clear
that Wilson would have to exert

pressure to defeat Clark.

This pressure was not forthcoming.

As

much as Tumulty would have liked to
change leaders in the House, he
recognized that a fight would be futile.
In the last election the

Northern wing of the party
the South

.had lost

heavily to the Republicans while

strength had reniained intact.

's

to beat Clark were simply not there.

Tumulty knew that the votes

when James McClintic of Okla-

homa, the secretary of the reorganization
committee, "requested

Tumulty to help

.

.

.

prevent the election of Clark as minority

leader" the "request was ignored"^^ and the fight
collapsed.

At

the caucus Clark was unanimously re-elected.

For Congressional Democrats, the Harding landslide
was disastrous.

In the party's worst defeat since 1894, only 131 Democrats
won

election to the House.

Even Clark lost his seat.

In this atmosphere

Kitchin quickly emerged as the consensus choice for the new Minority
Leader and was unanimously elected to the leadership post.

Kitchin

announced that Garrett of Tennessee would do "most of the floor work"^^
for the Democratic side and that William Oldfield of Arkansas would be

the Whip, the first one appointed since 1913.

During the session, Kitchin became seriously ill and had to leave

Washington to recuperate.

Before going, he called a special caucus

^^Blum, p. 187.
94

Ibid
95

NYT

,

.

,

p.

304.

Apr. 10, 1921, p. 20,

78

to appoint Garrett acting Minority
Leader in his absence.

This move

greatly upset Garner, who had expected
to get the nod because he
was
the second ranking Democrat on Ways
and Means, directly behind
Kitchin.

Garner's biographers attribute Garrett's
selection to

Kitchin's resentment over the role Garner
played during World War
as Wilson's liaison.

I

Another reason is that Kitchin was bothered

that the Democrats were drifting with the
conservative tide of the

Harding era.

Kitchin tried to unite the Democrats behind a
low tariff

position as a means of opposing Harding's first
revenue bill, but had
failed because Garner convinced a majority of the
Democrats on the

Ways and Means Committee to adopt the Republicans'
protectionist
stance.

Since Garrett was more of a free trader than Garner,
policy

considerations may also have entered into Kitchin's decision to
name
96
Garrett.

Following the Democrats' comeback in the 1922 election, there
were reports that the Democrats would replace Kitchin, who was
critically ill, with Garrett.

A few days later the news stories were

predicting that Kitchin would retire and that a lively contest was
shaping up between Garrett and Garner, but two days later Kitchin

announced he planned to continue as Minority Leader.

Despite the

uncertainty surrounding Kitchin, Garner decided to press ahead with
his campaign for Minority Leader.

His strategy was to line up the

new members by promising them good commitcee assignments.

(Garner

by virtue of his position on the Ways and Means Committee was on the

Timraons, pp.

87-88; Arnett, pp. 298-99.
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Co^nittee on Co^ittees.)

After a spurt of letter writing,
Garner's

allies claimed to be finding
support in all sections of
the country.^^
At this stage Garrett was not
pursuing votes as actively or
as
publicly as Garner. He was not
without friends, however, as
both
Hull, the Democratic National
Chair^n and newly re-elected
Congressfrom Tennessee, and Arthur Rouse
of Kentucky were ready to
begin
campaigning for him whenever he wanted.
After Kitchin's death in
May, 1923, Garrett became the
frontrunner in the contest. Arguments
made in Garrett's behalf were
1) that he was entitled to the
job be-

cause of his service as acting
Minority Leader; 2) he was the Democrats' ablest parliamentarian; and
3) he voted more regularly with

the party than Garner.

Garner, in turn, tried to rebut the
idea

that Garrett ought to be promoted because
he was the acting Minority

Leader by stressing his own legitimate claim
on the office.

He

•

argued that he should be the successor because
he was now the ranking

Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee.

Garrett replied that his

o\m position as ranking Democrat on the Rules
Committee carried
greater weight.
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When Garner saw that he could not win, he pulled out of
the race
by saying.
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NYT. Nov. 9, 1922, p. 2; Nov. 12, 1922,
p. 3; Nov. 14, 1922,
Jan.
p. 4;
9, 1923, p. 3; Tom Connolly, My Name is Tom Connolly
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Co., 1954), p. 139.
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James, p. 100; Boiling,

p.

147.
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In the interest of party
harmony, I do not expect
to become a candidate
for the minority floor
leadership in the Sixty-Eighty
Congress. loS

Even after his later triumphs.
Garner felt bitter about
Kitchin's decision to appoint Garrett acting
Minority Leader. He remained
convinced that Kitchin's action
had cost him the Minority
Leadership in
1923.
In his opinion, the only way
he could have circumvented
Kitchin's succession design would
have been to push the contest
to
a

caucus vote.

Garner thought an open fight
would have been too costly
to his long range leadership
ambitions for he would have
gained the
enmity of the Garrett faction, but
by helping restore harmony
he won
over Garrett's allies for a future
bid. At a harmonious caucus

Garrett was elected Minority Leader
and Oldfield was re-appointed
Whip.
In 1925 and 1927 the Democrats
again unanimously elected Garrett,

and Oldfield continued as Whip.

During this time span there were no

public signs of leadership discord although
in private Garner's
friends were urging him to challenge
Garrett.
no move.

Garner, however, made

"He had felt that Garrett would eventually
seek the Tennessee

Senatorship and he preferred to wait for that
instead of causing a
breach in the Democratic ranks. "^^^

During the summer of 1927 Garrett

announced that at the end of his term he would
retire from the House
to run for the Senate.

Speculation immediately focused on Garner as

the prime contender for the Minority Leadership,
but nothing was

definite since the election was over twenty months away.

Tiinmons, p.

102.
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In December, 1928, Oldfield
died and was replaced as
Whip by
John C. Box of Texas, whose
appointment was understood to
be an interi. one. The reasoning was
that Garner would be chosen
Minority

Leader at the start of the next
Congress and that it would be
inappropriate for the two party leaders
to come from the same
state.
In an unusual departure, Garrett
named John McDuffie of Alabama
assistant Whip, a new post.''"^^
In March, 1929, Garner was elected
Minority Leader.

real opponent.

Garrett"

He had no

Rainey "had maneuvered to be in a
position to succeed

103

but there is no evidence that he
took any concrete steps

to line up votes besides writing
to Garrett.

When Rainey realized

that he could not "successfully dispute
John Garner's claim to the
104
post,"
he dropped any idea of engaging in a
contest.
Garner pro-

moted McDuffie to

W-hip

but declined to appoint another
assistant Whip

Summa ry of the 1919 to 1931 Contests

Between 1919 and 1931 the Democrats again had
a high rate of
leadership turnover, just as in the earlier minority
period.

Four

different men served as Minority Leader--Glark from
1919 to 1921,

Kitchin from 1921 to 1923, Garrett from 1923 to
1929, and Garner from
1929 to 1931.

Serving as Whip were Oldfield for seven years, Box
for

three months, and McDuffie for two years.
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The numerous vacancies

NYT, July 8, 1927, p. 7; Dec. 4, 1928, p. 4.

^°\aller,
Ibid

p.

326,
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in the 1920

were „uch .ore Ukely to resuU
fro. election defeats
or deaths than from leaders
voluntarily relinquishing their
offices
for a job outside the House
as in the 1895 to 1911 era.

Only

Garrett followed the
cne older
^-p
oioer ^rar^^^^,^„
tradition of
resigning as Minority Leader
to run for the Senate.
In contrast to the peaceful
leadership changes of the majority

interval, the Democrats twice waged
contests over the Minority

Leadership between 1919 and 1931.

(See Table 14 for a suinmary.)

In 1919 the Wilsonians tried to
prevent Clark from assuming the

Minority Leadership and in 1923 Garrett
and Garner dueled over the
opening.

Although the competition is reminiscent
of the conflict

of the previous minority years, the
fights did not occur as often"

(two

in this twelve year span as compared
with four in the earlier

sixteen year phase) and lacked the wide open,
free-for-all style of
Some of the previous contests.

For example, the 1919 and 1923 fights

were settled before the caucus met and involved
only two contestants
whereas the leadership struggles between 1895 and
1911 had to a
large extent been ideological brawls that mobilized
the competing

wings of the party.

Although the 1919 fight is similar in that it

seems to be a last ditched effort by the Wilsonians to
wrest control
of the Congressional leadership, the 1923 contest seems
to more of
a fight revolving around the personal ambitions of
the participants

than a real attempt to change the direction of the party.

The orderly set of steps to a top party leadership post that

characterizes the present day Democratic hierarchy was beginning to
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TABLE 14

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION,
1919-1931

'

Year
1919

1921

1923

1925

1927
1929

Minority Leader

status of Post

Vacant (Party
became Minority)

what Happened

Contest--Reorganization
Committee formed to prevent Speaker Clark from
assuming Minority
Leadership.

Outcome
Clark elected

Vacant (Clark
defeated in 1920
election)

No contest

Vacant (Kitchin
died)

Contest between Garner
and Garrett; Garner
withdrew before caucus

Garrett elected

No vacancy

No contest

Garrett re-elected

No vacancy

No contest

Garrett re-elected

Vacant (Garrett
retired to run
for Senate)

No contest

Garner elected

Kitchin elected

Whip
1919

Vacant (No Whip
named since 1913

No appointment

Left vacant

1921

Vacant

Kitchin appoints first
Whip since 1913-1915.

Oldfield named

1923

No vacancy

Status quo

Oldfield renamed

1925

No vacancy

Status quo

Oldfield renamed

1927

No vacancy

Status quo

Oldfield renamed

1928

Vacancy (Oldfield died)

Garrett makes interim
appointment; also
names assistant Whip

Box named Whip;
McDuffie named
Assistant Wliip

1929

Vacancy (Box
interim appointment )

Garner appoints

McDuffie named

V/hip
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to take shape in the
1920's.

Clarlc was succeeded by
Kitchin, who,

as the former Majority Leader,
was the next highest ranking
Democrat
in the party leadership
hierarchy. He, in turn, was
followed by

Garrett, who had served as
Kitchin 's floor leader although
with no
formal title and had then been
designated acting Minority Leader.
Only Gamer's elevation does not
fit the pattern since he had
held
no party post independent of an
influential committee assignment

before his election.

Another difference with the present
arrange-

ment is that the Whip still had not
been built into the ladder.

Further evidence that leadership change
in the Democratic party
was becoming more routinized is that
for the first time candidates

began to contend that they had a special
right to an office or were

an heir apparent..

Clark's claim to the Minority Leadership
in 1919

was a solid one based not only on his
long and continuous tenure as
the senior party leader dating back to 1908
but was also bolstered

by the Carlisle and Crisp precedents.

Garner and Garrett's arguments

were much more tenuous since Garrett had only been
briefly co-opted
into the leadership hierarchy and Garner wanted
to expand the link

between the Majority Leader and the Chairman of the
Ways and Means
Committee to apply to the minority years as well.

A final indication that change was becoming more bureaucratized
with boundaries defining who was eligible to be a candidate

is that

contestants seem to have been drawn from a much narrower stratum in
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the party than before.

Between 1919 and 1931 only
„e:^ers on the

Rules or Ways and Means
Co™„ittees and with twenty
years service In
the House ran for Minority
Leader. Ko longer were
young representatives with service lifted
to „inor co^ittees
becoming candidates
or rising quickly to the
top rungs of the leadership
Udder as Bailey
had been able to do in 1897.

The shift to minority status
did not stop members of
the Wilson
administration from intervening in
House contests. Burleson and
possibly Tumulty initiated or at
least encouraged the formation
of the

reorganization committee and then when
the votes could not be produced Tumulty halted the
pro-administration forces by refusing to
intercede further himself or to pull
Wilson directly into the fray.

After the Republicans recaptured the
White House, there is no evidence of pressure being exerted by
outside sources on leadership
selection in the House.

The only possible exception is Hull's
ef-

forts to round up votes for Garrett in
1923 when he was the Democratic

National Committee Chairman.

Hull, however, seems to have partici-

pated more as a returning Congressman or as
a state colleague of

Garrett's than in his role as the National
Committee Chairman.

Analysis of the Variables

.Majority-Minority status

.

,

1919 - 1931

Minority status again coincides with

contested leadership change in the Democratic party.

Unlike the 1895

to 1911 era, where the contests occurred fairly
regularly throughout

the period, the leadership fights of this time span clustered
at

the beginning of the minority interval.

In the first four years.
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two of the three Minority
Leadership vacancies were
contested, but
after 1923 the only opening
was settled peacefully
and no revolts
n^teriali^ed.

As for the size of the
minority party, there is
again
a tendency for fights to
beco.e .ore co™.on as the
party increased
its ranks.
As Table 15 shows, both
fights developed when the
Democrats controlled over 40 per
cent of
the seats.

TABLE 15

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND SIZE OF

% of Democratic Seats

PAPvTY,

1919-1931

# of Congresses

30 to 34.9

# of fights

1

35 to 39.9

1

40 to 44.9

3

45 to 49.9

1

^^^^^^'^^ trends.

The Democratic fights of 1919 and 1923
oc-

curred under contrasting conditions.

As Table 16 indicates, the 1923

clash conforms to the earlier Democratic
minority pattern of coming

after a victory but the 1919 battle developed
after the off-year
losses of 1918.

The Democrats lost twenty-six seats in
1918, which

is a slightly lower number than the thirty
to fifty seat losses

Peabody found associated with the Republican
upheavals of the 1950 's
and 1960 's, but the election represented a
significant defeat for
the Democrats since it pushed them into minority
status.
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TABLE 16

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND
ELECTION RESULTS, 1919-1931

Year

# of Seats Won

19JL9

Change from
Last Election

190

-26

% of Democratic
Seats

43.9

•

1921

131

1923

-59

205

1925

1929

1

+74

47.6

-22

41.8

195

+12

44.8

167

-28

37.5

183

1927

try

indicates a contest

Leadership stability during the 1920
's tended to follow election
downturns, just as between 1895 and
1911.

The relation is not perfect,

In 1927 no contest developed even though
the party's fortunes had
improved in the 1926 election.
twelve additional seats for a

However, the Democrats netted only
3

per cent gain, which was the smallest

change in the partisan division in the House
during the 1920

Membership change

.

's.

The dual set of characteristics for contest

years, apparent for election returns, was also
evident with membership

turnover.

The 1923 contest between Garrett and Garner, again
cor-

responding to the 1895 to 1911 Democratic mold, followed a
massive
influx of new members into the party.

As Table 17 shows, 46.3 per

cent of the Democrats in the House in 1923 had not served
in the
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TABLE 17

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND
MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1919-1931

^^^"^

New Members

1919

19.2

1921

20.6

1923
1925

1927

% Incumbents
80.1

79.4

46.3

53.7

10.4

89.6

14.4

85.5

9.8

90.2

1929

indicates a contest

itnnaediately preceding Congress
although many had been House membe
jers

before the Harding landslide took
its toll.

The 1919 contest deviates

from the Democratic model by occurring
in a year when the composition
of the House party was very stable
with an 80.1 per cent incumbency
rate.

Just as between 1895 and 1911, the four
Congresses in the

1920's without conflict underwent little membership
change, with

newcomers ranging from a low of 9.8 per cent in
1929 to a high of
20.6 per cent in 1921.
Hierarchy.

The 1923 fight strongly resembles the battles
between

1895 and 1911 as Table 18 illustrates because the proportion
of fresh-

men was also over 30 per cent.

The level of freshmen in 1919--17.8

per cent--is considerably lower than the 30.0 per cent
figure typical
of the other contests, but, nevertheless, is
higher than for any of
the Congresses without leadership conflict during
this twelve year period,
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TABLE 18

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AM) SENIORITY,
1919-1931
.

Year
/o

1919
1921

1923

Freshman

Seniors

17.8

24.1

16.8

24.4

35.3

19.8

9.3

27.5

11.8

31.3

9.2

39.3

1925

1927

7o

1929

indicates a contest

The 1919 and 1923 fights developed during those
Congresses with
the fewest senior members- -24.1 per cent in 1919
and 19.8 per cent
in 1923.

In the Congresses without conflict the body of
senior

members ranged from 24.4 per cent in 1921 to 39.3 per
cent in 1929.
One difference with the earlier minority years is that
between 1895
and 1911 each time the Democrats picked up seats the proportion
of

veterans decreased, but between 1919 and 1931, except for the 1922
election, the reservoir of senior representatives steadily increased

with each election regardless of whether the Democrats were winning
or losing.

After 1923 the groT

of senior members is dramatic.

Until 1915 freshmen had always OLitnumbered senior members, sometimes
by ratios of four to one and five to one, especially before the turn
of the century.

In 1915, for the first time, senior Democrats were
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.ore n^erous than freshmen,
although the difference was
not overwhelming. This trend lasted
until 1923 when freshmen
regained the
edge, but beginning with the
1924 election there is such a
sharp decline in freshmen and a steep
rise in seniors that veterans
exceeded
freshmen by three to one and four
to one mrgins between
1925 and

This major structural change
occurs simultaneously with and
may well contribute to the
leadership stability after
1923-the
1931.

longest period of stability in the
Democratic party during either

minority interval.
Regional factionalism.

As would be expected when the
Democrats

are in the minority, the South was
the dominant regional faction for
the entire twelve years.

.

The North ordinarily held one-fourth
to one-

third of the seats, except in 1921
when the Northern delegation shrank
to a tiny 15.3 per cent.

Both fights, as Table 19 shows, developed

when Northern strength was at its peak-34.8
per cent in 1923 and
33.0 per cent in 1919.

This pattern is somewhat different from the

earlier Democratic one.

Between 1895 and 1911 the contests tended

to occur when the Northern faction was gaining
seats whereas in this

time span the fights took place whenever the North
won at least 33 per
cent of the House seats rather than correlating with
shifts in the size
of regional groupings.

Ideological factions

.

Between 1919 and 1931 the Democrats were

an uneasy coalition of Southerners, urban machine products, western

Bryanites, and Easterners "of the Grover Cleveland type, conservative

91

TABLE 19

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND REGIONALISM,
1919-1931

Year

% from South

1919

% from Border Statej

51.8

1921

1923
1925

1927
1929

% from North

15.2

33.0

73.3

11.5

15.3

48.8

16.4

34.8

55.5

15.9

28.6

51.8

16.9

31.3

58.9

11.0

30.1

indicates a contest

and respectable. "^^5

At the beginning of the decade the majority
of

House Democrats were still faithful to the reform
tradition and fre-

quently combined with progressive Republicans
in a liberal alliance,
but by the late 1920'
of the Wilson years.

s

few traces remained of the crusading spirit
The transformation occurs after the 1924 elec-

tion defeat when older Congressional Democrats blamed
the loss on the

party's "flirtation with radicalism.

Also contributing to the

party's shift in philosophy was that "many of the newer urban

^^^John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy
Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 92.

,

1921 - 1923

•^^avid Burner, The Politics of Provincialism
Part^ in Transition
p.

161.

1918 1932
--

.

,

,

(New York:

The Democratic
(New York: Alfred A. KnopfTl968)
:
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Democrats had^no special attachment
to the principles of
the Republican
insurgents"
and were as conservative
as their rural
counterparts.

On roll call votes, the Democrats
were a moderately cohesive
party in the 1920's.

The ideological divisions
that did occur were

largely along regional lines with
Northern Congressmen more ready
to
dissent from the party's position
than Southerners
On foreign
policy, George L. Grassmuck has
found that most Southerners
were
hostile to foreign assistance and army
expenditures but modestly sup.

portive of naval spending.

Democrats from Border States and
Mid-

western agricultural areas were usually
allied with the Southerners
although rural Midwesterners took a more
isolationist stand on the
navy.

In contrast, Democrats from the
Northeast and the industrial-

ized Midwest (Ohio, Michigan, Indiana,
and Illinois) favored foreign

loans and money for both the army and the
navy.^'^^

On domestic leg-

islation, sectional lines with the South and
West combined against
the Northeast were most strongly drawn on
the Volstead Act, Muscle

Shoals, and the McNary-Haugen Farm Relief bill.^^^

with ideology

Ibid .

108^
Julius ^
Turner, Party and Constituency
Pressures on Congress
ed. by Edward V. Schneier, Jr., (Baltimore:
Johnr'nopk
~T9 51)
pp. 21 and 173.
:

,

109^
George L. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign
Policy, (B.Utimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951),
pp. 33, 36-37, 977 99, and
143-145.
Burner, p. 159.

'
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region Intertwined, it
i. probably true
that tbe 1919 and
1923
fiShts occurred .ben tbe
party's ideological
differences were widest
sxnce in tbese Congresses
tbe North's (and .ost
Northern Democrats
ca.e fro. New Vork. New
Jersey. Massachusetts,
Ohio, and Illinois)

strength was at its naxii^um
in this

££SS~.
fro. the south.

Aside fro.

clarlc,

ti=,e

period.

all the Democratic
leaders were

The prominence of tbe
South in the party leadership

Mirrors the composition of
tbe Democratic rank-and-file,
which was
also dominated by Southerners.
With

ideology, leaders and
followers

also matched closely.

Clark and Kltchin, although
perceived as near-

reactionaries by tbe Wilsonians.
were probably the least
conservative
Democratic leaders between 1919
and 1931. of the three
Democratic

Minority Leaders who served under
a Republican President,
only
Kltchin tried to design alternate
measures. After the 1924 election
as the membership grew more
conservative, so did the leadership.

In

1926, Garrett was blasted by William
Green, president of the American

Federation of Labor, for losing no
opportunity
people or labor unions.

to antagonize working

Garner, even during the early days
of

the depression, insisted upon a
balanced budget and was content to

follow Hoover's lead while McDuffie
defended corporate interests."^
None of the Minority Leaders used his
appointive powers to name
111

Ihid.

,

p.

174.

112, J
Jordan A. Schwartz The Interregnum of Despair
Hoover
Congress and the Depression (Urbana: University
of IlllnSii 1970)
,

:

,

p.

67.

—
'
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a Whip „ho would bring
b^ance to the party leadership
as Richardson
aad Wllliaras had done between
1901 and 1908.
But then in the 1920's
there was nr. faction analogous
to the Bryanite or agrarian
refor.
wing that repeatedly challenged
the leadership and tried
to change
the direction of the party.

Summary of the Variables 1919 -1923

The two leadership fights of this
period occurred under contrasting circumstances.

The 1919 battle to oust Clark
followed the election

defeat that returned the Democrats to
minority status; seniority was
rising; and the Southern wing was
expanding. The 1923 contest between

Gamer and Garrett, instead, developed after

the 1922 comeback victory,

which left the Democrats' ranks swollen
with freshmen and former Congressmen who had won back the seats they had
lost in the 1920 Re"

publican landslide.
also.

The Northern bloc had increased considerably

Although no single, consistent set of traits
characterized

the contests of this period, the 1923 fight
occurred under the same

conditions as the 1897, 1899, 1903, and 1907 contests
had erupted.

The stable Congresses during the 1920 's also strongly
resembled the
stable Congresses before 1911 except that seniority was
more extensive
in the 1920 's.

In other words, the only Congress between 1919 and

1931 that does not fit the pattern identified for the previous minor-

ity Congresses is 1919 since a contest developed under conditions nor-

mally associated with stable leadership.

Part of the explanation for

this deviation is that the 1919 revolt was a delayed reaction to the

membership changes and to the tense relations between the House
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leade..hip poeeneial and
.he prere,.lslee
senio.U. to cHaUen.e
CXar. o. KUch.„.
Ko.eove.. s.nce .He
elecUon Haa slven .he Kepu.lican. a clea. ^jo.i.,
i„ ,he

presen. a

™Uea

House. .He De..„a.3
no longer Had .o

f.on. .o

^in.aln control of

.He House as Had been

necessa^ ,„
^^^^^^^^^

divided,

in

in,

^^^^ ^^^^^^^

3i„ce .Here was no possiHUi.,
.Ha. .He De^oc.a.s

could organize .He House,
.He pressure for leadership
Har:„o„y was
pas. and .He soldering
feuding be.ween factions
could Ho brougH.
in.o .he open. The
1919 revolt Is also .He
only example In el.her
minority interval of
administration, If „o.
Preslden.lal, in.erven.ion. This finding lends
suppor. .o Joe Martin's
con.en.ion .ha.
Eisenhower's decision .o let
HallecU proceed with the revolt
was one
of .he key conditions leading
to Martin's ouster.

'

Conclusions

Between 1895 and 1931 five of the
six Democratic leadership contests occurred under identical
conditions:
1) minority status; 2) an

election upturn;

3)

high membership turnover; 4) a
large freshman

class; and 5) increasing regional
and probably ideological diversity.
In each Congress that these five
variables occurred together, a con-

test developed over the Minority
Leadership even when no vacancy existed.

One interesting finding was that the
1907 revolt was not dis-

tinguishable from the fights over vacancies
in terms of the variablesthe variables were not more exaggerated
for that Congress.

point is

Another

.'at although a revolt was organized at
the start of the
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60th congress, a pitched
battle was avoided i„
.,e next session when
William resigned. Apparently,
astute politicking can
overcome the
tendency toT/ard conflict.

The sixth fight, the 1919
contest, developed under a
con:pletely
different set of conditions:
election defeat, low turnover,
a s^oall
fresh^nan class, and declining
Northern strength.

was minority status.

The only constant

One possible explanation for
this deviation is

that 1919 is the only instance
in either minority phase of
Presidential
or at least administration
intervention. Perhaps this influence
was
enough to have initiated a fight
that might not have developed
if the

Congressmen had been left alone.

Another is that 1919 may illustrate

Barbara Hinckley's hypothesis that
there can be a time lag between
the membership change and the
leadership change (or at least the at-

tempt to bring about leadership change),

m

1913 the North did not

receive leadership posts proportional to
its size possibly because
of its limited seniority, but by 1919
some Northern Wilsonians had

accumulated enough seniority to run for Minority
Leader.
Conditions that tended to inhibit contested
leadership change were

mjority status, election defeats, low turnover, few
freshman,

a growing

pool of senior members, rising Southern
representation and probably in-

creasing ideological agreement.
the above pattern-1911

a.nd

gresses despite the Democ

There are two prominent exceptions to

1913.
:s'

No fights occurred in these two Con-

electoral success, high membership turn-

over, and massive Northern gains.

These changes, however, built upon

and strengthened membership trends visible since 1907 that
had already
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forced a leadership comproMise
with the election of Minority
Leader
Clark.
Thus, before 1931 loajorlty-mlnorlty
status appeared to
portant determinant of conflict
in the Der«,cratlc party,

m

b<
5e

an im-

19U

and

1913 .^jorlty status seemed to deflect
conflict when all the other
indicators pointed to a fight and
in 1919 minority status may
have

contributed to the revolt when other
conditions indicated stability.
Yet at this stage it is impossible
to say for sure whether
majorityminority status is merely coincldentally
present or is a cause of
conflict since alternate hypotheses can
be offered to explain the
results.

Election defeats, contrary to Peabody's
findings, were not conducive to leadership fights.

Election victories, on the other hand,

did appear to provide the rnean^ of producing
the membership turnover
and regional. -ideological change needed
to bring pressure for leader-

ship change.

A defeat, which meant that the party membership
became

more strongly Southern, did not harm the incumbent
leadership faction
since the leaders of the House Democratic party were
usually from the
South.

A victory, instead, was more likely

to undercut the leaders

as many new members entered the House from the party's
more competi-

tive districts in the North.
In sum, high membership turnover (along with its close ally
a

large freshman class) and regional- ideological changes that weakened
the congruence between leaders and followers emerged as extremely

important conditions stimulating conflict.

It is easy to see why the

introduction of more Northerners and Bryanites could create tension
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m

a

Democratic party dominated
by Southern conservatives,
so.etl..3 harder to see ho„
.e„*ership

it Is

change could lead to
unrest

The 1923 contest provides
a clear illustration.

The North's share
of seats increased but did
not really alter the
regional balance in
the party. „ew ,nen,bers.
however, composed over 40
per cent ot the

rank-and-file.

n,ls large bloc of new
people gave Garner an op-

portunity to barter good
co^nlttee assignments for
pledges of support.
He wanted to put together a
coalition comprising the Texas
delegation, personal friend.,
and allies, and new members
willing to
bargain for better committee
appointments. More deals and more
ways
>:o put together
a winning coalition become
possible when turnover is
extensive.

Although these regional and membership
changes are important iu
predicting .daether or not there will
be a contest, they cannot fore-

cast who vrLll win or how far a
contest will be pushed,

urhich candi-

date is elected depends in part on
the size of the factions but also
on the personality and age of the
contenders.

For example, in 189

7,

McMillan's abrasiveness was a handicap whereas
Bailey's youthfulness
was an added attraction for the
anti-Bryanites
vitli his

.

In 1907,

if Clark

pleasant, easygoing manner had challenged
Williams instead

of DeArmond, whose sarcasm embittered
his colleagues, perhaps the

dissidents would have succeeded in ousting Williams.

Tluis,

the per-

sonal attributes of the participants seem to come
into play when the

members

m,ake

dicting when

their clioice for leader but are not important in prea

contest will develop.

CHAPTER III

CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY, 1895 to 1931
Leadership Contests

.

1 89S

Tavi_

For Congressional Republicans
1894 rather than 1896
was the realigning election. Between
the Civil „ar and 1895
control of the House
of Representatives had
alternated between Republicans
and De^crats but

With the Democrats more often
in co«^nd.

^de ^ssive

publicans
south.

m

1894, however, the Re-

inroads into Democratic
strongholds outside the

When these gains proved lasting.
Republican control of the

House of Representatives was not
permanently challenged again until
the
early days of the New Deal.

As victorious Republican Congressmen
headed 'toward Washington,
there was little doubt that they
would select their Minority Leader,

Thomas B. Reed of Maine, to be the
new Speaker.

midable House leaders of all

tisae.

One of the most for-

Reed had served as both Speaker and

Minority Leader for the last twelve years.

Although Reed had acquired

a reputation as an autocratic
presiding officer during his last stint
as Speaker,

in 1895.

there was almost universal acceptance
of him for Speaker

Besides his unquestioned ability, another
reason for the

lack of opposition was that William McKinley,
his strongest competitor
in past leadership battles, had been elected
Governor of Ohio."^

Be-

cause Reed, McKinley, and Benjamin Harrison were
all vying for the

New York Times (hereafter NYT) Oct. 24, 1894,
p. 1- Nov
1894, p. 8; and November 22, 1894, p. 13.

11

,

*

'
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1896 Republican Presidential

nclnaUon. there was

3o.e speculation
that If Reed would not
relinquish, subordinate, or
defer'^^ his quest
for the presidency, then
McKinley and „a.:rison might
try to defeat
hi. for speaker. If Harrison
and McKinley joined
forces, the New
Vork Times thought that
there might be enough
disenchantment among
senior Republicans who could
remember Reed's arbitrary
manner of presiding to topple him. The
prevailing attitude of the
thirty-one most
senior members was that:

Mr

Reed will not have the
Speakership brought
to hxm upon a silver platter.
Quite a number
of them would rather see his
head under a
charger

When no McKlnley-Harrlson combine
developed, Reed was unanimously
nominated for the Speakership.
In 1895 the Majority Leadership
had not yet been established
as

an independent leadership post.

The usual practice was for the
Chair-

man of the Ways and Means Committee
to act as floor leader.
pointed Nelson Dingley, who also came
from Maine.

Reed ap-

There was little

grumbling about two leaders from Maine
because Dingley was widely consulted on tariff technicalities and was
regarded as the ablest choice
for the chairmanship.^

In 1897, following McKinley's election to
the Presidency, Reed
2

Ibid., Nov. 23, 1894, p. 7.

^Ibid,
4

Edward N. Dingley, The Life and Times of Nelson Dingley
Jr.
(Kalamazoo, Mich.: Ihling Brothers & Everard,
1902), pp. 3Q9-39l7'
,
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va. easU. .e-eZec..
and M„,ie. co„«„.e.
.„
..al .ole as Ca...
wa.3 an. Means a„a Majori.,
.eade. Hee. .e.an a
new t.adu.on
by naming .a„es Ta™ey
of Minnesota to be
the first

-

«,lp.
Before
la«ney.s appointment, the
duties of whip had heen
handled by volunt eers
«ho would assist the
leadership in passing
particular bills, ihe
reasons for Tawney's
selection are unknown.^

in April. 1899. Reed
announced he would resign
fro. the House
before the start of the
next Congress because he
was at odds with

McKlnley-s expansionist
policies and Mark Hanna's
^nage:nent of the
party.
Before Reed announced his
intentions,

there had been talk of

replacing hl» with a Speaker
who was less dictatorial
and „ore in line.
With the administration and
the Congressional party on
foreign policy.
"Yet the Men who held such
views did not try to persuade
anyone to become a candidate against Reed.
No one felt sure he could beat
Reed."

Moreover, no one was certain
McKlnley would approve a revolt
for
••McKinley was not Inclined to
shoulder a contest if it could be

avoided.

After Reed's decision to resign, a
contest quickly developed to
fill his vacancy.

The early frontrunner was James
Sherman of New York.

Sherman, like Champ Clark in 1908, had
advance notice that Reed planned

Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations
in the United
Politzical science Review,
fSL'^'^'^'^I?''"
LVI^
rs^n^^
LVII (September,
1964), p. 562.

c;^.^.^^'^^^^

B.

"

6

Both quotations are from Arthur W. Dunn, From
Harrison to
Harding, (2 vols.. New York; Putnam's,
1922),

lT^8~
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to leave and had "lost
no time

the Republican side."

.

.

.

m

coimminicating with neniers
on

The early

j.^
particularly useful for
securing pledges in the
Midwest, which v.s expected
to challenge the
East's near ^nopoly on
House leadership posts,
sher^n's
chances

were also bolstered by the
widespread belief that he
was McKinley's
choice for Speaker.
Sherman, however, was undercut
by the surprise candidacy
of his
fellow New Yorker, Sereno Payne.
Upon Dingley's death in
January, 1899.
Reed had appointed Payne to
the Chainnanship of Ways
and Means and to
the Majority Leadership.
Although Payne steadily
^intained he was
running for Speaker, Many observers
thought he was really trying
to
protect his own office in opposing
Sherman. « Midwestern
Republicans,

vhile accepting two leaders from
Maine, would never agree

to a Speaker

and Majority Leader from New
York.

Illinois also had two contenders for
the nomination:

Cannon and Albert Hopkins.
strongest candidate.

Joseph G.

Cannon was considered the Midwest's

He had run for Speaker in 1881 and
1889, was

well liked by his colleagues, and was
considered highly qualified by

seniority and by his service as Appropriations
Chairman for the Speakership.

Hopkins, less qualified and less popular,
was equally ambitious

to advance to the Speakership.^

^NYT
g

,

Ibid.

May 25, 1899,

,

p.

After hard campaigning by both Cannon

4.

April 19, 1899, p. 4; and April 26, 1899,

9

p.

1.

Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of
Repres entatives,
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
~89
1967)

~J
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and Hopkins. Che

UUnois

delegation unexpectedly
endorsed HopUns.
In a rage Cannon told
Hopkins:

jo^%-r

------- ---^^

/T^

^^^^^
^^^^ an election of
;
Unxted
States Senator you have
tried to get the en
dorse^ent of the Illinois
delegation f^r'^L
TT

^r-

^^^^ ^'^^ ^hile he was lying
•
cold
.^^r,?^''^^^^
xn
the
hall of the House of
Representati vp^
got the Illinois delegation
to^'endor ry:rf;.-a;aL°"
man of the Ways and Means
Committee
Zt.r
*
didn't get the place.
Now you've turned and twisted
and got the endorsement of the Illinois
delegation fo? Speaker but
mark my words, Hopkins, you
won't be Speaker, ^^u've
only succeeded in beating
me out of it! for i wouL
be elected if Illinois
presented my nai^e.lO
"

*

With Cannon out of the race,
the prospects brightened for
the
other Midwestern candidates.
The most prominent was David
Henderson
of Iowa. Henderson was well liked
by his colleagues and was a
loyal

member of the Iowa machine headed
by Senator William

B.

Allison.

In

his campaign for the Speakership,
Henderson's major asset proved to
be Allison, one of the "Famour
Four" that ruled the Senate.
When

Allison and Henderson appealed to the other
top Senate leaders for
assistance, they agreed to help Henderson
to ensure close cooperation

between the two houses of Congress.

Wisconsin delegation and Orville

Dunn, I, pp. 310-311.

H.

John
Platr.

C.

Spooner lined up the

encouraged Payne to continue
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his cndidac, in order
to dra„ votes a.ay
fro„ sher^„
Although Helson Aldrich
also »r.ed on Henderson's
behalf, he was less
influential since the Rhode
Island delegation had so
few votes."
in case any of the leading
candidates faltered or the
caucus deadlocked. John Dalzell of
Pennsylvania and Charles
Grosvenor of Ohio
were standing In the wings.
Dal.ell was familiar with
House procedures
and folkways and was close
to the McKlnley
administration, but he was
handicapped by squabbling inside
the Pennsylvania delegation
over the

Quay ^chine.l2

^^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^

^^^^

^.^ opposition to
civil

service, had been approached by
several colleagues but hesitated
to
run because Ohio was already
prominently represented at the
highest
levels of the party with McKlnley
and

Hanna."

Ontil early May the contest was
a heated regional battle with
Sherman leading his Eastern rivals
and with Henderson and Hopkins

splitting the Midwestern vote.

'

By the middle of May. however,
Sherman

had begun to fade be cause the East
could not unite.

Payne refused to

^Vt.

Apr. 19, 1899, p. 4; Apr. 23,
1899. p. 4; Horace S and
Con^^ 1897-i913 (LeSnaL Dnn
FTusT'LiisTd-i^sa er^;:?fu^m
|llison, A Stud^, in Practical Politics (Iowa
City: state Histori cll
society of Iowa, 1956), p. 274l^Sr^rothy
Ganfield Fowler, 5ohn Colt
Spooner. (New York: University Publishers.
1961), p. 216.

Marion G. Merrill, The Re£ubUcan

iniS Tsi T

^^r^^^^

,

^

l^Matthew Quay, the boss of the Quay machine,
had recently been
re-elected to the Senate but might not be seated
because of election
irregularities. He was sure to oppose Dalzell's
advancement because
Dalzell belonged to the anti-Quay faction in
Pennsylvania politics
that would be very happy to see Quay lose his
seat.

E".

April 15, 1899, p. 4; Apr. 26. 1899, p. 1; and Apr.
29,
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Withdraw and Henr, Bingha.
of Pennsylvania, a
Quay ^n, prepared to
run to chec. Dalzell.

With the East split, the
contest changed f.o.
an inter-r.sional dispute
to a duel inside the
Midwest. The Iowa
delegation sent out a letter
urging Henderson's election
and a Grand
Am^ of the Republic (GAR) spolces^n
without official clearance
called
for Henderson's election
because he had voted for
easing pension requirements for veterans. Hopkins,
in turn, was being aided
by the
Illinois delegation and had
received assurance fro. the
GAR that the

organization would not for^lly
endorse any candidate.

Although some
of Shennan-s Midwestern support
began to shift to Hopkins,
.ost observers rated Henderson ahead. "'"^
In early June, the Ohio delegation,
one of the most influential

on the Republican side on account
of its size and the swing role
it
played between the East and Midwest,
voted for Henderson over Shennan
by a wide inargin. As soon as the
Ohio vote became known, the contest
for Speaker was quickly concluded.

Hopkins-under pressure from the

Illinois delegation-withdrew in favor of
Henderson and Dalzell soon

followed suit.

Nevertheless, Sherman maintained that Henderson
was

still twenty votes short of a majority and
vowed to fight on until

New York switched to another candidate.

At this crucial point, Payne

consulted Piatt and then pulled out of the race to
back Henderson.
This move was immediately interpreted in the
press as a Platt-Payne

stratagem to hold onto the Ways and Means Committee
Chairmanship

p.

3;

Ibid., May 18, 1899, p. 5; May 19, 1899, p.
May 23, 1899, p. 5; and May 25, 1899, p. 4.

7;

May 21, 1899,
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for New York.

Finally, five days after
Ohio caucused, Ne. Vor.

and selected sher^n to
.e Its choice for Speaker.

The p.o-sher^„
endorsement was probably a
co^U.entary vote and pre-arranged
since

Sher^n Wdlately withdrew
Henderson for Speaker.

and the delegation next
voted to support

,„„,^^^

^^^^

^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^

'

the Republican caucus ratified
the decision reached in
June through
back room bargaining.

Henderson treated the key
components in his victory
generously:
Payne remained as the Ways and
Means Chairman and Majority
Leader;
cannon (and Illinois) retained the
Appropriations Connnittee Chairmanship; and Wisconsin, which
Spooner had delivered to Henderson,
was re-,

warded with the vacancy on the
Rules Committee.

Tawney, despite the

change in Speakers, was reappointed
Whip.
In 1901 there were no leadership
changes.

Henderson was unani-

mously renominated for Speaker; Payne
continued as Majority Leader;
and Tawney remained as Whip.

In 1903 the Republicans had to elect a
new Speaker because Henderson abruptly announced his retirement
in the middle of the 1902 elec-

tion campaign.

The reasons for Henderson's decision have
never been

fully understood although it was known that
Henderson sharply dis-

agreed with a group of Iowa Republicans, led by
Governor Albert
Cummins, who advocated using free trade to break
the trusts.

B.

When

the Cummins' band dominated the Iowa State convention
during the summer

Ibid., June 2, 1899, p. 8; June 3, 1899, p. 4; June
4, 1899,
p. 13; June 5, 1899, p. 8; June 6, 1899, p. 2; and June 7, 1899, p. 7.
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of 1902, Henderson
n ouit
quit.

4 second
a
a
A
undercurrent
in Henderson's de-

cisionjas that during the
last session "signs of
revolt /had7 ^ItiPlled"
against his leadership as
Speaker. A bloc of young
.embers,
con^itted to changing the House
rules, had overridden
Henderson and
the House leadership on
several occasions. Although
the dissident
group had been .^klng lots of
noise and "threatening to make
itself
heard at the next caucus.""
anticipated a rebellion.

Despite pleas from Theodore Roosevelt
to reconsider. Henderson
did not
change his mind.
Early speculation about his successor
focused mainly on Cannon.
ITieodore Burton of Ohio, the
Chairman of the Rivers and Harbors
Com-

mittee, and James Hemenway of Indiana,
the third ranking Republican
on Appropriations, were also mentioned.

Hemenway, however, had little

time for campaigning for Speaker because
he faced a tough re-election

battle in Indiana and Burton might not be
able to unite the Ohio delegation over Hanna's opposition.

The young insurgents were also ex-

pected to run a candidate of their own-possibly
William Hepburn of
Iowa, an early champion of rules reform; Tawney
of Minnesota, whom

Henderson had temporarily removed as Whip in 1902 because
he disagreed
with the rest of the leadership on the question of Cuban
reciprocity;
16

Sage, pp. 285-287.

17

Charles W. Thompson, Party Leaders of the Time
Dillingham Co.
1906), p. 154.
,

MYT

.

Sept. 17, 1902. p. 1.

,

(New York- G. W
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or Charles Littlefield of
M.lne. who was incliaad to
take Independent
1 Q
positions.
Before the battle had a chance
to heat up, Hepburn, the
insurgentsstrongest candidate, withdrew.
As much as he wanted the job,
he did
not think Iowa could have two
Speakers in a row. He also thought
that
he would be unacceptable to the
Old Guard because he favored
rules reform and that Cannon had the
Midwestern-Western votes, necessary for

Hepburn's success, already sewn up.^°

After the Noveinber election. Cannon
appeared to be ahead although

he had several obstacles to overcome.

As Chairman of the Appropria-

tions Committee, Cannon had cut so many
items out of the budget that

he had made a number of enemies.

He was also closely identified with

Henderson's management of the House and his
campaign slogan of "stand
by the status" 21 did nothing to reassure
the Young Turks.

Finally',

Cannon was a protectionist and a defender of big
business (one of
his staunchest allies in the contest was

P.

J,

Morgan's legislative

assistant, George Perkins) while a number of other
Midwestern Republicans wanted to lower the tariff and favored Roosevelt's
trust busting
22

approach.

19

Ibid., pp. 1 and 3; and Ripley, Party Leaders

p.

,

21.

20

John E. Briggs, William Peters Hepburn
torical Society of Iowa, 1919), pp. 317-319.

,

(Iowa City: State His-

21
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Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 118.
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William R. Gwinn, Uncle Joe Cannon, Archfoe of Insurgency
History
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of the Rise and Fall of Cannonism (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), pp. 73-74.
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Also ca^algning hard for
.he Midwestern vote
were Littlefleld
and .oseph w. Bahooc.
of Wisconsin, a ne„
entr. after the
election

Littlefleld

independence had sone app.al
for the dissidents
hut
there was also concern
that he had opposed
McKinley and Roosevelt
too often to he a satisfactory
Republican leader. The
younger .embers, while hostile to
the House leadership,
admired Roosevelt and
attributed .uch o£ the party's
success In the 1902 election
to his
popularity. Although anxious
for refor-lng the rules,
the insurgents
were equally desirous of
electing a Speaker who would
work closely
With the President. Consequently
Babcock, who advocated
revising the
tariff, became a rallying
point for the reformers. As
Chairman of the
.

s

.

1902 congressional Campaign Con^ttee,
Babcock had many contacts with
the new, uncommitted members.
One additional asset was that
Hepburn
preferred Babcock for Speaker because
he thought he would be a more
democratic leader than Cannon.

Vying for the Eastern vote were
Sherman, Payne, and Dalzell-the
same three candidates as in 1899-but
none of them was making much

headway.
To batter down resistance to Cannon,
two Indiana Congressmen wrote
or wired every Republican member
asking for support for Cannon.

Cannon's campaign managers were especially
interested in receiving

pledges from freshmen, who were being advised
to take a wait and see

p.

7;

^^NYT, Nov. 7, 1902, p. 5; Nov. 15, 1902,
p. 8; Nov. 16, 1902,
and Nov. 17, 1902, p. 3.
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attitude by the insurgent ca^p.

Newly elected meters like
George

Norris of Nebraska readily agreed
to back Cannon.

Moreover, over

Cannon's vigorous protests. Watson
sent a telegram to Hepburn.
Hepburn and cannon had clashed bitterly
over the Panama Canal and
Cannon
fully expected Hepburn-already
publicly committed to Babcock-to

spurn any request from Cannon.

But if Babcock should decide to
pull

out, Hepburn agreed to help and
was expected to carry weight in
the

Iowa delegation.
In mid-November Babcock withdrew from
the contest and called for

Cannon's election.

Babcock decided not to run even though
the Wisconsin

delegation endorsed his candidacy.

Since five Congressmen from Wiscon-

sin were committee chairmen, Babcock's decision
to pull out was widely

viewed as a prudent move to protect Wisconsin's
power.

The Babcock

withdrawal tipped the balance in Cannon's favor
and the victory was
clinched two days later when Iowa declared for
Cannon.
vote, state after state came out for Cannon.

After the Iowa

By the end of November,

Cannon had enough votes to win easily and was nominated
without opposxtion at the caucus. 25

Payne continued as Majority Leader and Tawney

remained as Whip.

24 James

E. Watson, As I Knew Tliem
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill
Co., 1936), pp. 108-109; Blair Bolles, Tyrant from Illinois
Uncle
Jog Cannon s Experiment with Personal Power, (New York: W. W. Norton,
1951), p. 56; George W. Norris, Fighting Liberal (New York: MacMillan Co., 1945), p. 95; and Richard Lowitt, George W. Norris
The
Making of a Progressive , 1861 - 1912 , (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 1963), pp. 83-84.
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23, 1902, p. 9; Dunn, I, 375; and Bolles, p. 56.
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1905 cannon was renominated
without opposition and
Payne
stayed on as Majority leader.
Tawney. however, was
replaced as «hip
and reeved from the Ways
and Means Co»ittee because
he was .'a halfhearted protectionist..
lawney had opposed Cannon
on the tariff
and had convinced some
Republican meters on Ways and
Means to adopt
his position. When Payne
"began to wobble/." cannon
appointed Tawney
to the Chairmanship of the
Appropriations Co»ittee. James
E. Watson
of Indiana, who had been
oeen one
onp ot
nf Cannon
rar.r,^r,«^
s campaxgn managers
in 1903,

was named the new Whip.
In 1907 the first hints of
opposition to Cannon's leadership
appeared.
The Washington. Post carried
reports that Roosevelt wanted

cannon dumped for Burton of Ohio,
who was more in accord with Roosevelt's program. American Federation
of Labor (AFL) President Samuel
Gompers and the Anti-Saloon League urged
the Republicans to elect a

new Speaker but the Republican caucus
unanimously re-elected Cannon.
Payne and Watson also stayed in their
posts.
By 1909 the efforts to replace Cannon
as Speaker had grown.

Even before the 1908 election, pressure to
remove Cannon was mounting.

The Chicago Tribune, for example, was reluctant
to endorse Cannon for

re-election to Congress if he intended to run for
Speaker again.

William Howard Taft considered Cannon his greatest
handicap in campaigning for the Presidency and thought Cannon must
go as Speaker

^^andall Ripley, Majority Party Leadership in Congress, (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1969), p. 29.
27

Thompson, p. 203.
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because he had opposed the
planks on the tariff
carift a.H
k
and ilabor
in the 1908
28
platform.
•

When the 1908 election
results enla.sed the

sUe

of the P.os.essLve
hand in the House, the
Insurgents had high hopes
of defeating Cannon
and changing the House
tules with Taft-s help.
The insurgents'

first

problem „as finding a challenger
that they could all agree
upon.
Charles Fowler of New Jersey,
a conservative who„
Cannon had removed
as Chairman of Banking and
Currency in the last session,
"was busily

wrlting^his friends in an effort
to gain the speakership
for hlMself."
Edmund Hinshaw of Nebraska and
Miles Poindexter of Washington
started a boon, for Burton whereas
Edmond Madison of Kansas urged
the
selection of Charles lownsend of
Michigan. The Iowa insurgents,
bolstered by a crop of freshmen
progressives, "lay low and announced
they
would support Walter Smith as a
stalking horse against Cannon, at
least until the smoky haze cleared."'"'

Cannon's friends were also working hard
to guarantee his re-

election.

Confident he could win if incoming
President Taft and out-

going President Roosevelt stayed out of
the fight. Cannon dispatched

Vice President-elect Sherman and Tawney
to neutralize Taft and Roosevelt.

Roosevelt and Elihu Root were quickly convinced
that Cannon was
28

Gvinn, p. 129 and pp. 153-155; and Henry F.
Pringle, The Life
WUliain Howard Taft, (2 vols, New York: Farrar~i^rd~Ri^e£H£
hart, 1939), I, 404.
,
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A Text of Fowler's letter is reprinted in Bolles,
p. 171.
;
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unbeatable but Taft vacillated.

He was personally pleased
that the

insurgents were going to challenge
Cannon, but he feared that
his
entire legislative program
would be sabotaged if he
participated in
a revolt that failed in
the end to unseat Gannon.31
By early December,
1908, Taft ..decided to abandon his
effort to defeat Cannon and
assumed
an attitude of benevolent
neutrality toward the Speaker. '.^^

Nevertheless, in December, 1908,
twenty-five Republican insurgents, :nainly fro. the Midwest,
.et to discuss strategy. They
decided
to concentrate on changing the
rules for which they estnnated
that they
could nzuster fifty to sixty votes
rather than on trying to defeat
Cannon.

dead.

Thus, by the end of December, a
leadership revolt seemed

Cannon apparently had reached the same
conclusion for he turned

his attention to the rules and asked
Asher Hinds, House parliamentarian,
to prepare a defense of the status
quo.^^

In March, 1909, however, the threat of a
revolt again loomed.

Al-

though there were thirty solid votes for
altering the rules, a smaller

group of insurgents hoped to overthrow Cannon
by deadlocking the House

of Representatives.

If twenty-four Republicans withheld their
votes

from Cannon for Speaker, the Republicans would
not be able to organize
31

Gwinn, pp. 158-159; Bolles, p. 172; the Merrills,
p. 282:
Pringle, I, 404-405; Mowry, p. 239.
32

Hechler, p. 44.

33

NYT, Dec. 2, 1908, p.
I, 408.

p. 2; and Pringle,

2;

Dec. 8, 1908, p. 2; Dec. 12, 1908,
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the House and a coalition of
insurgent Republicans and
Democrats could
elect a new Speaker. Victor
Murdock of Kansas, one of the
Progressive
leaders, said that "with the
support of the Democrats the
organization
for the session could be wrested
from Cannon and his lieutenants."^"^

Cannon took the threat seriously
enough to take Majority Leader
Payne
and senator Aldrich to the White
House to see Taft. Taft was warned
that if Cannon were toppled or the
rules amended to diminish Cannon's
power by a Progressive-Democratic coalition,
Taft's tariff program was
in jeopardy.

If,

instead, Taft sided with the regulars.
Cannon, Payne,

and Aldrich promised to pass his reforms.

Taft agreed to support the

regulars and rationalized that as the leader
of his party he could not
stand with thirty Progressives against 190
regulars.

In six months

Taft had moved from opposition to Cannon to
neutrality to alignment

with the standpatters.
Taft tried to bring the warring factions together but
he had little
success.

A few votes were swayed from the insurgents when Taft and
his

Postmaster General Frank Hitchcock threatened to withhold
patronage
from the bolters.

Taft wrung a promise out of the insurgents to con-

clude their organizational battle on the floor of the House in one

day in order not to delay work on the tariff bill, but Taft could not
head off a fight entirely.

Many of the Midwestern Republicans were

committed to insurgency by their state platforms and they preferred

NYT

,

March 12, 1909, p.

2.
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to reiBain loyal to their
constituents rather than to
Taft.^^

The week before the caucus
net, the Cannon camp held
an ''all day
secret session''^^ after
erroneous reports circulated
that Roosevelt
was about to aid the Progressives.
Cannon decided that the tariff
was his best weapon to break
the Democratic-Progressive
Republican alliance. Accordingly, Billy
Austin, a brewery lobbyist and
the chair-

man of the Wisconsin Republican
Committee, pressured the Wisconsin
delegation while Lucius Littauer, a
wealthy New York glove manufact urer and former Republican Congressman,
enlisted Henry H. Rogers of

Standard Oil to work on New York
Democrats.^''

When the Republican caucus met, thirty
insurgents on the advice
of Senator Robert LaFollette boycotted
the meeting in order to main-

tain their independence on the floor of
the House in the organization
battle.

Without the most vocal dissidents present,
Cannon was easily

renominated.

However, his 162 vote total fell fifty-six
votes short

of the Republican membership and thirty-three
votes short of a House

majority.

Not only had Cannon failed to receive the votes
of the

35
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absent insurgents but
ncy rive of fhnco
twenty-five
those present voted for
another
candidate. The opposition
ballots were scattered a^ng
six candidates

With S.ith of Iowa and Tawney
of Minnesota drawing
.ost of the protest
ballots., considering that
both S.ith and Tawney
were allies of Cannon
and that the .ost vociferous
dissidents were absent, the
anti-Cannon
vote seeded to .ean that
Cannon's support a.ong the
regulars was beginning to erode. Furthermore,
the caucus declined to
^ke the vote
unanimous, a departure fro. custo..^«
After the caucus one Old Guard
Republican said that Cannon's chances
for retaining the Speakership
and for preventing changes in
the rules "looked 'pretty bad.'"^^
when
Congress opened. Cannon was chosen
Speaker with 204 votes.
In the end

only a dozen insurgents defected
to other candidates.

The twelve Re-

publican holdouts. were all from the
Midwest or West, with the largest
number of dissenters representing
Wisconsin. Even on the battle over
the rules, Cannon triumphed.

Although the insurgent bloc of thirty

expected votes held solid. Democratic
defecters, swayed by promises
of tariff protection and good committee
assignments, prevented any

major weakening of the Speaker's power.
Payne was reappointed Majority Leader and
John Dwight of New
York, a regular, was appointed Whip to
replace Watson, who had retired
38
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from the House.
In December, 1909,
at tne
the start of
y, dL
of t-u^
the secondj session of the
61st
Congress, Taft wrote:

Walter I. Smith is the man whom
I would select
for Speaker if we can only get
Uncle Joe (Cannon) out of the way--and I think
we can.^I
In another letter he expressed the
same sentiment when he wrote that

."There is now only one feature of the
situation that

I

look forward to

with considerable concern, and that is
the continuation in politics
_

of Cannon."

42

Although Murdock was ready to try again to
oust Cannon,

most of the insurgents "were once more
mystified and angered by the

President's devious course. "^^

No revolt was undertaken.

In March, 1910, the insurgent-Democratic
alliance finally suc-

ceeded in amending the rules of the House to
curtail the power of the

Speaker but Cannon remained in office.

Cannon himself, on the advice

of his crony, former representative Watson, stated
that the chair was

open to a motion to declare the Speakership vacant.
a Texas Democrat,

Albert Burleson,

so moved to the fury of Democratic leader Clark, who

knew the motion would never carry.

Only a handful of Republicans sup-

ported the motion so in a round-about-way Cannon had received a vote
of confidence to finish out his term as Speaker. ^'^

^^aft's letter of Dec.
42

1909 is quoted in Gwinn, p. 194.

Taft's letter is quoted in Mowry,
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Compared with the Democrat<?
emocrats dnt-fr,^
during thxs same time
period, the Republican leadership in the
House of Repr^^sentatw..
K.epr_sentatives was more
•

stable at
the highest levels with
three Speakers-Reed from
1895 to 1899,
Henderson from 1899 to 1903,
and Cannon from 1903 to
1911-and'two

Majority Leaders-Dingley for
three years and Payne for
thirteen
years.

In contrast, five different
Democrats served as Minority

Leader between 1895 and 1911.
was Similar in the two parties:

With the Whips the degree
of turnover
'

there were three Republican
Whips in

fourteen years-Tawney from 1897
to 1905, Watson from 1905
to 1909,
and Dwight from 1909 to
1911-as compared with three Democratic
Whips
in eleven years.
The Republicans' greater stability
seemed to result
largely because their top leaders
were less inclined to resign
from
office than the Democratic Minority
Leaders. For example, as Table

1

sunnnarizes, when the ranks of
Speaker and 14ajority Leader are
combined,

there were five vacancies on the
Republican side.

Two of these oc-

curred simply because the party had
become the majority party; one
was
caused by Dingley's death; and two
followed the resignations of Reed
and Henderson,

There were also five Minority Leader
openings for the

Democrats, but four of these vacancies occurred
when the leader vol-

untarily resigned or retired and only one resulted
from the party's
shift to minority status.

Although there was less leadership turnover and
fewer vacancies
in the Republican party, the Republicans waged
almost as many leader-

ship contests as the Democrats.

Between 1895 and 1911, the Republicans
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battled over the Speakership
three tl.,es-l„ 1899.
1903, and 1909.
The first two contests were
fought over vacancies but
the third was
the revolt to depose Cannon
and to curb the power
of the Speaker
Besides the futile atte.pt
to overthrow Cannon,
the threat of a revolt

had figured in the background
of both Reed and Henderson's
resignations although all sources
agree that the priory
motive for bowing
out in each case was
disagreement over policy rather
than the fear of
a fight.

In comparison, during the
1895 to

19U

era, the Democrats

had engaged in four leadership
struggles over the Minority
Leadership.
Three of these had been fights to
fill vacancies while one was
an un-

successful revolt.

There is no evidence of a formal
pattern of succession in the
Republican hierarchy except possibly
in the case -of the Minority
Leader rising to the Speakership.

The ebb and flow of Reed's career

in serving as both Minority Leader
and Speaker for sixteen years
paral-

leled Crisp's career on the Democratic
side.

hold on the leadership hardened over time.
sought the Speakership he had to fight for

As with Crisp, Reed's
In 1889 when he first

it"^^

despite his six years

service as Mnority Leader but in 1895 Reed
resumed the Speakership

without dissent.

Thus, by the turn of the century the highest
party

leader in both parties seemed to be able to move
easily back and forth

between the Minority Leadership and Speakership.

Aside from Reed, the

For a description of this early leadership battle,
see William
A. Robinson's Thomas R. Reed:
Parliamentarian
(New York: Dodd Mead
~
and Co., 1930), pp. 197-199.
,
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son

^.e

..ns.Uen

the Chair^„..ip of

^.o. .He

co^u.ee

a„a

Ca™o„

Appropriation. Co„i..ee.*^

«one of the.
iir
rivals, including Majority
Leader Payne, appeared
to have a stron,
^ger
clai. to the Office and
.one ar^ed that his
co-ittee as.i^ent or
leadership post gave hi. a
greater right to be
advanced.
Each leadership office
was filled and held
independently fro„ the
other leadership posts
rather than forcing a
leadership ladder, .or
exa^le, Payne's long reign
as Majority leader and
chairman of the
ways and Means Co^ittee
was not interrupted even
though the Speakership Changed hands twice
(and the Speaker
appointed the Majority
Leader and co^ittee chairmen).
lawney also remained as
Whip even
after Henderson and Cannon
succeeded Reed, who had
originally appointed hin>.
The long tenures of Payne and
Tawney-undisturhed by the
leadership changes swirling around
the. and yet not willing
or able
to be promoted themselves-bring
to mind Leslie Arends who
was wedded
to the post of Whip from
1943 to 1975 regardless of
Republican election fortunes or the number of
revolts and resignations bringing
•

change to the other leadership
posts.
In contrast to the Democratic
minority, the Republican leadership

contests between 1895 and 1911 attracted
a great deal of attention and
pressure firom outside the House of
Representatives. Taft's role in
the 1909 br^Kl is the most dramatic
example of Presidential inter-

vention in this period although rumors
abounded about McKinley and
46 See

the Consressional Directory for the 55th
and 57th Congresses.
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Roosevelt's intentions in earlier
^j-ier years buibut .hm,
without. specific documentation about the nature or
extent
of their involvement.

Presi-

dential interest in House
leadership struggles is not
unique to the
Republican party. Recall Cleveland's
warnings to Speaker Crisp in
1893 and Wilson's yearnings to change
the Democratic leadership
between
1915 and 1919.
What does differ from the
Democratic pattern is the

widespread involvement of Republican
Senators and a host of pressure
groups and business interests. The
clearest case of direct Senate
intervention was in 1899 when the four
most powerful Senate leaders
helped Henderson win the Speakership,
but Senators of varying ideological persuasions and regions wielded
influence in more subtle ways
in House contests.

For example, the disapproval of a
Hanna or a Quay

inside a state delegation could make a
difference in who competed for

office in the House and La Follette was
active behind the scenes in
advising the Progressives on tactics in 1909.

Most of the interest

group participation in Republican contests for
Speaker consisted

simply of calls for leadership change or mild
expressions of support
for individual candidates.

The activities of the AFL, GAR, and the

Anti-Saloon League would fall into this category and had
little impact on the outcomes of the contests.

played by

J.

P.

The active role, however,

Morgan's legislative aide in electing Cannon to the

Speakership in 1903 and by Standard Oil and glove manufacturer Littauer
in 1909 in maintaining Cannon in power m^y well have made a
difference
in who won.

Cannon felt he owed his re-election in 1909 to Littauer

and had the duty on gloves raised to $4 per dozen.

When Taft realized
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that the high tariff on
slove. .as a parent to
Mttauer, he backed
the senate's version^of
the hill, which reduced
the tariff on gloves
to 51.12 per dozen.
cannon also "arranged for
increased duties on
petroleum products."

The Democrats between 1911
and 1919 were not
subjected to such
intense corporate and lobbyist
pressure when choosing leaders
although
research by Mary Follett suggests
that before 1895 Democratic
Speakership contests were characterized
by such behavior also.
The 1910 revolt against Cannonism
significantly weakened the power
of the Speaker.
Before 1910 the Speaker was a
powerful officer. By appointing
con.ittees and controlling debate,
the Speaker was able to
determine to a
large degree which bills became
law and which ones withered.
Consequently, "special interests anxious
to obtain government subsidies
in
aid of some commercial enterprise"^^
were vitally interested in Speakership fights "because their very
fortunes depended upon the result.

After the 1910 revolt the Speaker no
longer made such a critical difference in the legislative process and
the involvement of business

groups in leadership selection dropped
off.

^^Bar field, p. 40.

The Merrills, p. 282.
49
^f"^' L
(New V
York:

Ibid.

^

^

^°ll^tt, The Speaker of the House of Representative
s.
igmans. Green and Co., 1896), p. 36.
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TABLE

1

REPUBLICAN LEMERSHIP
SELECTION 1895-1911
Year

Status of Post

What Happened

Outcome

Speaker

1895

1897
1899

1901

1903

1905
1907
1909

Vacancy
(Party became
majority)
No Vacancy

Vacancy

No Vacancy

Vacancy

No Vacancy
No Vacancy

No Vacancy

No Contest

No Contest

Contest -numerous
candidates, active
campaigning; all
but one withdrew
before caucus.
No Contest

Contest-several
candidates; all
but one withdrew
before caucus.

Reed elected

Reed re-elected

Henderson
elected

Hend erson reelected

Cannon elected

No Contest

Cannon re-elected

No Contest

Cannon re-elected

Contest-scattered
opposition and absentees in caucus;
Progressives moved
to deadlock voting
on House floor for
Speaker and to unite
with Democrats to
try to amend rules.

Cannon re-elected
Minor revision
of the rules.

Majority Leader
1895

Vacancy
(Party became
majority)

Speaker made appointment.

Ding ley named
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TABLE

1

continued

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
SELECTION 1895-1911
Year

Status of Post

What Happened

Outcome

Ma jority Leader
1897

Jan,

No Vacancy

1899

Vacancy
(Dingley dies)

1899

No Vacancy

Speaker made
appointment.

Dingley named

Speaker made
appointment

Payne re -named

New Speaker made
appointment.

1901

1903

No Vacancy
No Vacancy

No change

New Speaker made
appointment.

1905
1907
1909

No Vacancy
No Vacancy
No Vacancy

Payne re -named

Payne re-named
Payne re -named

No Change

Pa3me re-named

No Change

Payne re-named

No Change

Payne re-named

Whip
1895

1897

1899

1901

1903

1905

1907
1909

Vacancy
(office created)

Reed appointed
first Whip.

Tawney named

No Vacancy

New Speaker made
appointment

Tawney re -named

No Vacancy

No Change

Tawney re-named

No Vacancy

New Speaker made
appointment

Tawney re-named

No Vacancy

Cannon replaced
Whip to ensure
party regularity
on Ways and Means
Committee

Watson named

No Vacancy

No Change

Watson re -named

Speaker made
appointment

Dwight named

Vacancy
(Watson retired)
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^^^i^iZsis of the

Variables 1895-1911

1895 ana 1911. ehe aep..Uea..
„ere co^atlve. «shtln,
eH.ee Speakership contests, including
one unsuccessful revoU.
The fights „e.e
fairly evenly distributed
over the sixteen year
period with one occurri^ in the first half
of the „.Jority phase
and one at .id-point
while the attempted revolt
fell
the last two years.
The size of
the party, as with the
Democrats, seeded relevant
in predicting leadership conflict. AS Table
2 demonstrates, there
were no contests when
the Republicans held over
60 per cent
cen^ ol.
nf th^
the u
House seats but the

m

TABLE

2

REPIJBLICM CONTESTS AND PARTY
SIZE, 1895-1911
X of Republican Seats
50 to 54,9%

55 to 59.9%

60% and over

# of Congresses

# of Contests

2

2

4

1

2

0

chances for a leadership fight increased
as the Republicans approached
50 per cent.

This pattern is interesting because
in the Democratic

party before 1931 most clashes occurred
when the Democrats controlled

between 40 and 49.9 per cent of the seats
in the House, and this
tendency became more pronounced when the
Democrats commanded more
than 45 per cent of the seats.

These figures suggest that a fairly

narrow numerical band--clustering on either side of the
50 per cent
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mark

— is

the most condun'vo
^^.-^
j
conducxve for
leadership
con^etition in both parties
Lopsided Republican
majorities
J txLies and tmy
t^^^ Democratic
minority
-les were
less vulnerable to
conflict than .ore evenly
divided parties.

Il-Won

-i

AH

trends.

three Republican contests
followed

el.
Lec-

tion losses, which is in
sharp contrast to the
Democratic patt,
:ern
whore fights usually followed
election upswings, but is
co^atible
with the post-world War
Republican pattern. However,
unlike the
recent tendency for Republican
fights to coincide with
^Jor defeats,
the Republican contests
in this early period took
place after small
downturns ranging fro» three to
eighteen seat losses, when
the Republicans suffered their worst
setbacks

n

in the 1895 to 1911

era-the

loss of thirty-nine seats in
1896 and twenty-nine seats
in 1906. no
contest developed.
(See Table 3). On the other
.hand, when the Re-

publicans inproved their margin,
there was also no leadership
conflict.

In sum, leadership stability
was associated with both victories
and sizeable defeats while
contests followed modest electoral
down-

swings

MembershiH

tur^^^

As Table 4 shows, except for
1895, each

time the proportion of new men^bers
was on the rise, a leadership struggle followed and whenever the percentage
of new members dropped below
the level of the last Congress, no contest
took place.
is a major exception.

However, 1895

With the Republican ranks swollen with
freshmen

elected in the 1894 landslide, only 40.5 per
cent of the Republican
me^i'

ership had served in the preceding Congress.

turnover. Reed easily won the Speakership.

Yet despite the huge

At the other extreme, in
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TABLE

3

REPUBLICAN ELECTION RESULTS,
1895-1911
Year
Change from Previous Election

1895
1897
1899

1901

1903*

242

203
185

198
205 (190)

1905

250

1907

221

1909

218

+114
-

39

-

18

68.0
56.9

51.8

+ 13
+

7

+ 45

% of GOP Seats
When Congress Opened

55.5
(-8)

53,6
64.5

-

29

56.5

-

3

55.9

indicates contest

The size of the House was undergoing
rapid change.
The figures xn parentheses are
adjusted using the
previous House size as base.
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TABLE 4

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AM,
MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1895-1911
Year
/o

New Members
°k

Incumbents

1895
59.5

40.5

1897
25.6

74.4

1899
29.7
1901

70.3

25.3

74.7

1903
30.9

1905

69.1

27.3

1907

72.7

17.6

1909

82.4

19.7

80.3

indicates a contest

1909, when there was comparatively
little change in the composition
of the party in the House,
rebellion reared its head.
Therefore, Re.

publican leadership conflict
tended to correlate with
increased membership turnover but was not
necessarily related to large
scale
changes in the composition of
the party as was true for
the Democrats
whose fights tended to occur when
less than two-thirds of the
old

members returned to the new Congress.
Hierarchy.

AH

three Republican contests occurred
in Congresses

in which the percentage of
freshman Congressmen was higher than
in the
old Congress. When the proportion
of freshmen in the party was falling,
no fight developed.

As with membership turnover, the only
exception
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to this

pa.ce„ „as

18,5 when the RepuhUcans
.a„a,e. a t.an,uU ..an-

s.tion f.o. .inorlt, .o
^jority status despite the
Infl.. of a huge
freshman class.
(See Table 5).
^bee
^^
»<
Moreover, it should be
noted that
fro. 1897 until 1907 the
level of f.esh.en in
the Republican party
was nearly constant,
ranging f.o. a low of
23.2 per cent in
1897 to

a high of 28.5 per
cent in IQn-^
P
1903,

m

so the contests
correlate with rather

small gains in the size of
the freshman class.

TABLE

5

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND SENIORITY,
1895-1911
1

ear

7o

1895

Freshmen

55.8

1897
1899
1901

1903
1905

1907
1909

% Sophomores

% Seniors

23.6

5.8

23.2

41.4

10.8

25.9

24.3

12.4

24.2

21.7

10.1

28.5

17.9

15.0

24.9

23.2

19.7

16.7

20,8

24.4

17.4

14.7

27.5

indicates a contest

The relationship between growing junior cla
sses and increased
leadersh ip competition disappears when freshmen
and sophomores are
combined

,

which was also true of the Democrats.

When sophomores alone

are examined, the relationship with leadership
contests is a random one,
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There were only two
Coneresse.,
ngresses

m
-fn

•

this majority interval
in

1901..a„. in „eUh.r instance
was ehe.e an, leadership
confUct. i„
the six Congresses
in which the percentage
,
Furcentage of senior
members was
rising, there was a
50 ner
per cent chance for
a contest to develop.
Another way of examining
this relan^^.t,
relationship is to compare
g tnis
Congresses
With relatively high and
low levels of seniority.
Between 1893 and
1903 veteran Republicans
consistently composed under
15 per cent of
the party membership
and in those four
Congresses there was only
one
fight.
From 1903 until 1911, when
senior members held between
15.0
and 27.5 per cent of the
seats, two contests
developed. Democratic
conflict, instead, had
a tended to
^n take place
^i
when the proportion of
senior .e.bers was declining.
Thus, Republican contests
were characterized by increasing numbers
of both freshmen and
senior members..
•

•

,

It is easy to understand
why large freshmen classes
might provide

the impetus for a leadership
struggle in an age where the
Speaker had
the sole power to make cotnnittee
assignments. As Follett pointed
out:

There is a tremendous incentive
for the new
members to elect their Speaker:
if they do
not, they stand at the end of
the line for
committee places, and thus lose
their only
chance of getting any part of
the work or
the spoils of the House. 51
It is harder to unravel why in
the Republican party a large
pool of

senior members did not inhibit contests.

One possible explanation

is that Republican fights, unlike
most Democratic battles, more often

^^Ibid.

,

p.

119.
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revolved around the
concentration of leader.h
leadership power.
Senior Republicans were clearly
troubled by this issue
in 1895
^oyj when th
they were the
lea.t enc.us.as.l.
..pp„..„ o. .esto..,, Hee.
tHe Speakership
Before .he I,OI-Xno
rehelUon. .here . so.e
ev.ence .ha. ve.eran
RepuhUeans were heco.i„,
res.less .t.h Cannon's
arhl.rarln.s as he
axe. conserva.lves such
as .ovier and M.ar.
s. Henr. of
Connec.icu.
from comml.cee chairmanships.'^
Ps.
Alth™,oh rfew senior
Although
members actually
participated in the fish.s
igh.s after
aft^r the
fh= turn
,
^
of
the century, which
is
unaerstandahle since they had
the most to lose in
a confrontation with
the speaker, they also
may not have exerted
themselves behind the
scenes to head off a clash.
On the Democratic side,
the 1907 melee
also concerned the concentration
of leadership power
for John sharp
Williams had disciplined
mavericks by stripping them
of desirable

.

co^ittee assignments."

Not only did the 1907
revolt resemble the

Republican brawls on issues but
it was the only Democratic
contest

^^^-^^^3^"-^^,,

,

j,^

p^^p^^^^^^

excxu!!ve^^?:::tL°e":£%hnj::L\''''ca""™\=

^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^

"^^"^^

Of his cro^y, Us^^tso^^f i^d'
a'ia,'
o^^d'^rsharp" ^^^''t
make Democratic committee
assignments betweef IMS and JJos
imand Cannon were friends and Watson
predicted r gh .rtha «llla' t
assignments would soon lead to increased
bickerLg ind

Ught

f

L

wUhin

^= friendly\ .th Wifl ams' sue

cesser, Champ Clark, and did not
ceLorcha'L'rr^'^share his appoint
the Democratic Minority Leader
after 1908.

-nt

privlleae with
privilege
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to leadership stability
but the struggles
before 1910 support an

alternate hypothesis:

leadership contests to
uecencraiize „
decentralize
power tend
to need a band of
disgruntled veterans to spark
the conflict.

MSi£nal factionalism.

Ihe two Speakership
fights over vacancies

occurred when Midwestern
strength in the party was
at its peak,
1899 and 1903 the Midwest co^anded
49.2 per cent and 47.8
per cent
respectively of the Republican
seats as Table 6 Indicates,
when

m

TABLE

6

REPUBLICAN CONTEST AND REGIONAL
FACTIONS, 1895-1911
Year

1895
1897
1899

1901

1903
1905
1907
1909

7o

Midwest

% East

44.2

% West

7o

South-Border
States

37.1

5.8

12.8

43.8

2.5

12.3

35.1

5.9

9.7

44.9

38.9

6.6

9.6

47.8

38.2

7.7

6.3

46.2

36.5

8.0

9,2

45.2

36.7

9.0

9.0

40.4

39.4

7.8

12.4

41,4
49.2

indicates a contest

Western Congressmen are added to the figure, the
trend continues with
Midwestern-Western power at its height in both of
these Congresses with
55.1 per cent of the Republican seats in 1899 and 55.5 per
cent in
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occu„e. .en „..„es.e..
3.e„,.H was „ea.e. a.
Hid„esee„ .epresen.aUon

....„e. Wester-

a.oppea .elo„ 30 pe.
cen. .o. onl,

seco..

time during this period.

MMoalcal jacucnaus..
Sress.en

„.„.er of

.Us«e.t Repu.Uean

slowl, cU..e. f.o. a
.anaful a. .He

Con-

of the eentu., .0

between two ana th.ee ao.en
in 1909.

As Tahle 7 demonstrates.
In 1907
ana 1909 not only were
the insurgents saining
adherents, hut the
size

Of the Republican membership
in the House was
shrinUing. which gave
the aissiaents a bigger
voice inside the party.
Moreover, in 1903
ana 1909-both contest
years-the insurgents had enough
votes to aeadlock the House or to organize
the House in combination
with the
Democrats.
Thus, Republican conflict
seems strongly dependent on
the regional
ana iaeological cleavages
splitting the party,
the early years of
this period regional factions
seemea more important, but auring
the
latter half of the perloa i
aeological fissures overroae the
regional

m

pss,

(Boston: Little, Bro™ ana Company,
tKT
beginning in the House of Representatives
as 1903.
Rus ^1 B
in
A Historical study of Its Or^Ilns
" S:2Siesslve Politics:
f^/t,
|Hi Deve cpment 1|70-1958, (East LaSST^iT^hii^fsilt"

T9707r5^2^ef

L

,

nlSy

"^^^ P"g«=sive insurgency began in
^'
fSnf',,
V
1906 when ;Robert
LaFoUette of Wisconsin was first elecLd to
the
Senate ana startea to organize ana
influence the Wisconsin aele^ation
the House
Charles Thompson, on the other hana, in
Party Lea^aers
of the Time (citea before),
p. 154, contends that insurii^ first
appearea when young Midwestern members battled
Henaerson and the
House machine over rules and policy. But
whatever starting date
one uses, it is clear there were only a
few Miawestern insurgents
in the House at the turn of the century.
^'

m

~
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TABLE

7

REPUBLICA^J CONTESTS

OF THE PROGRESSIVES,

Year

# of Pro-

gressives

1901
1903
1905
1907

im

8

7.7

20

8.0

24

10.9

31

1901-1911

'

% of Pro
gressives

4.0

16

THE GROWTH

14.2

# of Re

publican!

.a

^

~~

.

cratr"
cracs

^^^^'^^^^^
fections necessary
to cause deadlock
between two
parties

198

153

23

207

176

16

249

137

56

221

167

27

218

171

24

indicates a contest

divisions with 1903 marking the
turning point.
the leadership struggles
buttress this the.e:

The issues involved i„
in 1899 the fight was
over

Eastern domination of the House
leadership; in 1903 the regional
identification of the candidates continued
to be stressed but their
views on

the tariff and their capacity
to be a fair presiding
officer were also
weighed; and by 1909 the debate
focused almost exclusively on rules
and
tariff reform.

Congruence

.

Until 1899 the East dominated the
Republican leader-

ship in the House as the Speaker and
both Majority Leaders represented

New York or Maine.

The only Midwesterner recruited into
the party
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leadership circle before
1899 was Tawney of
Minnesota, who. Reed appointed Whip in 1897. The
East's prominence coincided
with the
regional alignments on the
Republican sxde. Before 1899
the East
was either the largest
faction as in 1897 or when
combined with the
South and Border States
controlled half of the Republican
seats as
in 1895.
•

In 1899 the Midwest replaced
the East as the strongest

region and with its Western allies
held over a majority of the
seats
until 1909. The leadership
reflected this shift in regional
suprem-

acy:

from 1899 to 1911 the Speaker
was a Midwesterner with an
Eastern
Majority Leader. H.e Whips were also
from the Midwest until 1909
when

Midwestern strength began to wane and
Cannon appointed Dwight of New
York to replace Watson. Although
the Republicans responded quickly
to changes in regional factions,
the leadership did not accommodate

ideological diversity.

AH

the leaders between 1895 and 1911
belonged

to the regular, conservative, standpat
wing of the party although

Tawney had a reputation for independence.

However, when he strayed

too far from the regular viewpoint, he
was relieved of his duties as

Whip- temporarily

in 1902 by Henderson and permanently in
1905 by

Cannon

Summary of the Variables 1895 - 1911

All three contests in this period occurred under similar
conditions:

when the Republicans were the Majority party but held
under

56 per cent of the seats in the House; after an election loss; when

the composition of the party as measured by the percentage of
fresh-

men and the rate of returning members was less stable than in the
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P-cedln, Co„s.ess, „hen the
.e^e.ship ..s .eco.l^s .ore
senic;

a„a

when either the Midwest
or the insurgents,
share of seats „as highest
in determining which
conditions were .ost
responsible for the confllct. two variables can
be discounted or downgraded.

Majority status
hypothesised as Inhibiting
competition, did not have the
expected impact since the Republicans
fought over the leadership
almost as fre-

quently as the minority Democrats.

Election defeats can also be

eliminated.

Although the battles followed
election losses as Peabody
predicted, the fights did not
coincide with the biggest
Republican
defeats. Instead, the contests
of this period seemed strongly
related to the factional alignments
in the party-to the
competition
between East and Midwest until
1903 and to differences after
1903
between Progressives and regulars.
The size of the party also seemed
important, for in a House with closely
divided parties the insurgents

gained leverage and bargaining power
over the dominant wing.

In ad-

dition, the Inflow of larger freshman
classes appeared to encourage

competition, especially in 1399 and 1903.

In those years the com-

bination of a vacant Speakership with no
obvious heir apparent and a
sizeable body of freshmen uncommitted to any
particular leader may

well have spurred the large number of candidacies.

Finally, the grow-

ing contingent of veterans, wary about the
Speaker's ability to dis-

rupt their careers, seemed to contribute
particularly to the formation
of the 1909 revolt.

The Republican leaders tried to minimize the con-

flict by carefully balancing the leadership
geographically and by re-

warding orthodoxy in handing out committee assignments
and party
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posts-a practice

that likely prevented

Republicans fro. J„ini„,
the insurgency but also
fueled the insurgents'
determination to bring
about change.

Leadership Contests

,

1911 to 1919

With the party divided into
regular and Progressive factions,
the
Republicans lost control of the
House of Representatives for
the first
ti^e since 1894.

The Republicans were left in
a quandary about the

leadership.

During the campaign, Cannon had
repeatedly declared that
the charges of czarism and
"Cannonism" were trumped up by
nruckraker
n^-agazines and that he would run
again for Speaker.

day the

Nev;

Yet by election

York Tijnes could count eighty
Republican Congressmen who

had announced that they could no
longer support him.

The most sig-

nificant defection had come from
Nicholas Longworth, the regular

Republican from Ohio, who had close
political ties to the Tafts, but
was also Roosevelt's son-in-law.

Because Longworth had never par-

ticipated in the anti-Cannon movements before
and because he issued
his statement from

Taffs summer White

House, his statement was re-

garded as an important signal by other regular
Republicans that Cannon

could be beaten.
to emerge.

Republican members with leadership aspirations
began

Edgar Crumpacker of Indiana had already been
endorsed by

the Indiana delegation for Speaker.

Others who made their interest

known were Tawney, the former Whip; Smith of Iowa, "who

.had a

large

personal following; "^^ Hinds, the former House parliamentarian,
who

TO,

Aug. 19, 1910, p. 3.
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had recently .een
nominate, to .u„

01-ted Of Pennsylvania.

Congress fro. ^.l.e; a..

„.rU.

,a. conducted s„cH a
fair Investlsatlon

of naval scandals that
tnat evpn
even the Progressives
were impressed, what
was noteworthy about these
five potential contenders
was that they
vere all ..regulars of the
deepest dye, men who have
stood for everything the speaker has
eniodied...^^ „hen the
Republicans actually
lost control of the House,
the campaign issue had
been resolved in a
sense because Cannon would
no longer be Speaker.
Most Republicans
hoped Cannon would also decline
to run for Minority
Leader so that
they would not have to
repudiate his leadership further.
Defeat gave
cannon a graceful way to
retire.
Saying he would not want to
be
Minority Leader after having
served for so ^ny years as
Speaker.

Cannon stepped down.^^

After cannon's retire:nent, attention
turned to
Illinois.

Ja^.es R. Mann- of

Mann was considered a "hard worker,"
one of the "best

parliamentarians in the House, "^^ and an
effective debater.

The

greatest obstacle to Mann's selection
was the insurgent bloc, which
had mixed feelings about Mann.
Norris in describing the atmosphere
in the House when the Cannon rules"
were overthrown in 1910 remembered

that "from /Ihe? beginning to
/FheJ end of the battle between the in-

surgents and the Speaker.

.

.

.

Mann of Chicago had been Republican

^^Ibid.

^^Ibid., Nov.
II'
ju, iQ?n
lyiu, p. ^f.
12.

1910, p. 4 and Aug. 19, 1910, p. 3; Gwinn,
252-253; and LflFpIlf-ttC P WecKJbL ^a^a^, July

9,

Both quotes are from Lowitt, p. 208.

'
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floor manager.

The controversies on the
floor had been very bitter,
and he had displayed no
inclination to be lenient.
On the other
hand, Mann had voted against
the Payne-Aldrich tariff,
which La-

FoUette and the Progressives had
vehemently attacked,

shortly be-

fore the Republican caucus
convened, the insurgents met
separately.

A majority of the forty-one insurgents
agreed to support Mann since
they thought it was useless to
present their own challenger at a
caucus dominated by the regulars,
but a minority of seventeen
members
decided to fight Mann's election with
another candidate. The pro-

Mann insurgents attended the Republican
caucus where Mann was nominated by Cannon and unaniinously chosen.

The anti-Mann faction, com-

posed mainly of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and
Pacific Coast Progressives,

boycotted the caucus and on the floor of the
House voted for Henry
Cooper of Wisconsin.

Dwight of New York continued as Whip.

To pacify the insurgents and bring them back into
the party,

Mann abandoned Cannon's policy of treating dissidents
harshly and
instead gave the bolters favorable committee assignments.

For ex-

ample, Murdock was placed on Post Offices and Post Roads,
the very

committee from which he had been banished by Cannon, and Irvine
Lenroot, a Wisconsin Progressive, was appointed to the Rules
Committee.

60

Mann

s

considerate treatment, however, was overwhelmed by

^^Norris, p. 131,

p.

2;

N^T, Apr. 4, 1911, p. 1; April 5, 1911, p. 2; April 12, 1911,
Gwinn, pp. 223-229; Cong ressional Recor d, XLVII, Part 1, p. 6.
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the Taft-Roosevelt
breach that shattered
the party
By 1913 there were
three sets of
Kep.hUcans in

m

191^
the House-the

regulars; the Bull Moose
Progressives, .ho were
especially stron, i„
Pennsylvania and on the
West Coast; and the
rest of the Progressives
Whose stronghold was the
Midwest. The BuZl Moose
contingent decided'
to organize as a third
party and present their
own candidate for
speaker rather than try
to work with the regular
RepuhXicans. Invitations to the Bull Moose
caucus were sent to
forty-four insurgents
but a group led hy
Lenroot. Sydney Anderson
of Minnesota, and Willi..
Kent of California declined
to attend.
The absence of ^ny of
these
insurgents fron, the Bull Moose
conference can probably be
CKplained
by their close ties to
LaFollette. Lenroot had served
as LaFoUette's

floor leader in the Wisconsin
.^
legislature
j-egisiature and along
with^ Kent had
been a charter member ofX tne
the Nation;:.!
national Pt-^^>-^
Progressive League, founded at
LaFollette 's home in 1911.
1912 LaFollette had campaigned
hard
for the Republican presidential
nomination but his chances of
winning
had been severely undercut by
Roosevelt's late entry into the
campaign.
Roosevelt's tactics had soured the
LaFollette camp, which felt that
Roosevelt had deliberately used
LaFollette as his stalking horse so
•

m

LaFollette 's friends wanted no part of
a Bull Moose caucus.
The eighteen Bull Moosers went ahead
with their own caucus and
nominated Murdock for Speaker, allegedly
Roosevelt's personal choice.
The Progressives who had decided to
continue their uneasy alliance

with the Republican party attended the
regular caucus amidst flurries
of rumors that they might run their
own candidate against Mann in the
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spa.ea

.

_.e...,e ...

^^^^

^^^^

Nelson of Wisconsin.
Charles Burke of South
Dakota, assistant in.Wliip .
for several Congresses, was appointed
Whip
y to replace Pt.7^a^.^
Bwight of^ New York,
who had
re«.e. f.o. the House.
Bu^.e'. advance^enc
f.o„ assis... wh.p
to
Whip is one Of the fe.
instances of a Republican
leadership ladder
By 1915 the Progressives
had started to fade
as a significant
"
force Within the Republican
party and the Bull
Moosers had returned
to the party fold.
At the „„st fully attended
Republican caucus
Since 1907. Mann was
renominated by acclamation
and on the floor of
the House only two
California Progressives voted
"present" rather
than vote for Mann in a
mild show of uibpieaoure.
displeasure
tt,
.
The ,n,whip changed
as Charles Hanilton of
New York replaced Burke,
who had left the
House to run for the Senate.
In 1917, with the two parties
equally divided, the Republicans
had an excellent chance to
recapture the House of
Representatives if
they could induce three indep
endents to side with them and
if they

S-'^h flVA'
J.vr.^^.l
/o'
|2F2ll£tte,
(2 vols.;
MIett75 Wee^
P

al Record,

^'

l\V
^^^^^

'''''
^'

2;

Fola LaFollette

New York: MacMillan Co., 1953)
February 4 1911 dd 7 Q-

LrPirt17^63-64.

Congressional Record, LIII, Part

'

1,

pp.

'

5-6.

I

March 27, 1913
Robert "
M

sfl^
^"

. i n
^""^
Congression•
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could unite behind a
single choice for opeaKer.
Speaker

har^ny nearly collapsed
shortly after

H„„
,
Hopes for
party

the election «hen
Woodrow

Wilson asked the belligerents
to state their
peace ten., when Mann
._.
"unexpectedly arose in aerense
defense of
nf u-n
.
Wxlson as a peacemaker
and urged
bipartisan support for his
endeavor."" the interventionists
in the

P-ty, sy^oli.ed by Roosevelt,
decided

to challenge Mann.

After
consulting with Roosevelt,
Augustus Gardner of
Massachusetts announced he would back Lenroot
of Wisconsin for leader
because Mann
was pro-Ger^n.
Soon after. Tho^s Schall
of Minnesota, one of
the
last Bull Moose Progressives
left in the House, was
also invited to
confer with Roosevelt.
Roosevelt's Interest in the
leadership fight
steo^ed fro„ his desire to run
for President again in
1920.
He wanted
a Speaker congenial to his
candidacy and to win .the first
test for

control of the party ^chinery.

If an alignment of Republicans
and

independents could be forged, Mann
might have to be bypassed as
the
Republican nominee for Speaker.
The insurgents were determined
to

block Mann's advancement to the
Speakership even at the price of
letting the Democrats organize the
House because they feared a resurgence
of "Cannonisra" if Mann became Speaker.^*
To head off the brewing Mann-Lenroot
dispute. William Greene of
63
fi,

„

^T^^"^^

Llvermore, Politics is Adiourned

iSsififstfff *if^"—
26,

wfe.^n:

.

Woodrow Wilson and

(""-ii^^^^^ssr—weniTsruS^ifr

P-

3; and Dec.
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Massachusetts, the chair^n
of the Republican caucus,
appointed a
co^ittee composed of both
Progressives and regulars to
work out a
Plan acceptable to both wings
for organising the new
House. The
coonittee's .ost popular
proposal was for the Progressives
to vote
for Mann for Speaker in
return for regular votes to
elect Lenroot
Majority Leader. Another
possibility was to unite behind
a =o„pro.ise
choice such as Frederick GiUett
of Massachusetts or J.
Hampton Moore
of Pennsylvania. A final
alternative, whose chief proponent
was Hann.
called for a bipartisan organisation
of the House with Speaker
Clark
and floor leader Kitchin sharing
the leadership responsibilities
with
Mann as the Republican floor leader
and Lenroot as the chairman of
the Rules ConMlttee.

The Dei»ocrats were never enthusiastic
about

Mann's plan and Lenroot was hostile
to the idea even though Mann
offered to withdraw from the leadership
fight if a bipartisan approach

were adopted.
In March, 1917, Mann was renominated.

The most vocal dissenter

to his re-election was Gardner, who
announced that he intended to

vote for Lenroot on the House floor and moved
that the caucus decision
not be made binding on those present.

When this motion was tabled by

a vote of 127 to 47, Gardner walked out,
declaring that the Old Guard

was still in command.

After Gardner's departure, a couple of other

members indicated that they would also bolt to another
candidate when

^^I'iil" Feb. 8, 1917, p. 13; Feb. 16, 1917, p. 5; Feb. 18, 1917,
14; March 10, 1917, p. 1; March 27, 1917, p. 10; March
30,
1917, p. 5; and Livermore, pp. 13-14.
I,

p.

1A4

congress opened.

No

fo^x

candidate was entered
again.e >^nn at

the caucus, but Mann had
to accept two changes
that weakened his

power-apparently

Woofs

lost the power to

^Ue

price for dropping out
of the race.

Republican co™ittee
assignments.

He

In the

future this duty would be
shared by a co^ittee
of seventeen with
Mann presiding. Furthermore,
the caucus created an
advisory co™ittee of six, with Mann as
chainnan. to set party
policy.

When Congress convened, a
handful of Republicans did
not vote
for Mann.

Schall, in fact, supported
Clark for Speaker because
he

thought Wilson deserved a
Speaker fro™ his own party
with the country
on the verge of war. Most
of the bolters were
Easterners who had not
been pro=,inent in earlier
leadership battles and were
generally perceived as Roosevelt loyalists.^*

Hamilton was re-appointed Whip.

Sunmar;^ of the 1911 to 1919
Co ntests

Ihe 1911 to 1919 minority interlude
was a storey period for the
Republican leadership,
four Congresses, there were
three contests

m

over the Minority Leadership:

in 1911 the Republicans wrangled
over

the Minority Leader vacancy created
by the shift to minority status

and by Cannon's decision to step down;
and in 1913 and 1917 the Pro-

gressives led protests against Mann's leadership.

See Table 8 for a

March 31, 1917, p. 4; Richard Boiling. Power in
the HouseHistorjr of the Leadership of the House of
RepreseM^Uv'^ .-J^e"^
York: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1969),
p. 99; LTverr;;oVe. p. 14 and p. 251and Congressional Record. LV, Part
1, pp. 107-108.
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TABLE

8

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
SELECTION, 1911-1919
Status of Post

1911

1913

What Happened

Outcome

Minority Leader

Vacancy
(Party became
Minority)

No Vacancy

Contest-17 insurgents
boycotted caucus and
presented rival candidate on floor of
House.

Contest-Bull Moose
Progressives held separate caucus and presented own candidate
for Speaker on House

Mann elected
Insurgents
won better
committee
assignments.

Mann reelected

.

floor.

1915

1917

1911

1913

1915

1917

No Vacancy

No Vacancy

No Vacancy

No Contest.

Contest-rival candidate did not permit
name to be entered
at caucus

Mann reelected

.

Mann re-elected;
Steering Committee and Committee
on Committees established to decentralize leader's
power

New Minority Leader
made appointment.

Dwight re-named,

(Dwight retired)

Minority Leader promoted Assistant Whip.

Burke named.

Vacancy
(Burke retired)

Minority Leader made
appointment

Hamilton named.

Vacancy

No Vacancy

No Change

Hamilton re-named.
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.-.r,.
as

Minoru, .ea.e..

Afte. .He

I,U

^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^
..e

co„nic. „o„ conoeaslons
fo. .He

con.e... .He. deceive.

He«e. co^U.ee assi.^en.s

and .He 1,17 Ha..le
succeeded i„ u„i.,„,

..^^^^^^^^
power to appoint co»lttees
and to .ake policy.
The struggles of
this period see™ to be
a continuation of the
revolt against "Cannonis." for rules revision
and a wider distribution
of influence within
the Republican party
appeared to be as important
to the insurgents as
leadership change. Because
the insurgents were so
obviously outnumbered in the Republican
party, the contests were
conducted differently fro. the typical
Democratic fight. Democratic
clashes were
wrapped up before the caucus
or settled at the caucus;
but the Pro-

gressives, knowing they could
seldom win in the- caucus,
tended to
carry their quarrels to the
House floor in order to publicize
their
demands and force concessions.

Although Mann was the only Minority
Leader, turnover was high
among the Whips.

Dwight, Burke and Hamilton all
served as Whip during

this short interval.

Voluntary retirements from the House,
not re-

moval for poor performance in office,
accounted for this mobility.
Evidence of a routinized method of
recruiting leaders is very
slender.

Mann, before his selection as Minority
Leader, had served

as Chairman of the Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee.

He

seemed to be picked for his competence
and attachment to standpat

policies rather than for any previous post he
had held.

With the

Whips, Burke was selected after an apprenticeship
as Assistant Whip
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but neither Bwlght nor
Hamilton had acted In such
a capacity hefore
being appointed.
Finally, the Involvement
of individuals outside
the House of
Representatives continued to
be an Important factor
in Republican
contests,
the previous Majority
phase. Senators had
frequently
Played a leading role but
between 1911 and 1919. except
for LaFoIUtte
their influence had diminished.
Corporate and special interest
group
participation had also declined
but Taft. Roosevelt, and
LaFoUette.
each closely identified with
a ^Jor bloc within
the fragmented party,
were all active in the Republican
battles.
In 1911, Taft, through
Longworth, seems to have tried
to rally support to
overthrow Cannon;

m

in 1913 Roosevelt was behind
the Bull Moose decision to
organize as
a third party and picked
Murdock, while LaFoUette's
feelings of betrayal by Roosevelt In 1912 were
probably responsible for diluting

Progressive cohesion; and in 1917
Roosevelt was orchestrating the

opposition to Mann.

^Mlysifi of the V ariables
^^St22lllZ-m^^2ll^ £tatus.

,

1911 -1919

Minority status was associated with

more frequent leadership conflict in the
Republican party,

m

the

eight year minority interlude, three fights
occurred in comparison

with three skirmishes in the preceding
sixteen year majority period.
Moreover, two of the three contests between
1911 and 1919 were directed against the incumbent leader whereas
in the previous interval only

the 1909 revolt challenged an incumbent.

Fights developed regardless
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of the size of the nart-v
party.

tu
There
was a battle i. 1917
when the Repub-

licans were verv cln<3<3
y close to a^ .najority as well as
in 1913 when the
party had been reduced
to a tiny minority.
Consequently, as Table 9
demonstrates, the tendency
noted before for „ost
leadership fl.hts
to Cluster near the
50 per cent ^r, disappeared
between 1911 and 1,19,
•

.

TABLE

9

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND PARTY
SIZE, 1911-1919
% of Republican Seats

Under 40%

# of Congresses

1

40 to 44.97o

1

45 to 50.0%

2

Election trends
.

election disasters,

# of Contests

1
1

1

Two of the three Republican
struggles followed
in 1910, for instance, the
Republicans dropped

fifty-eight seats and lost control of
the House of Representatives
and
in 1912 they lost an additional
thirty-four seats and the Presidency.
(See Table 10).

These findings are compatible with
Peabody's study,

which indicated that leadership
quarrels were more likely to occur
after a major defeat, but differed from
the earlier Republican pattern where conflict coincided with minor
election losses rather than
the biggest downturns.

Hie 1917 contest deviated from both
patterns

in that for the first time since 1895
a Republican battle was as-

sociated with a modest election upswing that
netted the party fourteen

new seats rather than

a defeat of any size.
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Year

1911

1917

Change from Previous Election

161

1913*
1915

# of House
Seats won

% of GOP Seats When
Congress Opened

-58

127 (114)

41.3

-34 (-47)

196

+69

210

33.3

46.9

+14

49.4

indicates a contest

The House was expanding
rapidly in size. The
figures in parentheses are
adjusted uslno the
sx« of the previous Congress
as the base.

Me2bershi£ turnover.

There was no clear relationship
between

the extent of .e^ershlp
turnover and the tl.lng of
leadership contests between 1911 and 1919.
Although the 1911 and 1913
fights

correlated with Increased membership
change, this pattern broke
down
1915 and 1917, as Table 11 indicates.
In 1915 no contest de-

m

veloped even though nearly half
the Republican Congressn„.n had
not
served in the last Congress and
in 1917, despite a holdover
rate
among Republicans of nearly 30.0
per cent, there was a

nK,ve

to oust

Mann.
H ierarch y_.

The 1911 and 1913 contests followed
a rise in fresh-

men members, but as with membership
turnover the relationship became
fuzzy beginning with the 64th Congress.

An expanding freshman class

in 1915 coincided with the only example
of leadership stability in
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TABLE 11

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND
ME^ffiERSHIP CHANGE,
iyii-iyi9
Year

u£ iNew Members

/o

1911

°L

Incumbents

26.7

73.3

1913
37.9

1915

48.0

1917

21.4

62.1

52.0
78.6

indicates a contest

the minority period and a
substantial drop in the
proportion of
freshmen in 1917 was associated
with renewed conflict over
the

Minority Leadership as Table
12 illustrates.

TABLE 12

REPUBLICAN COOTESTS AND SENIORITY,
1911-1919
Year

% Freshmen

1911
1913
1915

1917

indicates a contest

% Seniors

26.1

25.5

37.2

20.0

39.2

18,1

18.6

19.5
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W.th senior .embers
the sa„e type of
ett.tic pattern existed
ana
a.hts eorreUte. .ith lo^er
proportion, of veteran
Republicans whereas the
1917 contest followed
a slight increase
in
senior „e^ers. furthermore,
when the percentage of
senior Kepuhlicans was loveat-lS.S
per cent in
1915-there was harmony
The
absence of strong relationships
between leadership challenges
and
membership change or age
groups in the Republican
party between
1911 and 1919 was also
characteristic
^-eristic of fh„
n
the Democratic
party during
the Wilson era.

»U

Factionalism.

All three contests developed
when the Midwest was
the largest regional bloc
in the House as Table
13 demonstrates,
when
Midwestern and Western delegates
are counted together,
they held over
a ..Jority of the seats
on the Republican side
.f the aisle in ever^
contest year,
1915, the only Congress in this
minority period.in
which there was no contest,
the East was the largest
regional faction
and in conxbination with
Southern and Border State
representatives

m

controlled the same number of seats
as the Midwest and West.
The ideological fragmentation of
the Republican party continued
to play an important role
in the development of the
leadership
clashes.

As Table 14 indicates, the fights
occurred under two dif-

ferent sets of circumstances-when
the Progressives composed at
least one-fourth of the Republican
membership as in 1911 and 1913.
or when Progressive votes were
necessary for the Republicans to or-

ganize the House as in 1917.

Between 1903 and 1911 Republican con-

tests had taken place under almost identical
conditions -when the
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TABLE 13

Year

1911

% Midwest

43.5

East

7o

% West

37.9

in

"U

South and Border
States

c

8.1

1913
1915
1917

40.0
39.7

43.3

35.9

15.2

43.1

9.0

10.3

41.4

6.9

8.8

6.5

indicates a contest

TABLE 14

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND
IDEOLOGICAL FACTIONS, 1911-1919
Year

1911

1913
1915

1917

# of Progressives

41

44
33
36

% of Pro
gressives

25.5%
34.1%

# of Republicans

# of Seats GOP
needed to control House

161

34

129

89

16.9%

195

23

16.7%

215

3

indicates a contest

Progressive band was at its height
in sl.c or when they
balance of power between Democrats
and Rep^iblicans .

heW

the

The 1917 case

is slightly different in
that the Republicans needed
the Progressives

plus some independent votes.

Nevertheless, the pattern remains:
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whenever the
Progressives held their
be,^ x
best
bargaining position,
the
Chances .or a leadership
bra„i increased
dra.aticail,

m

short, both regional
and ideological
factio
f-^-naUs. appeared
be associated with
the f
forn^tion of Republican
contests. These
variables were
intertwined because
.ost of the Progre
^^ogressives were
Midwesterners. The onlv
'
'^-^
a Sizable group
of Eastern Progressives
was in 191, X
„
Roosevelt's coattails
had
puiied a number of rflnri-;^ov
candidates running on
the Bull Moose
label to
victory in Pennsylvania
and New York
xork.
Yet „one suspects
that the
xdeological split in the
party superseded the
Lne regional
1
alignments
-iSSering the contests of
this period since
the issues involved
in the disputes
"
concerned the decentralisation
of power inside the
party and increased
opportunities for the
Progressive wing to innuence policy. Additionally.
Mann was a Midwesterner
so the Midwest had no need to
fi-ht tor
for Its
-fi-o
t,
-^^onc
share
of the spoils.
This minority interlude
makes an interesting
comparison with
the Republicans in
the .id-l^SO's and
ISeo's.
Peabody Hypothesised
that a deeply fragmented
party showed less
conflict than a party
with
fewer internal cleavages.
He based his theory on
the way the two
•

,

-

parties behaved between
1955 and 1966 when the
Republicans were a
homogeneous but conflict
riddled group.
data fro. the heyday
of the Progressives
n^vement in the Republican
party, however, suggest that deep divisions
in Republican ranks
were strongly conducive
to frequent leadership
battles.

Qons^mm^.

Just as between 1895 and
1911. the leadership care-

fully reflected the strength
of the largest regions.

A Midwesterner
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was Minority Leader
fr>T- t-u^ r i-.
the full minority
y lueaaer tor
xauervai, which
t-tH-j^k
y interval
correspond*
to .he Midwest's
do.inan. posiUo„ fo.
six of .he eish.
,e„s. Hxcepe fo. ln3 to
1915. .he Congress 1. which
the Mi.we.t „as
st.onsest, Mann had an
Easterner for whip. „hlch
neatly balanced the
leadership geographically.
The Republicans continued
to reward
orthodoxy in distributing
leadership posts. The
only Congress fro„
to
1895
1919 in which the Republicans
even talked about placing
an
insurgent in a party office
was in 1917 when to
entice Progressive
votes to elect a Republican
Speaker, the old guard
considered ^Uing
Lenroot Majority Leader.
'

Siimmary of the Variables

The 1911 and 1913 contests
occurred when the Republican
party
was undergoing tremendous
strains.
The party had suffered two
.ajor
defeats in the House, lost the
Presidency, and been left battered
by
the Taft-Roosevelt donnybrook.
the House the composition of
the

m

party was very unstable with a
high rate of turnover, large
freshmen
classes, and a dwindling reservoir
of experienced members. The
1917
contest, in contrast, formed when
the Republicans were regaining
their lost seats and when the House
membership was becoming more

settled and more senior.

The conditions that tie these three
con-

tests together and also separate them
from the one Congress in which
no challenge was undertaken were
1) that the Midwest was the largest

regional faction and 2) the Progressive wing
had improved its strategic position either by increasing in
size or by holding the votes

necessary for the Republicans to organize the
chamber.

The only
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other va.,aMe tUa.
^^^^^^^^^
is Minority
status
ouauufa,
J-

fnr the Democrats
n
ror
<:ii.i,
werp
were alcr,
also x^^^
more prone to fight

during the minority years.
Just how critical the
factlonalls. was in fostering
the distuptions can be illustrated
by the one Congress
without leadership
conflict.

In 1915 several of the
tne variable,
variables theorized. as
contributing
•

to fights were present:

only 52 per cent of the
Republicans had

served in the last Congress;
nearly 40 per cent were
freshmen; and
veterans composed the
s^Uest proportion of the party
.e^ershlp
since 1903. Yet no contest
developed, largely because
the Midwest
and more importantly the
Progressives had lost ground.
Thus, between 1911 and 1919
Republican leadership struggles
in
the House of Representatives
appeared to be an outgrowth of
the conflict raging at all levels of
the party between conservatives
and

Progressives.

In the House the battles tended
to be three way com-

petitions rather than strictly
Taft-Roosevelt or standpat-Bull

Moose divisions.

LaFollette's camp or at least politicians
sharing

his more agrarian brand of
Progressivlsm as opposed to Roosevelt's

more urban outlook" did not join
easily with either of the other
factions and added to the splintering of
the party.

Leadership Contests

,

1919 to 1931

After eight years as the minority, the
Republicans were victorious in 1918 and regained control of the
House of Representatives.

Nye, p. 184.
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A struggle over the
SoeakprcK,speakership
„as underway i„edlately.
The leading
contenders were CUlett
GinPt-^ of
^-f
Massachusetts. Martin
Madden of Illinois
inois
and Simeon Fess of nhir.
Ohxo.
Minority Leader Mann
„as discounted 1„
th e
beginning because of
poor health.

GlUett

v^j-i-iecc,

briefl
briefly mentioned ^as
a
speakership possibility
In l,n. Had acted
as floor leader
.hU e Mann
was 111 and „as second
ranking a„ong House
Republicans In seniority
Also Important was that
CUlett had a „ore passive
personality than
either Cannon or Mann
and .as expected
to be a less forceful
Speaker

Madden would be

a

candidate only If Mann
could not run.
„e was con/
sWered antl-buslness by so.e
urban Republicans but
he was popular
in Midwestern agriculture
circles
'«-'
Fess a
» former
f„,
tess,
president of
Antloch college, was the
chairman of the Republican
Congressional
campaign Co„ittee and had
been endorsed by
Prohibitionist groups
for the speakership.
Although a conservative,
Pess had so„e progressive
tendencies, which ^de hi™
acceptable to Midwestern
and Pacific Coast
Republicans who were threatening
to fight any leader
Identified with
or responsible for Cannonis,„
and the conservative
policies that tore
the party apart in 1912,
the early stages of the
contest Fess
seemed to be the likeliest
choice.
'

m

All predictions went awry in
December. 1918. when Mann
announced
that he was well enough to
compete for
the Speakership.

Coinciding

With Mann's declaration. Madden
withdrew so that Mann could have
a
united Illinois dele gation behind
him.
with Mann definitely in the

Ml,

~"~

"

68

Nov. 24. 1918, p.

Part^ Leaders

,

p.

99.

10-

Dec

191R

19
'

„ i/

?

j „
^"'^

,
Rlpley,
•
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pu«„,

contes...

Ha„„

cUle«.

„ann not o„I,
.^^^.^
by the Progressives,
.ut his refusal to
support Mils that „l,ht
embarrass president Wilson
while at the Peace
Conference ha. earned
hin, the entity of
the Roosevelt stalwarts
and several powerful
senators, including Henry
Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts.
GiUett. running as a liberal, argued
that Mann would bring
back Cannonis„ to
the House, especially
the Speaker's exclusive
perogative to appoint

co^ittees

GiUett further claimed that
he was noo

A.erican,"^° a slogan designed

to draw

per cent

attention to Mann's support

for Wilson's peace overtures.
In early January, 1919,
Longworth entered the Speakership
race
as a co.pro.ise choice.

Longworth was respected in the
Midwest, but

he was also strong among
younger members, particularly
in key states
like Pennsylvania and New
York.
In spite of a conservative
record.

Longworth also attracted m.oderate
votes by leading the fight to
abolish seniority as a hard and
fast rule for selecting committee
chairmen and for making committee
assignments.
Toward the end of January, will
Hays as Chairman of the Republican National Committee canvassed
the party's Congressional

membership and found strong opposition
to Mann, chiefly from a group
of prominent conservative senators
led by Lodge, Reed Smoot of Utah

Dec.

_NYT,
^

^Ibid

.

,

19,

1918, p. 14.

Jan. 20, 1919, p.

7.
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"

:

v"io.

eo .He

POUC, these
..e

Sp.Ue.3H.p „ouXa

.He

.e.o.e..

the

Se..e .ea.e„ .e.e ae.e™...

to ae.ea.

...0 on acco.n.

p.HU. .He .^p.ess.on

CCa„„o„

one o. Ka.n.s ca„p..,„

'

.Ha. .He pa..,

ano.He. a.HU.a.,

Kep„.u.„

^pea.e.

Ihe Se„a.ors „e.e also
.is.u..ea H, .epc...
.Ha. Mann Ha. accep.e.
Slf.s of beefs.eau fro.
s«if..s Mea.pae.ins
Co„pan..

^

.UHou^H .Hese

<ilsclosu.es

,U

no. .nle Mann ou.
co.ple.el,. f„.

one „as cHa.sln,
tha. .he presen.^ Had
influenced His official
HeHavio., .He scandal
Old provide a convenien.
excuse for .an. House
RepuHlicans .Ho Had
vo.ed for Mann for Minori.y
.eader Hu. were reluc.an.
.0 bac. Hi.
for Speaker.

In February, a deal
seemed to be under
unaer wpv
way:

Vi.h Gillet. in re.ur„ for
rules refor..

Longworth would side

iHis ru.or gained s.reng.H

when New VorU, Pennsylvania,
and Indiana Congressmen
leaning .oward
Longworth declared for Gille...
Because Mann was believed .0
be
n-aking li..le headway and
Fess Had wi.Hdrawn in the
interes. of

party solidari.y/1 .He
con.est seemed set.led.

A. .His poin. Philip

Cawpbell of Kansas suddenly
announced His candidacy.

Campbell had
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originally backed Mann
but in exnlainina
u
u
explaining why
he was entering the
con-

m

test, he said:

the opinion of
cons'uLe^s-^LtSp^o^^.lJjj^^,
because^he opposed
prohibition and'Lman s"!
But Campbell's effort
„a. too late and too
sectional to block
Gillett.

With

GlUetfs

victory certain, the demand
for rules revision

faded,

some of the senior members
supporting Gillett were not
keen
about ending seniority in
making co™ittee assignments.
At the
"
caucus the Fess. Longworth.
and Gillett contingents
combined to
elect Gillett with 138 votes
to sixty-nine for Mann,
thirteen for
Campbell, four for John Esch
of Wisconsin, and one for
Frank Mondell
of Wyoming.
but part of Gilletfs band
united with the Mann camp
to defeat the amendments to
the rules and to pass Mann's
resolution
that the Comrcittee on Committees
be composed of one member from
each
state delegation.'* The outcome
was that Gillett won the Speakership,

"im,

Feb. 26, 1919,

p., 1.

™=

adopted, proposed that each

state with
Republican delegation elect one member to
cast the state's vote
Control was thus concentrated in the four
largest Republican stat^sP«"nsyl™nla. Illinois, and Ohio-all regular
bastions In
ti
^tlo
I9ibi.
The Gillett plan or at least the scheme
presented by Gillett's
campaign manager proposed a seventeen man
Committee on Committees
The proposal listed the seventeen members.
Presumably, the plan
gave the moderates and the Progressives more
influence than the Mann
substitute.
See NYT, Feb. 28. 1919, p. 1.
a

'
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but Mann ana a
co.e.le „. old

on Co^ueees,

^l.H

not only

^ar.

Xeade.s dominated the
Co ramittee

^de co^Utee as.l^ents

nominated the Majority
Leader and Whip.
The Co^letee on

Co^U.ees

promptly voted .0

o«er

... al so

the Majority

Leadership to Mann.
^^^^^^ ^^^^

^^^^^^^

Mondell although Ohio.
Indiana. Idaho. .e„
.ersey, and West VVirginia
abstained and Samuel
Wlnslow of Massachusetts
(clUett's campaign
-naser) cast Massachusetts'
twelve votes "against
Mann." After
Mann, who had cast
lUlnols. flfty.four votes
for himself, refused
to serve-prohahly
hecause he was angry at
losing the Speakership
Mondell was picked with
160 votes.
Seventy-sl. ballots were
either
passed or cast against
Mondell.
Harold Knutson of Minnesota
was
chosen W,lp with 118 votes
over Clifton McArthur. of
Oregon with
forty-one votes and Albert
ere Ve<;ti1
nf t,,^,-o
vestal of
Indiana with twenty-three
votes
Since Mondell was "classified
as an extreme reactionary"
and Knutson
was considered "a Cannon
pupil," ,he anti-Mann wing
was Incensed
with the results. Longworth,
who had lobbied hard behind
the scenes
•

,

for the^Majority Leadership,
labeled the votes as "out
Cannoning

cannon"" and the
Progressive bloc hoped

to overturn the nominations

at the caucus if public
opinion could be aroused.

No source follows
the contest beyond this point
so it is probably safe to
assume that

no revolt materialized.

f

quotations in this paragraph
graph"^!;
For a br?
brieff'bbuti"'^
informative account of Longworth's leadershn'r,
'
ambitions, see Alice Roosevelt Longworth's
Crowded °Hours. vwew
York.
^, me! Vn"
Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1933),
p. 282.
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After the Harding
landslide
ndslide, there
thc.^^ was
great consternation
about
the Republican
Congressional leadership
uersnip.
Lindc.
p
Lindsay Rogers
noted in
the American

Ppj^^

The New York Times
bemoaned the
Lne state of leadership
in the Republican
party in Congress and
wondered if the public
ut
would blame Harding for
the lackluster Congressional
performance.'^ A contest
seemed possible
for rank and file
Republicans were also expressing
dissatisfaction
with the quality of leadership.
GiUett and Mondell took the
threat
of a revolt seriously
enough to acknowledge that
some changes might
be necessary to revitalize
the leadership.
The likeliest scapegoat
appeared to be Knutson the Whip,
since he had been absent on a
critical vote on railroad
legislation, no outburst was
anticipated
if he were dropped.
Nevertheless, despite all the talk.
GiUett
•

.

•

and Mondell were re-elected
without opposition and Knutson
was re»
J
earned as Whip.

.78

The 1922 election reinforced the
Progressives and the farm bloc,
a group of representatives
organized in the 67th Congress to
combat
the depression in farming communities
in the Midwest.

Ainerican

1920)!^p!''76!^

^""nyT,

Polity

During the

XIV (Feb.,

Feb. 8, 1921, p. 10.

^'

^^2^^ p-^^^-f;'

1920, p. 8; Feb. 14. 1921, p. 2; and March
1,
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sxmraer of 1921,

problems.

approximately one hundrpd
k
hundred members
y
of what John D

AUhougH KonaeU had los.

his sea. i„
1922 elecUon,
a contest was expected
pected nv^^-r
over v,-,-^
his vacancy and a
revolt against Speaker

Glllett seemed conceivable
too.
in the early weeks
there was much confusion
over who would run
for What Office but by
late November. 1922.
the contests had begun
to sort the^elves out.
Glllett would be unopposed
for Speaker even
though some party pros
thought Mann could upset
hl„. For Majority

Leader Longworth would run
with the blessings of
the old guard
against far™ bloc candidate
WxUiam Graham of Illinois.
Longworth, already strong
In the East, tried to

^ke

his candi-

dacy .ore palata.le to the
antl-ad.inistratlon wing by having
friends
clai. that he shared Roosevelt's
viewpoint. Even the
Nen York

Tl^

admitted that it was hard to
find ..ny traces of this
similarity.
An additional Longworth strategcn,
was to dangle the office of
wl.ip
in front of farm bloc meniers
«°
such as Jasper Tincher of
Kansas.
Graham, on the other hand,
campaigned hard among the freshmen
on the
theme that he could bring more
balance to the leadership than
Longworth.
When Longworth demanded to know how
a Massachusetts-Illinois

ticket was mo re geographically
balanced than a Massachusetts-Ohio
79

John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy.
1921-1933
York.
i iiii. CNewYnrkHarper and Brothers, 1 960).
8'!
p. 8
80
1923.

p^:

P-

Jan. 18,
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Slate.

Ho.„ no.,

of Kansas explained
.ha. since .o.h aiUet.
and
e^e fro„ p.ospero.s. industrial
districts, they Had
little firsthand .ncwledge
of the depression
in Midwestern farming
towns,
craha™, instead,
represented an agricultural
constituency in

^o„,

of farm problems to the
business oriented leadership.

The Progressives, meanwhile,
had decided not to back
either
Graham or Longworth in order
to devote themselves
to policy and
further liberalisation of
the rules. The practical
consequences of
the Progressives- aloofness
was to aid Longworth.

Yet the Progres-

sives were not unduly disturbed
by this development
because they
thought LaPollette's chances
for the Presidency in 1924
would benefit
if Longworth prevented the
passage of needed reform.
In November, 1923, Graham
presented the conditions under
which

he «,uld pull out of the race and
thus ensure Longw^rth's victory.
To offset the domination of New
England (a major issue after Calvin
Coolidge became President). Graham
demanded that three of the four
Steering Committee vacancies go to
the Midwest. Always the pragmatist, Longworth quickly pledged to
recommend Graham's proposal to

the Committee on Committees and soon
had a commitment from the leadership to increase farm bloc strength
on the Steering Committee.

Graham then withdrew saying he was satisfied
that a Midwestern agriculture majority on the Steering Committee
would balance the

Ibid.. Nov. 24, 1923, p. 15 and Nov.
25, 1923, p. 4.
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leadership.

Graham's withdrawal caused
widespread JubUation^^ in
the Republican party for
no ^re organization
problems were expected,
but the party had reckoned
without considering the trap
the Progressives were setting.
The Progressives, .ho had
been conferring with LaFollette,
wanted
to reorganize several
influential co^ittees,
particularly the Interstate and Foreign Conferee
Con^ittee and the Ways and
Means Con^ittee,
in order to have a greater voice
on taxes, the tariff, and the
adjustment of railroad rates. A second
den^nd was to reduce the power
of
the Rules CoHHuittee to gag the
membership. The specific complaint
was that in the last Congress the
Rules Committee had refused to report at least thirty measures.

One reform the Progressives did
not

want was to tamper with seniority because
some of them were in line
to become committee chairman in the
near future.

To gain their ends

the Progressives were prepared to deadlock
the House by voting for

their own candidate for Speaker until
the Republican leadership
83
agreed to their demands.

At the caucus, Gillett was renominated over
token opposition:
Cooper polled fifteen votes. Madden eight, and
Edward Little of
82

Ibid., Jan 22, 1923, p. 4; Feb. 12, 1923,
p. 15; Aug. 18,
1923, p. 3; Nov. 18, 1923, p. 9; Nov. 23, 1923,
p. 19; and Nov. 29,
1923, p. 6,
83

Ibid., Nov. 15, 1923, p. 21; Nov. 19, 1923,
p. 1; Nov. 22,
1923, p. 21; Nov. 25, 1923, p. 4; Dec. 1, 1923,
pp. 1-2; the LaFollettes, II, pp. 1066-1067; Hicks, p. 89; Chiu,
p. 271; and
Clarence A. Berdahl, "Some Notes on Party Membership in Congress,"
American Political Science Review XLIII (April, 1949), pp.°320-321.
,
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Kansas one.

The ballots for
for- r
cooper, which were
cast by Wisconsin
and Minnesota
.embers, were
interpreted
H tiuea as "out
a H
out-and-out
anti-Gillett"
voces
..e H.a.e„ ...es
.ere

^u.

eons.e.e.

With four or five cprt^^^

^

.^e.

e.a.cee..-

•

'°

C°°P« votes on the House
Longworth was elected hv
by voxce vote
with one or two no
votes
recorded. When Nelson
asked xf
if the
th. caucus vote
for Speaker was
binding, caucus chairman
Anderson
on rules
rule, that
tb.h only
i
a special nu^tion
would
^ke it so. None was offered
tered, wb-fri.
which cleared the
path for the Progressive protest on the
House
floor.

•

floor.

For two days and eight
gnt ba^^n^c
ballots, twenty- two
Republicans steadily
voted for Cooper or
q^^^i
Madden for
fn^ Speaker
and successfully
stalled the election of Cillett as
Speaker. Nelson told
Longworth that the ProSressives were willing to
drop their demand for
better co^^ittee assignments if they could be
oe sure thp^
that ^b
their rule changes would
be
voted upon. Longworth
refused to budge / arguing
that the country
would tire of the
Progressives' t.ctics.
Kinally, „hen the Progressives showed no signs of
disintegrating, Longworth
yielded. The
rules that were adopted set
the number of signatures
needed on a dlscharge petition at 150 and
Nelson was plaeed, on the
Rules Co™ittee.«=
•

Dec. 2. 1923. p.
1, for both quotations
f-^o""

Dec

I^his paragraph

the footnotes,
pp. 33-34; NYT, Dee. 4. 1923

|en£. (New York: MacMillan Co
.T967)
.

p

1-

,^7^17 anTio?fi|.~UO-

167

Knutson, who voted
for Cooper
uooper at the
t-h. caucus
and on each of the
eight ballots on the
flno-r
*.u
floor of the House,
was replaced as Whip,
,

^e

because o. his .efecUon
.o rhe Progressive

-tson

.as first chosen to
.e

^Ip

ca^

or he

have .e-

he .as ver. conservative,

.url.

the 1930.S his
conservatism .as again
apparent .hen he .as one
of thl
Republicans- ^st articulate
opponents of the Ne. Oeal.^^
purther
evidence .hlch suggests
that Knutson's
dismissal preceded his
all,n-nt .1th the Progressives .ould
he that .ons.orth
,ulte openl. tried
to entice Key far.
bloc .embers to his
side by talking about
their
fitness to be Whip, and
that Knutson had almost
lost the office In
1921.
Vestal of Indiana replaced
Knutson.

in May, 1,24, GUlett
announced he planned to
run for the Senate
A contest to fill the open
Speakership Wdlately began
.1th the
Illinois delegation endorsing
Madden for the position.
Madden .as
the Chairman of the
Appropriations Co„ittee and a
strict fiscal conservative. His Chief rival .as
Majority Leader Long.orth.
Because
Longworth "thre. the .eight of
his support
to Mr.

GlUett, thus con-

tributing in a measure to Che
selection of the Massachusetts
veteran,""
Long.orth .as expected to have
GlUetfs help, .hlch in turn .ould
probably bring Coolldge's blessings.

86„
'"^^ Republicans In a
Minority Role, 1933-1938 "
ni„™,bl
li
^f""!"'
(Unpublished
Ph.D.
dissertation, state University of
Lwa, i960),
3M.
p

87
E£L> Nov. 6, 1924, p. 11.
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Ma....
^^^^^^^

CooX.ase „o.Z.

neu..: 3.„ce K..
.o„„.,o.H an. .a..e„
„e.e

ular Republicans with
no bleirish
leiLish on -h.88
.heir party records"^^
and had
stood by Coolidge on
key
ey roll
roll mTi
call votes in the
last Congress. He
also argued that
Madden 'ss zpaI
zeal -r,,
xn protecting the
treasury from raids
by spendthrift
Congressmen would guarantee
harmony between the
House
and the White House.
Although Coolidge never
publicly e^ressed a
preference, he did work
quietly to round up
votes for Longworth
-e Martin, then a fresh:.n, for
example, recalled voting
for Longworth at Coolidge 's
request.^'

As the caucus approached,
the fight hec»,e .ore
bruising as both
Sides tried to win
Pennsylvania. The first
hint that Pennsylvania
was the icey to the outcoMe
ca.e when Britt..,,. blasted
Senator
David

Reed of Pennsylvania for
trying to assume -the
..ntle of Boles
Penrose and the political
dictatorship of Pennsylvania.
Reed
had convinced two Madden
Congressmen in the Pennsylvania
delegation
to switch to Longworth.
addition. Senator George
Pepper and
Secretary of the Treasury Andrew
Mellon-both powerful in the Penn-

m

sylvania Republican party-were
working for Longworth while
Representative WiUian. Vare fought on
behalf of Madden.
(The real

issue

88

Ibid., Nov. 9, 1924, p. 22.

89

McGra„.Sli?l96S)

'W,

Feb.

.^.^

^

14, 1925, p.

3.

^^"^

^ ^ii^i^s

,

(New York:

"
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fiefdo., and the

PMla.elpMa crsan.aUon.
Va.e's .o„e

.ase.

was

Va.e

^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^

ing Reed for .He Sena.e
in

„„,er pressure fro.
^.a.e„

Mellon aeniea cha. He
favored Lo„s.or.H and
praised Madden's
as Appropriations
Chairs as

„r.

...ideal....'!

,uho.gH both sides
clai^d to He ^.in, ,.eat
inroads into Pennsylvania.
.ong^ortH's
Victory seeded certain
„Hen He released

..one

of His pledged votes/.^

«ho was under intense
pressure from Vare.
While tHe speakership
contest was being waged.
Jockeying for
the Majority Leadership
was occurring si„„ltaneously.
Bertrand
Snell of New VorU and John
Tilson of Conaecticuf were
the leading
contenders.
Snell was the Chair^n of
the Rules Co^ittee and
had
been endorsed by New York
for Majority Leader.
An early Longworth
supporter. Snell had ..become
inactive', and there was
gossip He '.had
gone over to the Madden ca^p
because of the failure of
the Longworth
leaders to slate Hi. for next
House leader..." xilson. who
was Longworth's choice for Majority
Leader, was on the Ways and
Means Committee and had briefly aspired
to be Speaker.
No data exist of a
deal between Longworth and lilson.
but it would have been
advantageous
to Longvorth to head off
Tilson
lij-bon.
Til^nn
tt^„i^ have
iiison would
split Longworth's
91
92

Ibid., Feb. 26, 1925, p.

3.

Ibid., Feb. 27, 1925, p. 3.

^^Ibid., Feb. 27, 1925, p. 3, for both
quotations about Snell.
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.a.te.„ .upp.„.
Midwest.

ehe caucus

^^^^

^^^^^^ ^^^^

.on^..,

Txlson was unanimously
picked for Majority
Leader.
94
txnued as Whip

Vestal con-

,

one voice uncharacterististictly
,uiet in the struggle
„as the
Progressives'. Ihe 1924
election had cut sharply
into their strength
but the .re l^ortant
reason was that Longworth,
with Coolidge's
approval, had decided to
punish the Progressives who
had campaigned
for LaPollette for President
in 1924.
The Wisconsin delegation
of
ten plus Fiorello LaGuardia
of New York, Ja.es Sinclair
of North
Dakota, and Oscar Keller
of Minnesota did not receive
invitations
to the Republican caucus
that nominated Longworth.
Moreover, two
tests of party orthodoxy were
devised. Unless these thirteen
Insurgents voted for Longworth for
Speaker on the House floor and
voted
to undo the rules changes
they had forced through the
House in 1923,
they would be stripped of their
conMittee seniority. The Progressives' answer was to vote for
Cooper instead of Longworth and
to op-

pose the tousher discharge petition
Longworth advocated.

On the

vote to raise the number of signatures
needed for a discharge pe-

tition from 150 to 218, twelve other
insurgents Joined the La-

Follette bolters but forty-three Republicans
who had voted fc- liberalization in 1923 switched sides in 1925.

Longworth ouste

Nelson

and James Frear of Wisconsin from the
Rules and Ways and Means
94
p.

306.

Ibid-. Feb- 10, 1925, p. 3; Feb. 28.
1925, p. 1; and Chiu,
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ments.
in 1927

^eir

fa.„

„aJor s.tpe „as

.^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
.^.a.

.he SCeerlng

Co^Ueee's po„er

^^^^^^^^^^
.o set

legislative priorities had
heen ".surped

the 'Bi, Pou.-'^
eon
sistin, o^ .onsworth.
Tilson. Snell. an.
.a„es Bess o. Ohio,
.ho was
Longvorth.s campaign
..nager for the Speakership.
Although the dissldents never threatened
a revolt against
Long>.rth. they did favor
postponing the election of
the Majority Leader fro.
the end of the
dying congress to the
start of the new Congress.
Ihey hoped the
extra nine months would
give the. enough ti.e
to organize a .ove.ent
'
to depose Tilson.
Nevertheless, the eaucus took
place as scheduled
and Longworth and Tilson
were both renominated
without opposition,
vestal regained as Whip.
On the floor of the House,
five Republicans
voted "present" and eighteen
were absent in protest of
Longworth 's
re-election and his disciplining
of the Progressives in the
last

Congress,
In 1929 there were some
rumors that Tilson'

s

friends planned to

try to duMp Longworth. but
these stories were forcefully
scotched

when Tilson said:

—^

°" ^'^'^ Men^ership in Congress
\.
ioU?
XLIII (June, 1949),
PP 499 Ifi—^^"^^^If
instead voted
ZrJffnl^'\
""tl
present.
Nevertheless,
he was disciplined too

i^ScL

^^i^ S^™,

96
NYT' Feb. 22, 1927, p. 21.
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vhicVrdo^^ot'"?

speakership.

tTl?'°'

At the caucus both
Longworth
S"
and TUson
Til,-.
were again unanimously
reelected and Vestal
continued as Whip.

SUTESEZ °£ the 1919 to 1931
Contests

-e

1919 to 1931

.Jorit. period .as anoLer
tumultous era

for
Xn twelve .ears
the Kepuhlicans
.aged si. Uadersh.p contests. (Xahle
15 su™.ri.es the
conflict.)
Xn 1919 the .epublicans engaged in a
major
jor struggle
stru..»l„ .or control
of the Hons,
3e ma-

House ^epuhlicans.

;e

as

Minority Leader and
„ithin the Co^ittee on
Co...ittees. there .ere
fierce battles over the
ne majority
Maion>v t^.^
i
Leadership
and Whip,
•

1923 the

Republicans re-elected
OiUett over to.en opposition
in the caucus
and a two day deadlock
on the floor of the
House,
in the sa.e year
Longworth .on the ^,aJority
Leadership'^ after the
far. bloc gained
control Of the Steering
Co,™ittee. and Vestal
replaced Knutson a,
"hip. Finally, in
1925. there was a contest
over the vacant SpeakerShip and some squabbling
over the Majority Leadership.
I„ 1,21 and
1927 there .ere threats of revolts
but no contests took
place.
Ibid., Feb. 23, 1929,
p.
98,

''''' Republican Majority Leader to be ^-^ecced airectiy
Plectdirecafbv'^hr'
by the caucus.
Between 1919 And
^
f-u
Committee
on
Conimittees had picked the Maioritv tI!;
tl
although
the caucus could
overrule their choice
The iJ^^n ^
^^^^^^^
by the Con^ittee^^^^c"
•

JtteS^Snt^rLl^^
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TABLE 15

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
SELECTION, 1919-1931
Year

Status of Post

What Happened

Outcome

Speaker

1919

1921

1923

Vacancy
(Party became
Majority)
No Vacancy

No Vacancy

Contest-settled by
caucus vote.

No Contest

Contest-minor opposition in caucus;
Progressives dead-'
locked Speakership
vote for 2 days and
8 ballots on House
floor.

Gillett elected.

Gillett reelected.
Gillett reelected; Liberal
discharge petition adopted
and some Progressives got. better
committee assignments
.

1925

1927

Vacancy

Contest-2 candidates; settled by
caucus vote; 12
Progressives voted
for another candidate on House floor.

Longworth elected;
Discharge petition made harder
to use; Progressives disciplined.

No Vacancy

No Contest

Long^^orth re-

elected

1929

No Vacancy

No Contest

.

Longworth reelected.

Majority Leader
1919

Vacancy

Contest-in CommitMondell elected,
tee on Committees; 2
ballots, split vote

1921

No Vacancy

No Contest

Mondell re-elected.

174

TABLE 15 (continued)

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
SELECTION, 1919-1931

^-joritv Leader
1923

1925

Vacancy
(Mondell defeated
in 1922 election).

Vacancy
(Longworth elected Speaker)

Contest-all but one
candidate withdrew
before caucus.

No Contest-Snell
was interested but
mounted no real campaign after receiving N.Y. endorsement.

Longworth elected; Farm bloc
gained representation on
Steering Committee.

Tilson elected.

1927

No Vacancy

No Contest-talk of
Tilson rerevolt but no action.
elected.

1929

No Vacancy

No Contest

Tilson re-elected,

Whit

1919

1921

1923
1925
1927
1929

Vacancy

Contest in Committee on Committees
between three candidates.

Knutson elected.

No Vacancy

No Contest-talk of
dropping incumbent,
but no action.

Knutson re-

No Vacancy

Whip replaced

Vestal elected.

No Vacancy

No Contest

Vestal re-elected.

No Vacancy

No Contest

Vestal re-electedc

No Vacancy

No Contest

Vestal re-elected.

elected.
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Despite the number of
conte«^»
contests, ^turnover was
not exceptional
with t.o speakers, three
Hajorit. headers, an.
two *ips. however
the turnover was uneven!,
aiviaed with all the
leadership changes'

^onsworth. lilson. and
Vestal held office.

The onl, leadership
chan.es that resulted
fro. the contests
were Mann's displace^nt
as
leader and possihl,
Knutson-s removal as .Mp.
.iUett voluntarily
relinquished the Speakership
to run for the Senate;
Mondell lost hi.
seat in the 1922 election;
and Longworth advanced
fro. Majority
Leader to Speaker.

The early outlines of the
De„«>crats- carefully notched
leadership ladder were beginning
to evolve in the
1920.s. but exao^les of
Republicans advancing routinely
fro. lower to higher party
posts
were scarce in this period.
Only Longworth ..naged to
cli.b fro.
Majority Leader to Speaker and
his advancement was hotly
contested.
Minority Leader Mann failed in
his bid to secure the
Speakership
even though Reed had been able
to .»ke the Jump twice-in
1889
and

1895.

Between 1919 and 1931 the Republicans
preferred to recruit

their Speaker and Majority Leader
from influential House committees
rather than use a series of
apprenticeships in lower party offices.

GiUett and Mondell. for example, were
both members of

the Appropria-

tions Comiaittee when they were
elected Speaker and Majority Leader
in 1919 whereas Longworth and
Tilson had both served on the Ways

and Means Committee before being
tapped to be Majority Leader.
Whips, in contrast, were recruited from
minor committees.

The

Knutson

prior to his election, had been a member
of the Immigration and
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Natu„U.a«o„ Co™,....
^^^^^^
as ehe

C.a.™a„
^^^^^^^^

-e.

NeUHe. w.,p ..3 eve.
^„«o.ed

higher office «hen a
vacancy arose.

as a possible
ca„.«ate fc.

rossitiiy
Possiblv th»
the great gap In ex-

perience and seniority
between the highest
ligaesc partv
h
party 1leaders
and the
Whips precluded their
advancement.

intervention fro. other
Republican leaders again
typified Republican contests.
the Presidential level.
Coolidge lined up votes
for Longworth for
Speaker and his Secretary
of the Treasury.
Mellon
seems to have participated
in the fight on
Longworth's behalf also
senate participation, after
declining in the Minority
years, again
was common:
in
n li'iy
1919 kf>v
Qomo*-^
t
key Senate leacers along
with the Republican
National Co^ittee Chairman
helped Gillett beat Mann;
in 1923 La-

U

-

FoUette coordinated Progressive
protests

in the Senate and the

House; and in 1925 Pennsylvania
Senators pressured Congressmen
from
their state to back Longworth.
The New York Tte. claims
that Senators from New York and Ohio
were also responsible for
bringing votes
to the Longworth cause, but
the Times does not provide
any specifics."
One difference with the former
Majority interval is that although
or-

ganizations like the Prohibitionists
continued to make their opinions
kno™ about competing leadership candidates,
lobbyists for corporations and other major business
interests no longer seemed to participate In the armtwisting and bargaining
involved in the contests.
99

C ongressional Director: for the 65th.
66th, and 67th Congresses.

^°°NYI, March 3, 1925, p. 16.
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^SSteis of the Variables

,

1919 to 1931

Majoritv- Mlaorj>,, 2_£tus.
^ status

MAinr-jf-„ status
.
Majority
again coincided with
frequent contests in the
Republican
J-ican party.
P
DarLv
r
Compared^ with the minority
interlude, the total number
"moer ot
of fipht-c
fights increased from
three to six
but because the contests
of the 191, .o 1931
era clustered into three
congresses, the rate of
conflict dropped. Between
1911 and 1919 contests flared in 75 per cent
of the Congresses but
between 1919 and
1931 contests erupted in only
ot f-h=
3 50
the r
^ per cent of
Congresses, a figure
so^what higher than the 37.5
rate for 1895-1911 ^jority
Congresses.
'

•

The si.e of the n^jority party
again was relevant in
forecasting
fights,
conflict tended to be .ore
coM.on as the size of the
party
neared 50 per cent. As Table
16 shows, there were no
fights when
the Republicans held 60 per
cent or more of the House
seats, one
fight when the party held between
55 and 59.9 per cent of the
seats,
and two fights when the
Republicans had their lowest ratio
of seats.

TABLE 16

REPUBLICAN COmESTS AND PARTY SIZE,
1919-1931

Z of Republican Seats
60% or over

# of Congresses

# of Contests

9
^

0

55% to 59.9

1

^

50% to 54.9

3

^
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returns.

The

rel.u„„,Mp .ee„een election
returns

and con^etUlon in
this period ...
Inconclusive. The 1919
and 1923
contests
election victories of
moderate proportions
(altHoush the 1919 victor,
„as Important .e.ond
the raw nu^ers
because
the Republicans were
restored to .^jority
status), but the 1923
fight developed after
the Republicans
suffered their biggest
set
bac. Of the era.
(See Table 17). The
conflict-free Congresses followed a slMlar pattern
with 1921 and 1929
coinciding with upswings

folWd

with a minor loss of scats.

TABLE 17

REPUBLICAN ELECTION RESULTS,
1919-1931
Year

# of House
Seats Won

1919

240

1921

+63

225

1925

1929

+30

303

1923

1927

Change from Previous Election

-78

247

+22

237

-10

267

+30

% of Republican Seats
When Congress Opened
54.7
69.2

51.7
56.3
54.5
61.4

indicates a contest

Membersh ip change.

Membership change also showed no clear
re-

lationship with leadership conflict in
the Republican party between
1919 and 1931.

As Table 18 indicates, the 1919 and
1925 contests
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TABLE 18

REPUBLICS CONTESTS AND MEMBERSHIP
CHANGE, 1919-1931
Year

% New Members

.1919

29.0

7o

Incumbents
71.0

1921
69.1

1923

20.0

1925

24.1

1927

13.5

1929

21.0

80.0
75.9

86.5
79.0

indicates a contest

occurred when turnover was rising but
the 1923 brawl took place even
though 80 per cent of the Republican
members had been re-elected to
the House.

The Congresses without leadership
disputes, however,

showed the identical pattern.

In two of these Congresses-1921 and

1929-the composition of the party was undergoing
increased changes,
but in 1927 the turnover rate of 13.5
per cent was the lowest in
this period.

Hierarchy.

The 1919 and 1925 contests coincided with larger

freshman classes, which were also characteristic of
Republican conflict between 1895 and 1911.

The 1923 fight, however, was associated

with a sizeable drop in the percentage of freshman members.

Con-

gresses marked by the absence of leadership fights continued to
show
the same profile as the contest years:

in 1921 and 1929 there were
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f.esh„e„ than

m

men were very scarce.

.he p.ecedi.s Congresses,
.ue In 1,27 fresh-

See Table 19 for the
details.

TABLE 19

REPUBLICS CONTESTS AND
SENIORITY, 1919-1931
Year
/o

1919

rresnmen
26.1

1921

14.7

26.9

1923

13,6

18.6

1925

20.0

20.4

1927

24.5

11.4

1929

% Seniors

29.5

17.2

32.5

indicates a contest.

With seniority, the lack of a
relationship continued,

m

two

of the contest Congresses,
1923 and 1925, veteran Republicans
were
expanding, reminiscent of Republican
struggles before 1911, but the
1919 fight occurred when the proportion
of senior members was declining, a trait common in Democratic
clashes.

However, when the stable

Congresses are checked, two-1927 and
1929-were also characterized

by growing ranks of senior Republicans
while in 1921, after the

Harding sweep, the percentage of veteran
Republicans had declined.
factionalism.

Regional factionalism again seemed rele-

vant in predicting Republican combat.

when the Midwest picked up seats.

The fights tended to occur

For example, as Table 20 demonstrates,
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TABLE 20

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND
REGIONAL FACTIONS. 1919-1931
Year

% Midwest

7o

East

7o

West

7o

South and Border
i)caces

.1919

45.4

1921

41.2

1923

44.9

1925

42.4

1927

43.5

1929

41.6

,

36.6

9.2

8.8

35.9

9.6

13.3

36.9

10.7

7.6

37.9

10.2

9.4

38.0

11.0

7.6

34.5

10.5

13.5

indicates a contest

in 1919, after the Midwestern
delegation rose from 43.3 per cent to

45.4 per cent and in 1923 after a 3.7 per cent
increase, contests
followed.

The 1925 battles, however, deviated
from this pattern for

it followed a slight drop in Midwestern
seats.

Stability, in turn,

tended to coincide with declining Midwestern
power although 1927 was

an exception.
Ideological factionalism

.

Ideological cleavages in the Repub-

lican party also continued to be valuable in
explaining the leadership conflict.

As Table 21 illustrates, although the Progressives

were losing ground in the Republican paity in the 1920
's, they held
the balance of power in the House between the Democratic
minority

and the Republican majority in 1919, 1923, and 1927.

Except for
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TABLE 21

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND
THE PROGRESSIVES, 1919-1931
Year

# of Progressives

1919

% of Progressives

24

1921

10.1

29

1923
1925

27

1927

29

1929

30

fections needed
for a deadlock

238

24

301

85

14.2

225

9

11.0

245

32

12.2

237

21

11.2

267

55

Q

32

# of GOP de-

publicans

C

indicates a contest

1927, there was a leadership contest at
the start of the other two

Congresses.

In 1927, for the first time in a
quarter of a century,

there was no fracas even though the
Progressives had enough votes to

deadlock the House.

Why 1927 should vary from the general
trend is

an intriguing question.

Part of the answer perhaps lies with
Long-

worth's decision to discontinue the Mann and
Gillett policy of treating dissidents leniently in order to
entice them back to party regu-

larity.

Longworth's decision to use the stick rather than
the carrot

to gain party unity may have temporarily
cooled the Progressives'

ardor for revolt.

A second factor was that for the Progressives

to

win concessions from the Republican leadership on
revising the rules
or passing more liberal legislation, they needed the
cooperation of

;

—
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:,07

u„.n

^He

S.nUat.onal sUUIs. Ho.se
Progressives

.e.oc..;...

Have

si^l, Xac.ed

the

incentive to mobillEe
themselves.
in addition to tHe
Progressives-regular split,
the Republicans
were deeply divided alona
xong a rural
„vk, or an
rural-urban
agriculture-business
Cleavage during roost of
the 1920's as the
for^tlon of the farm bloc
indicates. From its
organization in Hay. 1921.
until 1929. the farm
bloc was the largest
dissident group within the
Republican party
Estl^tes of its Size range as
High as one hundred votes^"!
although
on organizational matters
a more realistic count
is probably seventy
to eighty members.
The far. bloc was a
significant faction at the
start of three Congressea-1923.
1925. and 1927^°^.and in
two of
these congresses leadership
fights erupted with the far.,
bloc playing at least a supporting
role.
In 1923 the farm bloc ran
Graham
for Majority Leader and in
1925 Madd en, although not
sponsored by the

T^or estimates of farm bloc
streneth for rh^ «7n, ^

Congress, see NYI, Nov. 18, 1923
iofC
d 9- for th«
69th ;
Congress see the roll call vSt^s
on the McNary-Haig!; Srm relief bills and commentary In Ripley,
Majoritv Party LeadSshiu in
congress, pp. 114 and 116; and for
thrlStlSt

Ir'Lsur" 'of

CO*

f

102,
Jones, pp. 118 and 120.

'"""^

^e^fsfi^if^the

and Cog:t tu n v

:

"
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bloc. ..e„ ..e
„aJo.i., o. His ei,..,.,..e

identical

nu^er of vote,

as the eighty Oraha™
„as expected to dra„

he Had p..sued His
candidac. to tHe caucus)
f.o.
Nebraska, Minnesota, South
Dakota and
.r.^ t ^
Dakota,
Indiana,

UHnoU.

Kansas

•

the heart of the

]^Q3

farmland.

iqo7 ^i.
In 1927
the farm bloc considered
contesting lilson's

re-election as Majority
Leader hut was possihly
deterred fro. pushing ahead with the
rebellion by Longworth's
punitive action against
the Progressives in the
last Congress.
in short, between 1919 and
1931. in three of the four
cases in
«I.ich the far. bloc was
a ^jor force within
the Republican ™e:*ership in the House and/or
when the Progressives had
enough votes to
delay the regulars' organization
of the House, a contest
developed
over the Republican leadership,
contrast. In 1921 and 1929,
when
the Republicans had such
huge ^jorities that they were
invulnerable

m

to Progressive sniping and
enjoyed greater party unity-Julius
Turner

calculates Republican cohesion for
1921 as 74.4"Aand Hoover took
the steam out of far, bloc
demands in 1929 by presenting His
own farm
,

~
103,
^°"SW°'''h released very accurate state by
state estimates of
his support.
When the actual
,

New York and Pennsylvania votr^which
Longworth underestlnated) are added
to Longworth's estij^es
the
figure comes very close to the 140
votes cist at the c^us fof
Longworth. The geographical distribution
of Madden's support can
easily be calculated from the Longworth
count.
See NYT, Lb! 8
p. 2 for LongwortH's tabulations and NYT. Nov "23
1923 d 19
^ °^ Graham's strength prior —his withdrawal from
tZ
""f
tne
iy^j contest.

10^ urner,

p.

21.
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relief measures 105
j
no tleadership
fights occurred.
,

.

SSaa-nce.

M:en GiUett. an Easterner.
„as Speaker, the
Majority Leader and >*ip
„ere f.o. the Midwest
or West.
In 1925
When Longworth .ecan.
speaker, the Majority
Leadership vent to an
Easterner with a Midwestemer
as >*ip.
before, the Kepnhlican
leadership showed careful
geographical balance between
the dominant
regions.
But the Republicans
continued to exclude
dissidents-aether

Progressives or far. bloc
me^ers-fro™ the for^l leadership
posts
Although GiUett campaigned
as a liberal and
Longworth advocated reforming the rules in
1919. neither can be classified
by any stretch
of the i^gination as an
insurgent. At ..st, Gillett
was a moderate,
'
which was more a consequence
of his personality and
position on procedural questions than on
substantive policy issues.
Longworth was
a conservative, whose
willingness to revoke the
Progressives' committee seniority underlines his
attitude toward strict party
regularity.
The only question mark Is Knutson
who sided «Lth the Progressives in 1923 and 1925. Tl,e only
two references that pinpoint
his
ideological views, though widely
separated in time, are consistent
in calling Knutson a conservative.

Knutson

inay

have voted with the

Progressives on organizational matters
merely because he resented
being dropped as Whip rather than
because of any real sympathy for
the Progressives' goal.

Jones, p. 121.
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21 the Variables

.

1919 to 1931

only Chree variables
correlated „leh the
leadership contest s in
this tl.e period:
the size of the party,
regional factions. and
Ideological Cleavages.
Mghts tended to occur when
the Republicans
held only a slight edge
over the Democrats.
*e„ Midwestern reprementation was Increasing,
and when the ideological
fragmentation in
the party was „„st severe.
T^ese three variables are
strongly Interconnected. Most Of the
dissidents were fro. the
Midwest and the tiny
Progressive band deliberately
chose to compete when the
Republicans
had their s:^llest majorities
in order
to :„axi.l.e their
Influence.

Thus, It was no accident that
the contests developed
when the Republicans held less than 55 per
cent of the House seats.
The variable.
however, that seemed most
important in producing the
conflict was
the deep and persistent disunity
over domestic issues. As in
the
1911 to 1919 period, the Ideological
splintering appeared vastly
more Important than the regional
competitiveness in causing the batties.

The Midwest was too fragmented by
economics to act as a bloc

on organizational matters In the 1920
's.

The eastern areas of the

Midwest, especially Ohio and Michigan
which were toportant manu-

facturing centers, tended to side with
the business-oriented East
In leadership quarrels wiiereas
Wisconsin Republicans, although

sharing the concern of the farm bloc on
the plight of agriculture,
took much more radical stands on Issues
such as the public ownership of Muscle Shoals and the reduction of
the tariff and went their

own way on leadership disputes.

Rather than work out compromises

"
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and Share the leadership
posts-perhaps the various segments
of the
party were too far apart for
concillatlon-the competing Republican
factions preferred to engage
in bitter fights for control
of the
party. Before 1925 the
insurgents gained so,„e important
victories
although they were never strong
enough to elect one of their
own,
but beginning with 1925 the
regulars under Long>,orth's firm
and
skillful leadership reasserted
their dominance in the House
of

Representatives.

SumniarY 1895-1931

Between 1895 and 1931 the Republicans
skirmished over the leadership in nine out of eighteen Congresses.

The pace of internal con-

flict stepped up during the minority
years, with clashes in 75 per
cent of the Congresses as compared
with fights in slightly over

40 per cent of the Congresses during the majority
intervals.

Com-

parison with the Democrats in the same time
period reveals that the
Republicans were more prone to conflict as both
a majority and a

minority party than the Democrats.

All six of the Democratic up-

heavals occurred during the minority years, which
means that the
Democrats as a minority fought in the identical nuiaber
of Congresses as the Republican majority, which had been expected
to be less

combative,

Thus, before the New Deal, party was a more important

determinant of leadership conflict than majority or minority status,
but V7ithin each party, leadership struggles were more common during
the minority years.
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The conditions that
correlated with the Republican
conflict
and
account for the fre.uent
battles were: 1) an election
loss2) less than 55 per cent of the seats
in the House of
Representatives;
3) increased .e.bership turnover;
4) an expanding fresh^nan
class;
5) a growing body of senior ne:nbers;

6)

a

rise in Midwestern repre-

sentation; and 7) a large
dissident bloc (at least 25
per cent of
the Republican mei^ership
in the House) or an
i^roven^ent in the

dissidents' strategic position.

Although each of these traits
char-

acteri.ed at least six of the
clashes, no swingle condition
was present
in ever^ fi^.
However, when the regional and
ideological variables
are conjoined, factionalism does
appear to be a necessary correlate
of the conflict in this era.
Table 22 first lists the Congresses
"

characterized by increased Midwestern
representation, then those in
vhich the Progressives had enough votes
to block the regulars' or-

ganization of the House, and finally those
Congresses in which at
least one-fourth of the Republicans
belonged to the farm bloc or

were Progressives.

The ten Congresses in which one or more
of these

three measures of factionalism was present
included every contest

year plus 1927, when a challenge to Majority
Leader Tilson was contemplated but not pursued by the farm bloc.

In other words, when

either the Midwest was gaining seats or the
dissident faction was
large or capable of disrupting the organization of
the House, there
was a 90

cent chance of a contest in the Republican party.

none of these conditions occurred, no contest developed
betv/een
1895 and 1931.

When

189

TABLE 22

FACTIONALISM AND LEADERSHIP
CONFLICT
IN THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY, 1895-1931

Rising Midwestern
Representation

Progressives Had the
Votes to Deadlock
the House

Progressives or Farm
Bloc COTrmncorl OK"/
More of Party

1899

1903

1903
1909

1911
1911

1913

1917

1917

1919

1919

1923

1923

1923
1925

1927

1927

1927

indicates a contest

As for the other conditions that
correlated with the Republican
contests, some of these variables may
have exerted an independent
iinpact in particular cases.

For example, as noted earlier, the

growing number of veterans angry about having
their careers wrecked

by Cannon's committee reassignment s or about
having their bills

pigeonholed by the Rules Committee likely encouraged
the battles of
1909 and 1923.

Most of the time, however, variables such as
election
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defeats o. larger frestaan
classes helpe. produce
^he conflict
bringing a.out changes
In the relative
positions of the regional
and Ideological factions.
An election downsUde.
for
Instance.

usually increased the
Midwest's scrength
strength
the

^ny

safe districts In that
region,

m
m
.'n

ry.
the
party because of

m

1899. a large

Midwestern seats encouraged
the Midwest to challenge
the East's long
hold on the leadership,
other years, a rise In
Midwestern representatlon au^ented the
Insurgent wing of the party
as well.
One
striking difference with the
Democratic party is the role
of .ember-

m

ship change in the
Republican contests,

m

the Democratic party

before 1931 the typical clash
was preceded by a massive
influx of
new r^ers. Because the
party was so strongly skewed
in a Southern,"
conservative direction as a minority,
large scale changes seemed

necessary to produce conflict,

m

the Republican party, although

more freshmen and higher turnover
were usually attributes of
the
contests, the amount of membership
change was not as dramatic as
in
the Democratic party.
Smaller shifts in the Republican
membership
seemed to be sufficient to alter
the factional alignments.

In sum. the Republicans were a deeply
fragmented and very com-

petitive party before 1931.

As Peabody noted, after World War
II

the Democrats, despite the gulf
separating Northerners and Southerners, have been able to overcome the
severe cleavage by picking

moderate leaders.

The Republicans, during their long majority

years, however, were not able to reach such
an accomnBdation.

Al-

though the Republicans were very sensitive
to regional divisions
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in the

pa«y

and suc.eeOea i„
heading off .e.ietl,
.egional .^wls
after
ea.efuU. .alanc.., Uade.sh.p
slates „.tH Basterne.
and Mid„esten>ers. they
did .ot forge a.
equally satisfactory co.pro^se for dealing with the
ideological factionalisn..
possibly
because there were so few
^derates in the Rep.hlican
party who
could genuinely act as
brokers between the
disputing wings. Conse,ue„tly, in congress after
Congress, al^st without
interruption
fro. 1909 through
1925. House Republicans were
torn apart by leadership contests that reflected
the ideological strife.

CHAPTER IV

LEADERSHIP CHAKGE IN THE
DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1931-1955
Leadership Conflict

.

1931 -1941

As the depression worsened.
Democratic fortunes began to
rebound
starting with the 1930
Congressional elections.
Running well in
Border States that had defected
to Hoover in 1928 and
in the Midwest,
the Democrats picked up
fifty-six seats in the House
of Representatives and eight seats in the
Senate.
By the time the new Congress
convened, the Democrats had won
enough additional seats in
special
elections to have wrested control
of the House of Representatives
away from the Republicans for
the first time since 1919.
As the new majority party, the
Democrats had a Speaker and a
Majority Leader to elect. The two
principal candidates for Speaker

were Minority Leader John Nance Garner
of Texas and Henry
of Illinois, the most senior Northern
Democrat.

T.

Rainey

With Rainey's con-

sent, Senator-elect James Hamilton
Lewis of Illinois began seeking

votes for Rainey among Western liberals
and the Tammany organization.

The Texas delegation, in turn, recognized
Rainey as Garner's chief
threat and urged him to back Garner for
the Speakership.

Although

there is no record of the negotiations
between Garner and Rainey, by
mid -March, 1931, an accord seems to have
been reached in which Rainey

relinquished his bid for the Speakership in return for
Garner's help
in becoming Majority Leader.

Robert A. Waller, "Congressman Henry T. Rainey of IllinoisHis
Rise to the Speakership, 1903-1934," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.
University of Illinois, 1963), pp. 326-28.
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In spite of Garner's support
for Rainey, there were a
host of
other candidates for Majority
Leader. Other Northerners
who were interested included John O'Connor
of New York and William
A. Ayres of
Kansas. Among the Southerners
campaigning hard were John
McDuffie of
Alabama, the^Whip; Joseph W.
Byrns of Tennessee; and John
Rankin of
Mississippi.
McDuffie and O'Connor were Rainey's
most formidable
rivals. McDuffie was the
candidate of the Garner clique
if not of
Garner himself and O'Connor's
candidacy was a bargaining gambit
for
the New York delegation, which
was demanding more recognition
and

threatening to boycott the vote on
Speaker.

Without New York's votes,

the Democrats would not be able to
organize the new House.

To assure his own election and to keep
faith with Rainey, Garner

began to wheel and deal.

First, he met with Tammany boss John
Curry

and promised Ne^v York better committee
assignments, including an ad-

ditional seat on Ways and Means and the
Chairmanship of the Immi-

gration Committee.

Curry agreed that New York would vote
against the

creation of a Steering Committee, (an idea advocated
by Rainey and
Ayres) and presumably pledged that he would try
to discourage O'Connor's
candidacy.

2

4

Next, Garner turned his attention to the Southerners.

New York Times (hereafter NYT )

,

Nov.

14, p.

2; Nov.

21,

p. 5.

1931

'

'

3

Waller, pp. 329-330; Richard Boiling, Power iji the House
A
History of the Leadership of the House of Representatives (New YorkE. P. Dutton and Co., 1969), p. 146; NYT, Nov.
16, 1931, p. 6.
,

,

^

NYT

,

Nov. 22, 1931, p. 1.
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Arguing that the Notth was
entitled to

«.e

leadership posts, Garner
persuaded MeBuffle to re^ln
as whip rather than
pursue the Majority
Leadership,
,uick succession, he
convinced Byrns to withdraw
fro™ the Majority Leadership
contest in return for the
Chalr^nship

m

of the Appropriations Con^ittee
and talked Rankin into
bowing out of
the race by offering him
the Veterans Co^lttee
Chairmanship.
Charles Crisp of Georgia resented
Garner's tactics and insistence
on a Northern Majority Leader.
He considered entering the
race hi.self because
•

The South has always backed the
Democratic Presidential nominee, but it is only
seldom that the
North does. Wlien the Republicans
are in control,
the South does not have a chance.
Vny should the
Democrats hand over part of their
leadership to
the North when in power? The
Northerners never
hand anything over to the South.

Nevertheless, after Crisp conferred with
Garner and other Southern
leaders, he decided not to run.

At, the caucus.

Garner and Rainey

were elected without opposition and
McDuffie was reappointed Whip.

Franklin Roosevelt's landslide victory,
Garner's election to
the Vice Presidency, and the enormous
infusion of freshman Democrats
set the stage for a wild leadership battle
in 1933.

Tlie

earliest

contender for the Speakership was McDuffie, who
in the summer of 1932

began gathering endorsements from the Alabama
legislature and press
in order to deter the possible candidacy of his
Alabama colleague,

5
p.

20.

Ibid., Nov. 24, 1931, p. 4; Nov. 25, 1931,
p. 5; Nov. 26, 1931,

^Ibid.

'

,

Nov. 11, 1931, p. 5.
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Joh. Ba:*heaa.

other Southern hopefuls
were Byrns and Ran.ln.,
Majority Leader Rainey was
the fore^st Northern
candidate. The the»e
of
campaign was that since
the election results had
.Iven
.he North a two-to-one
edge over the South
in the House, a Northerner
ought to he speaker.
Moreover, as a llheral.
Raine, argued that he
was compatible with Roosevelt,
but at the sa„e ti.e
his rural Midwestern background would
complement Roosevelt's urban.
Eastern ties.
Finally, Rainey. who was
slated to become «ays and
Means Chairman,
thought he should be pronoted
because of precedent.'

Raws

,

Four of the Democratic
Speakers since the Fortyseventh Congress had been elevated
from the post
of majority leader and a fifth
from 'actlno'
majority leader,
all other cases without
exception, the Speaker had been
selected from the
ranking member of the Ways and
Means Committee
Precedent doubly favored the
selection of

m

Ramey.

Because of the North's overwhelming
margin, the Southern candidates needed to corral some Northern
votes.

McDuffie,

a

foe of estab-

lishing a Steering Coiiniittee in past
battles, did an about-face and
favored the creation of one in 1933.

Byrns advocated giving the North

better committee assignments and
pointed out that he was no Johnny-

come-lately on the Steering Committee
issue.

In addition, both Byrns

and McDuffie trekked to New York to
confer with Curry, who claimed he

1932,^p!^lr'
o

Waller, p. 359.

—

P'

^'
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was neutral .ut also
volunteered that He woula
.e .u^e.
Frank Hague of Jersey
City.^

Ma,o.

in the North. Ralney's
.ost serious obstacle
was the New VorU
delegation.
Both O'Connor and Iho^s
CuUen were Interested

m

leadership posts.

0-Connor had hacking In
Massachusetts while CuUen
was put forward late in
i-ano by
k,. n,
the race
the m
Tannnany chieftains in
case of
a caucus deadlock,
xhe New York strategy
=^
was to vote for CuUen
until
the second or third ballot
and then switch to
the candidate offering
the best deal on patronage
and leadership posts,
.ainey dispatched
Mayor Anton Cern^k of Chicago
and Governor-elect Henry
Horner of
Illinois to bargain on his
behalf with the
leaders."

Ta™y

To at'
tract southern support to
his candidacy and particularly
to undercut
McDuffle. Rainey's camp approached
Bankhead to run for Majority
Leader
on a Rainey-Bankhead ticket.
Bankhead. however, refused
because he
did not want to jeopardise
McDuffie's chances for the
Speakership in
any way. 11

In a counter:nove, the Southern
candidates for Speaker encouraged

"favorite son" candidacies for Speaker
araong Midwesterners to
split
Rainey's potential votes. Arthur
Greenwood of Indiana and Robert

Grosser of Ohio were prominent examples.

p.

2;

There was also talk of a

^Ea.> Nov. 17, 1932, p. 11; Nov. 18, 1932, p. 3; Nov
Dec. 1, 1932, p. 2; Dec. 26,
1932, p. 1.

and F\'b!^^^:'l9'33''p:

f^'

'''''
'

'

''''
'

Dec. 28, 1932, p. 2; Feb. 2, 1933,
p. 2.

'

28

1932
'

^'

'

«^
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Southern Speaker-Northern
Majority Leader slate."
The biggest plum any contender
could hope for in 1933 was
Roosevelt', personal endorsement.
Rumors abounded that the
administratlon favored McDuffie, but
both Roosevelt and Postmaster
General
James Farley strenuously denied
these stories. Garner was
definitely
in McDuffie's corner, but
his Impact was minimized by
Roosevelt's
hands off policy. '^"^

Shortly before the caucus met,
Rainey announced a complicated
deal in which he would be elected
Speaker with help from B>.:ns,
Tammany, and the Texas delegation.
Byrns, in turn, would be backed
by Rainey's adherents for Majority
Leader.
Byrns' advancement ap-

pealed to the Texas delegation because
James

P.

Buchanan of Texas

would replace Byrns as Chairman of the
Appropriations Committee.
Finally, Cullen of New York would be
named Assistant Majority Leader,
a new office.

Unstated but also part of the pact was that
New York

would get more patronage.

The McDuffie camp, stunned by the an-

nouncement, had only a few hours in which to
regroup.

Their main

hope was that the sheer number of trades would
backfire.
At the caucus Rainey defeated McDuffie 166 votes to
112.
also polled twenty votes.

Rankin

McDuffie received support from Bankhead,

Sam Rayburn of Texas, and the Massachusetts delegation.

In the

balloting for Majority Leader, Byrns was elected 151 to 140 votes
12

Ibid., Dec. 14, 1932, p. 13; Dec. 30, 1932, p.

3.

13

Waller, pp. 361-62; NYT, Dec.
p.

2.

1,

1932, p. 2; Mar. 1, 1933,
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over Bankhead. „ho. the
McDuffie forces had
decided to run after
Rainey s announcement
'

in the after^th,
Greenwood replaced McDuffle
as whip.

:x.ri„,

the ca^algn. Greenwood
had been contacted h,
Rainey allies with the
-ssage that Rainey was favorably
disposed toward Greenwood's
leader,
ship ambitions.
Greenwood had urged his
followers to back Rainey
but Whether Greenwood had
been promised the Whip
specifically or given
a .ore vaguely worded
pledge of good treatment
Is unclear.
Grosser,
the other favorite son
who threatened Rainey's
hold on Midwestern
support, was rewarded with
the Chairmanship of the
newly created
"''^
Steering Committee.
In August, 1934, Rainey
unexpectedly died.

The Democrats de-

cided to postpone the election
of the new Speaker until
January, 1935,
«hen the next Congress opened.
The .ost logical no„,inee was
Majority
Leader Byrns, but his pronation
was challenged by Bankhead
and Rayburn, who picked up the n^ntle
of the Garner coterie when
McDuffie
deferred to Bankhead. There were
several minor candidates also,

including Rankin.

Byrns. like Rainey, argued that
he should succeed

to the Speakership because of
precedent.

Moreover, many of the fresh-

men felt indebted to Byrns because of
the hard work he had done as
Chairman of the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee.

Bankhead

privately said he would settle for Majority
Leader if sectionalism

^W.
Ibid

Mar. 3. 1933. pp. 1 and 3; Waller,
p. 364.
.

,

Mar. 4, 1933, p. 4.
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-St deee^ine.

co.petlto..

«ho ,u.etl. Helped

.o^d

Raybu.„.3 greatest
asset „as Gatnet

up votes ..t co,Ud
.ot ta.e a .ote

pu.lL

role because of Roosevelt's
neutrality."

The large, pivotal
Pennsylvania delegation was
the key to the
outcome, under pressure
f.o. Senator-elect
.oseph P. Ou«ey and
David Lawrence, Democratic
DeInocr3^^v state
o^-o^-^
u
chairman,
the Pennsylvania delegation caucused early,
agreed to act as a unit
to increase its leverage in the outcome, and
decided to support Byrns
for Speaker,
with
Byrns assured of victory,
Rayburn withdrew saying
•

,

•l am no longer a candidate
for Speaker,
niere are no alibis. Under
the circumstances I cannot be elected. '17

Following the Pennsylvania
decision, attention switched
to the
Majority Leader contest. Bankhead
was the leading contender
but the
list of hopefuls was long,
ranging fro., John McCormack
of Massachusetts to O'Connor and James
Mead, also of New York. Many
Democrats

preferred a Northerner for the post
in order to emphasize the
national scope of the party, but
several senior Northerners, who
were more Interested in legislative
"results rather than sectional

consideration s," 18 spearheaded the drive
for Bankhead.

,

16
.ISii-'

V/9

C.

18

22, 1934. p. 18; Aug. 24. 1934.
p. 9; Aug. 25

l93':,]'f:

17_

^

Claiming that

''''

1"4

1934

p.'"

^
Dwight
Borough, Mr. Sam, (New York: Random House,
1962),

'

.

NYT, Dec. 26, 1934, p. 10.

p.

253.
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Bankheaa was pop.la.. a.
able pania:„e„.aria„.
an. a "suave paclfUr
his backers argued that
such sUiUs would be
valuable for a leader
trying to unite the party
behind Roosevelt's reform,
slowly Ban,,
head began to put together
a coalition of votes.
His support
1„ the

south was nearly solid
since his only Southern
rival was Rankin, and
in the North, Ohio
co^itted two-thirds of Us
ballots to him,

Pennsylvania pledged half of Its
votes, and a group of
Congressmen
from Kansas. Nebraska, and
Oklahoma asked freshmen to
align with
Bankhead

20

At the caucus, Byrns was easily
elected Speaker but two ballots
were required to decide the
contest for Majority Leader.
On the
first round, Bankhead ^.dth 140
votes had a wide lead over his
six
rivals. The rest of the count
showed O'Connor with fifty-four
votes.

Rankin with thirty-three, Adolph
Sabath of Illinois with thirty-three^
McCormack with twenty-one, Mead with
twenty-one, and William Arnold
of Illinois with five. On the
second
ballot, Bankhead won.^^

Ibid.

20
NTT, Dec. 11, 1934, p. 5; Dec.
14, 1934,

p.

31; Dec.

p. 8: Dec
16 1934
23, 1934, p. 2; Dec. 28, 1934, p. {3^ De^.
p!'2.
'o! 1934

21^,

r^^"

^'
^^^^ light of the contest that
H-^ not efrect the outcome Pdid
of the fight was that Bankhead had a
severe heart attack before the caucus. Only a
few close friends knew
the truth and were able to keep the information
secret until after the
caucus.
Bc.nkhead was in the hospital when the
Democrats elected him
Majority Leader. See Walter J. Heacock's, "William
B. Bankhead and
the New Deal," Journaj. of Southern History.
XXI, (August, 1955), pp.
347-369, for an account.

" 19
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Patrick Bolana of
Pennsylvania replaced
Greenwood as Whip, apparently a payoff to Cuffey
for His crucial help
in electing Byrns
to the Speakership.^^
in June, 1936, eighteen
.onths after Byrns won
the Speakership
he suddenly died. Within
twelve hours of his death,
Bankhead was

unani^^usly pro^ted to the
Speakership.

The election of a new
Ma-

jority Leader was delayed
until the start of the
next Congress and
during the intervening six
:nonths a fight heated up.
Rules Chainnan
O'Connor was the acting Majority
Leader during the interi.
and he was
eager to keep the post per^nently.

m

two ^najor liabilities.

his bid for the job he had

First, he had difficulty
uniting the New York

delegation behind his candidacy
because Mead was also interested
and
there were splits anx^ng the Bronx,
Brooklyn, and Manhattan factions.
Second, although O'Connor had
fought for the election of a
liberal
to the House leadership in
1931 to balance Garner and
McDuffie's

conservatism, by 1936 O'Connor hirnself
had begun to move to the right.
Roosevelt and other New Dealers were
concerned that the President's

program would be stymied if O'Connor
became Majority Leader.
O'Connor's staunchest foe was Rayburn.

Rayburn was expected

to do well with "the older House
faction"^^ that had been the base
22

NYT., Jan. 5, 1935, p. 4; Randall
Ripley, Party Leader s in the
House of Representatives, (Washington, D.C.:
Bro^k^s-l^^ilTtuiio—
1967), p. 55.

23
p.

28;

J^ne 5, 1936, p.
Dorough, p. 253.

2;

^^NYT, Aug. 1, 1936, p. 4.

June 6, 1936, p. 3; Nov. 15, 1936,
>

»
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of Garner -s power and his
i^,.

^berals had l^roved after
he

crushed a priory opponent
put up hy private
utility co^anies that
resented Rayburn's support
of leeic;!
or
FP
af.'n. ^
legislation
to curtail the
monopolistic
practices of gas and electric
holding companies.
Furthermore
Roosevelt had been impressed
with Rayburn's work as
chair^^n of the
Speakers Bureau in the 1936
campaign.

The fourth candidate for
Majority leader was Rankin,
but he was
given little chance of success.
As a New York Times editorial
noted
in assessing Rankin's leadership
ability,

Vinegar is not a seductive drink;
and a majority
leader sure of the suUenness
of tvo groups
'
can look forward to a heap of
trouble. 2 6
'

'

Of the four contenders for Majority
Leader, Rayburn seemed the
most organized and waged the least
sectional ca^aign. While O'Connor
vacationed, Rayburn met with various
party and administration leaders
to line up support.

Harold Ickes, Secretary of Interior,
recalled

Rayburn asking him to sound out the
Illinois delegation.

Mead,

meanwhile, argued that a Northerner ought
to be elected to offset the
South 's domination of committee chairmen
and Rankin tried appealing
to Southern and Western representatives
with his platform of cheap

^^"^""^ Patterson, Congressional Conservati
.^m and the New
n
1
^/J^^"?*'
ueai,
(Lexington, Ky.
University of Kentucky, 1967), p. 5T.
:

^^NYT, Nov. 20, 1936, p. 22.
27

Harold Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes
York: Simon and Schuster, 1953-1954), II, 10.

,

(3 vols.

,

New
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electricity and lower railroad
i cites, but
rates
Dut r.vK,
Rayburn wrote to every
Democrat In the nev House
without regard to region.
Garner, v*o had without
fanfare backed McBuffte
for Speaker In
1933 and Rayburn In 1935, jumped
right Into the middle of
the fray
this time.
In a public staten^nt he
declared that he was '200
per

cent-

for Rayburn and that he
would "'contribute all
I can'"^' to
Rayburn's winning. O'Connor
supporters promptly attacked
Garner for
interfering in a House matter, but
Rayburn welcomed Garner's open

proclamation of support as evidence
that Roosevelt approved
his
cand idacy

Once again the Pennsylvania
delegation played a decisive role
in
the outcome.
Prodded by Senator Guffey,
Pennsylvania backed Rayburn
by an eighteen to six margin.
Rayburn was jubilant, saying Pennsyl-

vania's support -would mean a lot in
the final wind-up of this
thing.

•

Then the Rayburn camp released
endorsements from the

mayors of Chicago and Jersey City, the
Louisiana delegation, Boss
Crump of Memphis, and even Farley.

The timing was meant to give the

appearance that Pennsylvania had started

a band

wagon movement toward

Rayburn, but actually the pledges of support
had been secured much
,

.

earlier.

28

29

30

31

31

NYT, Nov. 6, 1936, p.

3;

Nov. 13, 1936, p. 4.

Ibid., Dec. 2, 1936, p. 11.
Ibid., Dec. 4, 1936, p. 10.

Dorough, p. 254.
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Guffey's intervention did not
sit well with the O'Connor
forces.
Charles Faddis of Pennsylvania,
one of O'Connor's six votes
in the

Pennsylvania delegation, blasted
Guffey for reneging on a deal
with
O'Connor. Faddis recalled:
•Myself and some other Pennsylvania
Democrats
obtained the support of Mr.
O'Connor for the
Guffey Coal Bill in the last
Congress.
It was
passed by a small majority and due,
I think
to the effort of Mr. O'Connor.
In return fox
his support we assured him that we
would be
glad to be for him for leader.
I feel obliged
to keep ray promise. '32

To try to balance Rayburn's inroads
in the North, O'Connor rallied his Southern allies.

Franklin Hancock of North Carolina said

it would be "statesmanlike" for the
Democrats to give the North an

expanded leadership role in the House and
Robert Ramspeck of Georgia

urged his Southern colleagues "'not to insist '"^^
upon the election
of another Southerner.

Before the caucus met, Mead and Rankin withdrew
from the contest,

At the caucus, Bankhead was nominated for Speaker by
acclamation and

Rayburn bested O'Connor 184 votes to 127 votes with
ballots for other members.

a scattering of

The results had been expected when the

nominating speeches showed that O'Connor had not been able to
heal
the split in the New York delegation.

Cullen of Brooklyn and Bronx

Democrats belonging to Edward Flynn's organization backed Rayburn

whereas upstate, Manhattan, and the rest of the Bronx delegates

^^NYT, Dec. 5, 1936, p. 20.
Ibid., Dec. 13, 1936, p. 4 (for the Hancock quote) and Dec. 20,
1936, p. 6 (for the Ramspeck quote).
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Sided With O'Ccno..

other Northern votes
for Rayhurn ca.e fro.

Clarence Lea of California,
who would .ove up to the
chainnanship
of the interstate Co^erce
Co^ttee with Rayburn's advancement ,^4
and McConnaC, who '-produced
about ten votes in the
New England delegation to put Rayburn across.
Boland, who had favored
Rayburn at
the critical Pennsylvania
caucus, was re-appointed
Whip.
In 1939, for the first time
since the Democrats had
become the
-Jority party in 1931, there were no
leadership vacancies and no
contests.
Bankhead and Rayburn were re-elected
and Boland stayed as
Whip. Roosevelt was unhappy
with the House leadership and
complained
to secretary Ickes that
Bankhead was weak and "Rayburn
was so anxious
to succeed to the Speakership
that he feared to offend anyone.

Roosevelt, however, did not try to
stir up a revolt.
In September. 1940, Bankhead died
and Rayburn, who had been

•

Speaker pro tempore during Bankhead 's
extended sickness, was im-

mediately elevated to the Speakership.

His advancement, of course,

left the Majority Leadership vacant and
a contest began brewing as
a long line of potential contenders
started jockeying for the post.

McCormack, Boland, Jere Cooper of Tennessee,
Clifton Woodrum of
Virginia, Eugene Cox of Georgia, and Rankin were
all interested.
34

5,

Ibid.
Dec. 9, 1936, p. 15; Jan. 4, 1937,
pp.
1937, p. 15; Dorough, p. 255.

1

and 14; Jan.

35

Richard Boiling, House out of Order, (New York:
and Co., 1965), p. 73.
36 James

MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt:
York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 307.

E.

P

Dutton

The Lion and the Fox, (New

206

Mccor^c. and Woodru™, Ho.ever.
,uicKl, e^er.ed f.„„
two stronses. co^peUto.s.

.His field as the

HcCor„.cU was close to
.ayhurn, havin, „o..

mated hi. for SpeaUe. when
BanUhead died

and having delivered
New

England's votes in his successful
tr, for the Majority
Leadership in
1937. McCor.ac.. a staunch New
Dealer, was also widely
believed to be

Roosevelfs choice."

„oodru., i„ contrast, was
a conservative who had

opposed several administration
measures that did not directly
benefit
his own district. Nevertheless,
he was able, respected, and

likely to

carry the "entire Southern
membership of more than 100"^^
if he should
run,

The most important issues in the
fight were sectionalism and
loyalty to the New Deal.

Northern Democrats were demanding

a

Northern leader

since the South had dominated the
top party leadership positions
since
Rainey's death and the liberals wanted
a Majority Leader who would
be

responsive to the President's legislative
goals.

Nonetheless, the

issues that were directly involved in
the maneuvering were procedural
questions.

'

McCormack's forces wanted to hold the election
immediately

since McCormack seemed to be ahead while
Woodrum and the other possible

contenders favored postponing the caucus in
hopes that the 1940 election

might alter the House alignment sufficiently
to improve their chances
for election.

caucus.

McCormack favored open voting, but Woodrum was worried
that

^W,
38

The second dispute was over using a secret ballot
at the

Sept. 16, 1940, p. 10; Sept. 18, 1940, p. 16.

Ibid., Sept. 16, 1940, p. 10.
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see

Of

Ms

suppo.ters who wanted
.o .e.a.n

Roosevelt's ,ood ,.aces
would bolt to Mccor^ck
unless the voting was
secret.^^
McCormack's friends rounded
naea

up thp
f? f^
the fifty
signatures needed to call
•

an early caucus.

v

When it met,
met Carl
r^r-i
Vinson moved that the vote
be delayed until the new House
convened
unvenea, but M.-.this proposal lost 108
to 91,

possibly because there was
a report that
1. wanted
Roosevelt
McCormack's
election "at this timp "'^^ a^:*After this vote, Cooper,
Roland, and Rankin
withdrew from the contest,
open balloting, McCormack
outpolled
Woodrum 141 to sixty-seven.
As Woodrum had suspected,
there were n.ny
southerners who switched to
McCormack, including
•

m

Cox, who was the in-

formal leader of the Southern
conservative bloc.^^

Summary of the 1931-1941 Contests

The most striking aspect about
the Democratic conflict in
this
period was the high number of
contests. Table 1 summarizes the
fights.
The Democrats battled twice over
the Speakership:

in 1933 when Rainey,

McDuffie, and Byrns engaged in a
spectacular brawl that involved all
three leadership offices in the trading
and bargaining and in 1935 when
Byrns, Bankhead, and Rayburn vied to
succeed Rainey.
In addition, there

were five fights, one in each Congress,
over the Majority Leadership.
In 1931, after contemplating challenging
Garner for the Speakership,
39

1940,

^-15; sept.

p^T-Ind'?::
Ibid., Sept. 26, 1940, pp.

41

Boiling, Power in the House

1

and 14.

,

pp.

155-56.

26.
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TABLE

1

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP
SELECTION, 1931-1941

_Speaker

Year
1931

Status of Post

What Happened

Vacant--Party became
inajority.

Vacant --Garner elected Vice President.

Vacant--Rainey had
died.

Vacant--Byrns had
died.

No contest--Rainey and
Garner struck deal;
Rainey ran for Majority
Leader instead of
Speaker

Contest--3 major candidates; decided on 1st
ballot at caucus.
Contest--3 candidates;
all but one withdrew
before caucus.
No contest

No contest

No contest

Vacant--Bankhead
had died.

Outcome

No contest

Majority Leader
Vacant --Party
became majority.

Contest--Garner 's
deals caused all
contenders except
one to withdraw before caucus

Vacant--Maj. Leader
chose to run for
Speaker

Contest--2 candidates; decided on
1st ballot at
caucus

Bankhead reelected

Bankhead reelected

209

TABLE 1- -Continued

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION,
1931-1941

Majority Leader
Status of Post

What Happened

Outcome

Vacant- -Ma j
Leader ran for
Speaker.

Contest--? candidates;
decided on 2nd ballot
at caucus

Bankhead
elected

Vacant- -Ma j
Leader had become Speaker.

Contest--4 candidates;
decided on 1st ballot

Rayburn
elected

No vacancy

No contest

Vacant- -Ma j
Leader had become Speaker.

at caucus.

Contest--all candidates
but 2 withdrew before
caucus vote; decided on
1st ballot.

Rayburn
elected

.

McCormack
elected

Whip
No vacancy

No Change

McDuffie reappointed

Vacant Whip
chose to run
for Speaker.

Change- -new Whip appointed as part of
deal that elected
Speaker

Greenwood
appointed

No vacancy

Change--new Whip as
part of Speakership
bargaining.

Bo land

No vacancy

No change

Boland reappointed

No vacancy

No change

Boland reappointed

—

appointed
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Rainey beac a long list of
opponents; in 1933 Byrns barely
defeated
Banlchead In the intricate
deal that swept

B.ainey into the Speakership;

in 1935, Bankhead outlasted
six rivals to win on the
second ballot; in
Raybnru
1937,
bested O'Connor at the
caucus; and in 1,40, HcCor^ack.

with adn>i„istration help,

triumphed over Woodrum.

Thus, in a single
decade, the Democrats waged
seven leadership fights, which
amounted
to one more contest than they
had fought in the preceding
thirty-six
years

Turnover in the leadership hierarchy
was extensive, with five
Speakers, five Majority Leaders, and
three l^ips. The Speakership
vacancies began when Garner was elected
Vice President in 1932 but resulted priinarily from the successive
deaths of Speakers Rainey, Byrns,
and Bankhead, all of whom were in
their sixties or seventies when orig-

inally elected to the Speakership.

Furthermore, because the Democrats

consistently elevated their Majority Leaders to
the Speakership, Majority Leadership openings were as plentiful
as Speakership vacancies.
The Whips were appointed but that practice did
not protect them from
the upheavals.

The Whips changed almost as frequently as the
Speakers

and the Majority Leaders because the office of
Whip became valuable in
the bargaining that characterized the Speakership
clashes.

For example,

McDuffie remained as Whip in 1931 when he agreed to pull out
of the contest for Majority Leader but was dumped in 1933 when he was
on the losing
side of the Speakership battle.

Greenwood, who replaced McDuffie, was

shunted aside in 1935 to make way for Boland, whose appointment apparently was part of the price Guffey extracted for his help in electing Byrns
to the Speakership.
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By the 1930-3, despite
the number of challenges,
the Minority Leader
or Majority Leader without
fail advanced to the
Speakership. One of the
recurring the.es in the
contests was that the Majority
Leader was the
rightful heir to the office
because of precedent.
However, no such

progression was visible for the
position of Majority Leader,
which may
account for the greater number
of contests over that post.

All three
Whips wanted to move up to the
Majority Leadership, but none
succeeded
in making the transition in
this decade.
McDuffie dropped out of the

race for Majority Leader in
1931 under pressure from Garner;
Greenwood
was interested in running against
Bankhead
in 1935 but did not appear

to organize a campaign; and
Boland withdrew from the Majority
Leader

skirmish at the caucus rather than
confront McCormack in 1940.

Com-

mittee assignments do not reveal any
alternate method for recruiting

Majority Leaders.

Rainey was on the Ways and Means Committee,
Byrns

was Chairman of the Appropriations
Committee, Bankhead was Chairman of
Rules, Rayburn was Chairman of the
Interstate Commerce Committee, and

McCormack was a member of the Ways and Means
Committee when elected to
the Majority Leadership.

Aside from general requirements like senior-

ity-the Majority Leaders in the 1930's averaged 21.2
years

in the House

at the time of election— and an important committee
assignment, there

seemed to be no particular position that conferred or
guaranteed heir

apparent status.

Outside intervention was rampant in Democratic contests in this
period.

Like Cleveland and Wilson, Roosevelt occasionally took part in

the contests.

Rumors abounded in every fight about Roosevelt's choice,
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but in 1933 and 1935 he
appeared to be genuinely
neutral. By 1937, with
the conservatives gaining
strength. Roosevelt „as
ready to unleash
bers of his administration,
like Garner. Ickes, and
Farley, to rally
support for Rayburn. who was
»,re congenial to the New Deal
than
O'Connor.
i„ 1,40. Roosevelt's reported
preference for McCoroack seems
to have helped him win.
Although no source unequivocally
states that
Roosevelt intervened on McCormack's
behalf, there were also no loud
and

emphatic denials from the White
wiiiue nuuse
House as had
naa h«nr,
been common

m

some of the

earlier battles when speculative
stories had circulated.

A new element in the Democratic brawls
was the widespread participation of Senators, Governors, Mayors,
and local party bosses.

The most

blatant examples of interference were
Senator Guffey's involvement in
1935 and 1937 aad Tammany's negotiations for
better committee treatment
in 1931 and 1933.

Republican disputes had frequently attracted
the in-

terest of leading senators

also but what was completely different
from

the Republican pattern was the active
role of Democratic local leaders

like Mayor Cermak, Mayor Hague, and the Tammany
chiefs.

Although the

formal positions in the two parties differed,
important Republican
senators, like the big city leaders in the Democratic
party, often con-

trolled the nominating process in their home states for
House seats.
This informal power made it possible for these two groups
of outsiders
to influence the course of House leadership contests.

Interest group participation generally seemed absent from the Demo-

cratic fights in this decade.

One exception was the interest expressed

A2

James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story
York: McGraw-Hill, 19A8), p. 182.

:

The Roosevelt Years

,

(New
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by l.bor and postal
workers in behalf of Mead,
.ho was^he chalr„.n
of the Appropriations
subcoMnittee handling the
Post Office.

Anal^si^ of the Va riables

MaiaEitZ-Mlnoria status.

.

1931-1941

Majority status had appeared
to deflect

leadership competition between
1911 and 1919, as
hypothesized, but
between 1931 and 1941 the
Democrats fought in every
Congress despite
being the ..Jority party. il,e
conflict probably reached
its height in
1933 and 1935, when both the Speakership
and the Majority Leadership
were battled over. By the end
of the decade there were
at least a
couple of signs that the quarreling
was subsiding. Bankhead
and Rayburn
assumed the Speakership autonu^tically
'
and the Whip did not change
hands
after 1935.

The last time the Democrats had
wi-angled so steadily over the
leadership was from 1897 to 1907, when
as a minority party they had
engaged in four contests. What these
two competitive decades have in
common is that both coincide with

a

realigning election or era.

The

earlier combat followed the 1896 election
when Bryan re-oriented the

presidential party to the needs of the South
and the West while the conflict of the 1930

's

raged during, the realigning era of 1928 to
1936 when

urban, ethnic voters moved into the Democratic
party.

Consequently, the

timing of the Democratic battles in the House
would suggest that a durable change in party alignments may be more conducive
to leadership up-

heavals than either majority or minority status.
As Table 2 indicates, the Democrats fought slightly more
often when

they held overwhelming majorities in the House than when they
had more
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TABLE

2

PARTY SIZE AND DEMOCRATIC
CONELICT, 1931-1941

ox^.e or jrarcy

50.0 to 54.9%
55.0 to 59.9%
60.07o and over

# of Congresses

# of Fights

1

1

I

1

3

modest leads over the Republicans.

5

The Democrats controlled over two-

thirds of House seats in 60 per cent
of the Congresses between 1931 and
1941, but fought over 70 per cent of their
contests in these three Con-

gresses.

This pattern is in sharp contrast to
Republican majorities,

which were more inclined to fight when they
had their narrowest majorities

^^^^^^^^
crats
'

Success at the polls preceded most of the Demo-

leadership altercations between 1931 and 1941.

In fact, some of

the stormiest contests, such as the Rainey-McDuf
f ie donnybrook in 1933

and Bankhead's fight for Majority Leader in
1935, coincided with some

of the Democrats' greatest victories.

The only exception, as Table

3

shows, was the 1940 Woodrum-McCormack clash, which developed
after the

Democrats lost sixty-nine seats in the 1938 election.

Aside from the

1940 contest, these findings run contrary to Peabody's expectations.

Based on the Democrats' ability to side-step leadership conflict be-

tween 1955 and 19 66, Peabody theorized that a series of electoral

triumphs would tend to inhibit fights and promote stability and
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TABLE 3

DEMOCRATIC ELECTION RETURNS,
1931-1941
Year

1931

1933
1935

1937

# of House Seat
Won 43

Change from Previous Election

219

310
322
329

1939

260

of Democratic
Seats When Congress Met

7o

+56

50.3

+91

71,3

+12

74.0

+

75.6

7

-69

59.8

indicates contest

orderly change, but the results
from the 1930 's suggest otherwise.
What is particularly noteworthy
about the relationship between
election success and conflict in the 1930

's

is that between 1895 and 1931

most Democratic skirmishes also
followed election upsurges rather
downturns.

In short, the evidence from nearly
a half century indi-

cates that Democratic leadership clashes
occasionally erupted after
the party lost ground,

as in 1919 and 1939, but more often
the Demo-

crats battled over the leadership after
winning an election.

Membership turnover.

During the 1930

's

in 80 per cent of the Con-

gresses torn apart by leadership strife, membership
turnover was fairly
43

The figures refer to the House line-up when Congress
opened
rather than the November returns.
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hxgh With .e„ .embers
co^osi.g between 22.2 and
41.9 pe. cent of the

Be.oc«tic „e^ership.

On the other hand,
turnover was low In the

76th congress, when McCo^ack
captured the Majority
Leadership
See
Table 4 for the details.
Before 1931 „ost Democratic
contests had
also been characterized by
high turnover. One
difference with the
earlier period was that the
extent of .e^bership change
in igso's had
declined froM the rates recorded
between 1895 and 1931. when
it was
co».on for over 37 per cent
of the Democrats to be
newcomers in contested congresses. The drop
in turnover probably could
be predicted
TABLE 4

DEMOCRATIC CONFLICT AND ^ffiMBERSHIP
CHANGE, 1931-1941

^^^^

% of New Members

1931

32.9

1933

58.1

25.2

1937
.

Incumbents

67.1

41.9

1935

1939

7o

74.8

22.2

77.8

12.3

87.7

indicate^ a contest

in light of studies emphasizing the lengthening
careers of Congressmen

after the

t irn

of the century.

Nevertheless, when the amount of mem-

bership stability among House Democrats during the peaceful
Congresses
of the late 1920' s is con^ared with the 1930

's,

the degree of member-

ship change after 1930 was clearly rising, as Table

5 shows.

Thus,
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TABLE 5

MEMERSHIP CHANGE IN THE
DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1919-1941

^
Year

7o

1919

1931

-

-

New Members

1931 (all Congresses)
(contest Congresses)
(stable Congresses)

33*1
i3]8

1941 (all contest Congresses)

26.9

# of Cases

20 2
J
7
4

at a less dramatic level,
the pattern froxu the minority
Congress re-

peatcd itself with leadership
conflict .ore likely to develop
when the
membership was least stable.
Hieraxch^.

m

four of the five Congresses
in which leadership

conflict flared between 1931 and
1941, freshmen composed a minimum
of 20 per cent of the Democratic
membership. This figure is compara-

tively high since no freshman class
on the Democratic side had exceeded 20 per cent since 1913 except
for 1923, which had been the last
time the Democrats brawled before the
wave of fights in the 1930

's.

Of the fights between 1931 and
1941, only the 1940 clash occurred

when a small freshman class was present, as
Table

6

indicates.

Be-

fore 1931 five of the six Democratic battles
had also developed when

freshmen flowed into the party.

As with membership change, the pro-

portion of freshman Democrats in the earlier contests
was even higher,

usually over 30 per cent, than in the 1930's.

Again the pattern from

the minority years persisted but with a somewhat
reduced percentage

of freshmen.
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TABLE

6

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND
SENIORITY, 1931-1941

Year

1931
.1933

1935

1937
1939

7„

Freshmen

% Members from 3
Youngest Classes

25.1

39.0

24.2

21.3
11.5

% Senior

43.8

29.7

62.8

25.5

66.4

21.1

64.0

20.4

50.8

23.1

indicates a contest

When second or third term Democrats, are
examined independently,
they do not add to an understanding of
the conditions facilitating'

leadership conflict but when first, second,
and third term members
are combined, the youthfulness of the
Democratic party in the mid-

1930 's is underscored.

For example, in 1935 approximately two-

thirds of the Democrats in the House had been
elected since the onset

of the depression and by 1937 nearly two-thirds had
been elected at
the time of or after Roosevelt's 1932 triumph.

Although the per-

centage of freshmen decreased after the 1932 landslide, the
Democrats

continued to be a very junior and, in terms of personnel, a vastly
changed party from the 1920

's

because of the large numbers of second

and third term representatives.

Before 1931 there was no comparable

bloc of junior members associated with the leadership fights.

One
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reason for this structural difference
is that in the minority
years
freshmen elected in off-years were swept
out of office in the next

election as Republican Congressmen returned
on the coattails of their
presidential candidates. In the 1930 's
with the Democrats steadily
winning, freshmen got re-elected.

The junior classes in the mid-

thirties may possibly have substituted for
and played a role similar

to

the very large freshman classes before
1931. in the formation of

leadership contests.

All the Democratic fights in this decade took
place when the proportion of senior Democrats was either declining,
as from 1931 through
1939, or comparatively low, ranging from 20.4 to 23.1
per cent, as

from 1935 to 1941.

To find other Democratic Congresses with equally

small pools of veterans, one must go back to the New
Freedom Con-

gresses except for 1923.

The association between falling seniority

and conflict was also evident in Democratic leadership struggles

before 1931.
Regional

f actionalism .

During the 1920 's the South dominated the

Congressional wing of the Democratic party, but beginning with the
1930 election Northerners started to pour into the party and soon sur-

passed the Southern contingent in size.

Table

7

The raw figures presented in

illustrate how quickly the geographical base of the Democratic

party in the House shifted.
held one hundred seats.

Betv/een 1919 and 1931 the South usually

In the 1930

's

the South 's number seats re-

mained constant, but the North's share increased dramatically from
eighty-two in 1931 to 167 in 1933 and to 186 by 1937 and then back to
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TABLE

7

REGIONAL FACTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS, 1931-1941

from
South
It-

If

# from
North

7o

South

7o

North

7o

Border
t-oe
O LctL.€S

1931

101

1933
1935
1937
1939

99

100
101
99

82

46.1

37.4

16.4

10/

31.9

53.9

14.2

181

31.1

56.2

12.7

186

30.7

56.5

12.8

122

38.1

46.9

15.0

indicates a contest

122 in 1939,

This enormous growth in Northern
representation coincided

with the great spurt in leadership conflict.

In each Congress in which

the Democrats quarreled in this period,
the Northern wing of the party

was either expanding, as from 1931 until
1939, or the largest regional

factional within the party, as from 1933 through
1941.

Before 1931

when the Democrats were a minority, a rise in
Northern strength often
signalled a leadership contest while a drop in Northern
representation
and a complementary upswing in Southern seats usually
forecast leadership harmony.

During the majority years of Wilson's Presidency, how-

ever, the large but shortlived Northern majorities had not
led to

increased leadership hostility.
Ideological factionalism

.

By the late 1920

's

the Democrats had

turned into a conservative party, content to follow the lead of the
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business-oriented .ep.Wican
administrations

With the depression the
De™,cratic party began to
rediscover its reforming
.eal and the large.
Northern, urban influxes "X
of cne
the early
earlv 1930
iQ-^n* s .
transformed the party into
a predominantly liberal
party. The very
pervasiveness of the depression tended to unite the
party behind Roosevelt's
refor^ns between 1933
and 1935 although a conservative
minority
.

remained.

By 1935 as the

New Deal switched its attention
from emergency recovery
measures

to a

tnore

fundamental restructuring of the
economy, the conservatives,
r-stly but by no means exclusively
Southerners, began to enlarge and
the unity began to disintegrate.
By 1937-1939 the New Deal
majorities
were crumbling and the conservative
bloc had joined forces with
the

Republicans to stop or at least slow
down the pace of change.

James

Patterson estimates the size of the
conservative faction within the
Democratic party in the House as 12.9
per cent in 1933, 19.2 per cent
in 1935, 21.6 per cent in 1937, and
23.1 per cent in

1939,'^'^

j^ii^s

Turner's data indicate that the level of
cohesion among Democrats in
1933 was 63.5-not very different from the scores
registered in the
1920's, but by 1937 cohesion had fallen to
53.9, the lowest score

Turner recorded for either party in the
Congresses he studied.
the 1920

Northern Democrats had been more likely to stray
from the

's

party position on roll call votes whereas in the 1930
's the Southern
wing, particularly Southerners from rural constituencies
in Virginia,

^^Patterson, pp. 340-43.
45

,
Julius ^
Turner, Party and Constituency
Pressures on Congress
ed. by Edward V. Schneier, Jr., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins,
1951), p. 21.
.

;

,
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Texas, Mississippi, and
Georgia, showed .he least
enthusiasm for the
New Deal.

The Widening gulf between
conservatives and New Dealers
after
1935 corresponded with the leadership
tur.oil in the .id and late
1930's and early 1940's. The
contests in those years
reflected the
growing ideological cleavage.
In 1937 Rayburn with
administration
support battled O'Connor, who
was on Roosevelt's purge
list in 1938,
and Mccoro^ck, allegedly
Roosevelt's favorite, defeated
Woodru., thl
conservative candidate. The earlier
contests in this decade had ideo-

logical overtones, but they had
not been so clearly head-on
confrontations between pro and anti-New
Deal candidates.

Con^n^.

Regionally Democratic leaders and
followers did not

n^atch well during the 1930's.

Except for Rainey, the Speakers
were

Southerners despite the North's lopsided
inajorities.

Two of the five

Majority Leaders were from the North, but
between Rainey 's death in
1934 and McCormack's election in 1940 there
was no Northerner in

either of the top two party leadership
posts.

Part of the explanation

for the dearth in Northern leaders was
that fewer Northerners than

Southerners had accumulated extensive seniority
during the long minority interval from 1919 to 1931, as Table

'

8

depicts.

Consequently,

the North's circle of potential leaders was smaller
than the South 's
pool although larger than in the New Freedom
Congresses.

Patterson, pp. 340-43.

Another
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TABLE 8

SENIOR DEMOCRATS CLASSIFIED
BY REGION, 1931-1941

Year

# of Senior*
Democrats

1931

# from Qmn-v,

65

1933

79

1935

68

1937

67

1939

60

*

^

^^^^^

46 (5)

44 (6)

^^^^^^

# from North

(1)

12 (3)

10 (0)

25 (3)

7

40 (11)

5

(0)

23 (2)

33 (10)

12 (0)

22 (5)

31 (10)

11 (1)

18 (6)

Senior is defined as a minimum
of ten years
service in the House. The numbers
in parentheses refer to those Democrats
with at least
twenty years service in the House.

factor was that about half of the
Northerners with the needed experience were from New York."^^

m

spite of being the largest state dele-

gation on the Democratic side. New York
was unable to capitalize on
its numerical superiority because of
the friction inside the delega-

tion between the Mead, O'Connor, and Cullen
factions.

Another handi-

cap veterans like Edward Taylor of Colorado
and Ayres of Kansas

labored under was that they were from small states
and lacked a
power base from which to initiate a campaign.

47

McCormack compensated

The number of senior representatives from New York in each
Congress are as follows:
in 1931 four; in 1933 twelve; in 1935 elevenin 1937 eleven; in 1939 eight.
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for the sr^llness of the
Massachusetts delegation
inthe 1930's by
running as New England's
candidate. Nonetheless,
the North was not
completely excluded fro. the
leadership even during the
1934-1940
period. All the Whips except
for McDuffie were
Northerners. Yet
the lack of a higher ranking
Northern leader after 1934
see.ed to be
one of the elements stimulating
McCormack's quick election
in 1940.

Northern Democrats had lost
heavily in the 1938 setback
and were determined to elect one of their
own before the 1940 election
in case

the results further eroded
their strength.
In terms of ideology, the fit
between rank and file and the

leadership seemed somewhat closer,

m

1931 Garner and McDuffie's

conservatism was offset by Rainey's
liberalism and in 1933 Rainey
was probably balanced by Byrns
although it is hard to draw many
definite conclusions about Byrns since
so little has been written
about him.

After Rainey died, the leaders-regardless
of regional

affiliation-were all loyal New Dealers and
thus compatible with the
majority of House Democrats.

However, with the exception of the Whip

Boland, the leaders were initially
recruited from the more conservativc wing of the party. 48 Bankhead styled
himself as a "states'
48

William E. Sullivan in "Criteria for Selecting
Party Leadership in Congress: An Empirical Test," American
Politics Quarterly
III, (January, 1975), pp. 25-44, makes the
interIiIili~i:oint that
Congressional leaders are not necessarily moderates or
high party
scorers befo_re their selection as leaders but after
becoming a leader
an individual's voting record moderates. Initially,
Rayburn, Bankhead, and Byrns were identified with the conservative
wing of the
party but all of them were loyal to the President even
when they
personally found some of his proposals difficult to swallow.
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rights Democrat" and a
..'strict constructionist

'-^^

Although Rayburn
was the more liberal candidate
in his bid for Majority
Leader in 1937,
he referred to himself as a
conservative.
The addition of McCor^c,
a staunch New Dealer with
ties to labor and the urban
ethnics, helped

link the ideological wings of
the party more closely and
also gave
tangible recognition to the North's
strength in the House.
Summary

o_f

the Variables

.

1931 -1941

The leadership contests between
1931 and 1939 occurred under

strikingly sionilar conditions.

The Democrats were the majority
party,

they were trouncing the Republicans
in election after election, and

expanding rapidly as freshmen flowed into
the party.

'

As the freshmen

won re-election, junior members began to
outnumber veterans by margins
as high as three to one in some Congresses.

But, above all, the in-

flux of freshmen in terms of region was highly
uneven.

Typically,

in the Congresses before 1939 sixteen of the
freshmen were from the
South, but the number of non-Southern freshmen
varied between thirty-

nine and 105.

(See Table

9

for the specific figures.)

As a result,

the Democratic party in the House was quickly transformed
from a

Southern conservative party with a small Northern wing into a
pre-

dominantly Northern, reformist party with

^^Heacock, p. 350.

a Southern minority.

The

'

^ayburn's voting record from the 1920 's would bear out such a
label. Rayburn voted against child labor, woman's suffrage but voted
in favor of selling Muscle Shoals to Henry Ford.
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TABLE

9

THE REGIO^IAL DISTRIBUTION OF
FRESHMEN DEMOCRATS, 1931-1941
Year

IF

1931

OX Freshmen

55

1933

121
78

1937

70

1939

30

# from South

# from Border
States

# from North

16

9

30

16

13

92

15

9

54

16

5

49

16

3

11

leadership battles in these Congresses seemed
strongly related to the
changing regional and ideological alignments
as the new, junior,

Northern wing competed with the older, Southern
wing and as liberals
battled conservatives for a share of the leadership
spoils.
The 1940 battle occurred under very different
circumstances.
1939 the great era of growth and change was over.

The party

I.ad

By
suf-

fered its first loss since 1928 and had begun to
become more stable
and senior in membership.

Nevertheless, at a slightly diminished

level, the Democratic party retained its new configuration
as a

Northern, liberal party.

The leadership, however, did not fully re-

flect the changed factional alignments, particularly in terms of

region.

This lag appears to have fueled the 1940 clash as the under-

represented Northern, reform faction fought for an increased leadership role while the Southern conservatives tried to bloc this re-

distribution of power.
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Thus, the one characteristic
that was con^on to all
the conflict
in this decade was the shift
in the regional and
ideological structure
of the party. Although the
alteration was produced by the
series of
victories that caused the huge
influx of Northerners, the
impact of
these ^ssive personnel changes
persisted after the membership
became
more settled. Until the leadership
accurately reflected the new
regional and ideological alignments,
contests seemed likely to continue.

Finally, fate or chance seemed to
exacerbate the conflict.

Through the trading and swapping
involved in the contests in the
early
1930 -s the Democrats appeared
to hammer out leadership
compromises
that recognized the changing factional
alignments, but the deaths of

three successive Speakers meant that the
battles had to be refought
in each Congress.

As the decade wore on, the Speakership
fights died

away as the Majority Leaders began to assume
the Speakership almost

automatically but no similar method of routine
advancement had yet
been devised for the Majority Leadership so the
conflict continued
at that level.

Leadership Conflict

,

1941 - 1955

The upheavals of the 1930 's were followed by an era of leadership stability and peaceful changes.

From 1941 until 1947 Rayburn

and McCormack were continually elected Speaker and Majority Leader

without opposition.

The only leadership changes that had to be made

in this time span were the appointments of two new Whips.

When

Boland died in June, 1942, Ramspeck of Georgia replaced him and when
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Ramspeck resigned in November
er, 1945
iy^5, to become an
executive with the
Air Transport Association
of ^erica,
America John
Tnhr, Sparkman
q
of Alabama became Whip.

m

,

In 1947, after a sixteen
year reign as the ^jority
party in the
House, the Democrats were
forced to step down,
shortly after the

election, Rayburn in a surprise
announcement disclosed that
he would
not be a candidate for
Minority Leader. His reasoning
was that for
the Democrats to regain
control of the House, they
would have to win
back the Northern voters who
had switched to the
Republicans in 1945.
He thought that a Northern leader
would be more effective in
attracting these voters back to the
Democratic fold. Consequently,
Rayburn
telegraphed McCormack to endorse him
for Minority Leader.^^

A fight immediately began brewing
between Southern conservatives
and Truman Fair Dealers.

Many Southerners considered McCormack
too

liberal and preferred a conservative.

Cox argued that if McCormack

were elected '"the rift within the rank
of the House Democrats will
be wider than that between the
Democrats and Republicans."'^^

Northern

Democrats, in turn, found Cox and Graham
Barden of North Carolina, the

conservatives most frequently mentioned as
Rayburn 's replacement, unacceptable.

^Vt,

To head off the fight, the Texas delegation
began a

June 9, 1942, p. 43; Nov. 27, 1945,

p.

1.

Doroagh, pp. 387-89.

^^obert A. Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of
Sectionalism, 1941-1948, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Universit?
Press, 1974), pp. 204-05.
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draft Rayburn «=ve.e„..

SparU^n and other Southern
moderates also

called upon Rayhurn to
ren.l„ in hopes of
avoidins a deeper split
within the southern contingents.
A few days hefote the caucus
was
scheduled to ^et, Rayburn
was still refusing to
lead, but he was
being bo„*arded with letters
and telegrams.
Tru^n reportedly asked
Rayburn to stay In order to
hold the two wings of the
party together,
and McCor^ck, who had
concluded he could win only
If he risked a
bitter, factional dispute,
also appealed to Rayburn to
return." At
last Rayburn agreed, saying
he -yielded like

soldier should

do.-"

I

figured a good

Rayburn appointed McCor^ck to bo
the Minority

Whip to replace Sparkman, who had
moved to the Senate.
In 1949 Rayburn and McCormack
easily resumed their posts as

speaker and Majority Leader, and Percy
Priest of Tennessee became the

new Majority Whip,

m

1951. the trio of Rayburn. McConnack,
and

Priest continued in office.

When the Democrats lost control of
the

House In 1953. the pattern established
in 1947 was repeated without

dissent as Rayburn stepped down to Minority
Leader and McCormack to
Whip.

P-

n
y; Dec. 31, 1946, ^^'"f
p. 9.^^r°"^f
p. 8.
^^NYT, Jan. 3, 1947, pp.
56

Borough, p. 389.

1

and

4,

Nov.

17, 1946,
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of the Leadershin
changes

1941-1955
in contrast to the
extensive leadership
turnover In the 1930'
the Democratic hierarchy
„as exceedingly stable
hetween 1941 and
1955.
Rayburn and McCor^cU
served as the two top
leaders during
the entire period.
Burlng the transitions
to minority status
and
hac. again to ^.orlty
status, only their
titles changed, otherwise.
the only leadership
nances were
worp the appointments
.
P chan<^es
of new Majority

Whips in 1942, 1945, and
ly^y.
1949

,

Tahl^ in
Table
10 summarizes the leadership

changes

The convenient coincidence
of a Whip vacancy in
1947 apparently
gave birth to the practice
of ranking the Democratic
leaders as "l"
and "2" and moving them
as a team during transitions,
when the chance"
event of 1947 was deliberately
repeated In 1953. although
the Majority
Whip Priest had been re-elected
to the House, the office
of WlUp began
to be recognized as an
important leadership post and
an integral part
of the leadership ladder.
Before 1955 the Majority whips
did not appear to attach much importance
to being Whip.
Except for Boland who
died in office, the other Whips
voluntarily surrendered their
Jobs.

Ramspeck went into private industry.
Sparkman was elected to the
senate, and Priest In 1955 preferred

continuing as Whip.

a co-mnittee

chairmanship to

Beginning with Carl Albert, no Democrat
Whip

has abandoned his post for another
House position or for a career

elsewhere.

A second vivid difference with the 1930 's was
that the Democrats
fought no leadership battles between
1941 and 1955 although a brawl
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TABLE 10

DEMOCEATIG LEADERSHIP
SELECTION, 1941-1955

Speaker

Year

Status of Post

1941

No vacancy

1943

Rayburn re-elected

No contest

Rayburn re-elected

No contest

Rayburn re-elected

Vacant- -Party
became Majority

No contest

Rayburn re-elected

No vacancy

No contest

Rayburn re-elected

No vacancy

1949

1951

Outcome

No contest

No vacancy

1945

What Happened

Majority Leader
1941

1943
1945
1949

1951

No vacancy

No contest

McCormack re-elected

No vacancy

No contest

McCormack re-elected

No vacancy

No contest

McCormack re-elected

Vacant--Party
became Majority

No contest

McCormack re-elected

No vacancy

No contest

McCormack re-elected

Majority Whip
1941

No vacancy

1942

Vacant
died

No change

Boland re-named

New appointment

Ramspeck named

No vacancy

No change

Ramspeck named

a.

No vacancy

No change.

Ramspeck named

b.

Vacant Ramspeck
resigned

New appointment

Sparkman named

— Bo land

1

1943
1945

—

1949

Vacant--Party became Majority

New appointment

Priest named

1951

No vacancy

No change

Priest re-named
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TABLE 10

SaiOCRATIC

I^ERSHI P

SELECTION.

1941-1955-Contir.ued

Minority Leader
Year

1947

1953

Status of Post

What Happened

Outcome

Vacant--Party became Minority

No contest--fight
loomed until Raybum agreed to stay

Raybum elected

Vacant- -Party became Minority

No contest

Rayburn elected

'

Minority Whi£
1947

1953

Vacant--Party became Minority and
Sparkman had been
elected to Senate

New Appointment

McCormack named

Vacant- -Party became Minority;
former Majority
Whip still in
House

New Appointment

McCormack named

almost exploded in 1947.

The only other time the Democrats had
gone

so long without a leadership struggle
was during the majority Con-

gresses from 1911 to 1919.

One continuing element in Democratic leadership
disputes was the
alleged intervention of President Truman.

Truman's decision to urge

Rayburn to stay on as leader had many precedents
in Democratic politics since Cleveland, Wilson, and Roosevelt had
also expressed leader-

ship preferences on occasion.

Aside from Truman's interest, there is
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no evidence of outside pressure
or participation fro.
Senators, local
party bosses, or interest
groups.

Analysis of the Variables

Majorit^-Mi^io^ status.

.

1941 -1955

Fron. 1941 to 1955, the
Democrats were

in the majority five times and
in the minority twice.

Regardless of
the party's status in the House,
no leadership battle was waged
al-

though a struggle almost erupted
when the Democrats became the
minority in 1947. This near-fight provides
only slight support for the

hypothesis that minority status tends to
produce leadership conflict.
Between 1931 and 1955, the Democrats fought
seven contests and all of

them developed during majority Congresses.

Before 1931 the Democrats

had competed six times and in each instance
had been the minority
party.

In short, neither majority nor minority
status was an accurate

or useful index for predicting leadership fights.
The size of the party in this period did not seem
to explain the

absence of conflict.

As Table 11 shows, no battles formed when the

Democrats had a comfortable lead over the Republicans as
in 1941 and
1949 or when the Democrats' share of seats in the House fell below

50 per cent as in 1947 and 1953.

Election returns

.

gered leadership fights.

Peabody thought that election defeats trigIn 1943 and 1947 the Democrats suffered

major losses, dropping forty-six and fifty-six seats respectively,
and in the early 1950 's lost enough seats in two successive setbacks
to lose control of the House in 1953, as Table 12 indicates.

No
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TABLE 11
SIZE OF PARTY AND DEMOCRATIC
CONTESTS, 1941-1955

7o

of Democratic Members

# of Contests

Under 50

# of Congres ses

0

50.0 to 59.9

0

60.0 and over

0

TABLE 12

DEMOCRATIC ELECTION RETURNS, 1941-1955
Year

7/^

of Seats Won

Change from Last
Election

% of Democratic
Seats

1941

268

+

7

61.7

1943

222

-46

51.0

1945

243

+21

55.9

1947

187

-56

43.0

1949

262

+75

60.2

1951

235

-27

54.0

1953

211

-24

48.5
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fight occurred in any of these
Congresses although a challenge
seemed
likely in 1947 if Rayburn retired,
the past, Democratic skirmishes
usually followed election upsurges
but in this time span even
the
biggest victories such as the
seventy-five seat rebound in 1948
were
associated with leadership stability.

m

^-^^^^^^P

£1-I1S£.

As Table 13 depicts, House
Democrats were a

comparatively stable body between 1941
and 1955.

The average per-

centage of incumbents in these Congresses
was 80.5 per cent, up from
73.1 per cent in the 1930's.

general trend,

m

Only 1949 deviates noticeably from
the

1949 38.2 per cent of the Democratic
members had

not served in the Republican dominated 80th
Congress.

Before 1941

whenever such a large segment of the Democratic
membership had been
new, a struggle had ensued.

In 1949, however, the party was calm

as Rayburn and McCormack resumed the Speakership
and Majority Leader-

ship.

What can account for the change in behavior?

An analysis of the

1949 new members shows that eighty of the 100 newcomers were freshmen

whereas twenty were former Congressmen who had gone down to defeat
in
the 1946 Republican comeback but were able to recover their seats
in
1948.

The four to one ratio between freshmen and former Congressmen

is unusual.

Ordinarily, a much higher percentage of new members can

be classified as freshmen.

Moreover, most of the new members--both

freshmen and former legislators--were Northerners, which strongly
suggests that 1948 was a re-instating election^'^ in the House.

V. 0. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties
and Pressure Groups
ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964), p. 536.
,

.

In

(5th
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TABLE 13

DEMOCRATIC CONFLICT AND
MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1941-1955

1941

16.8

1943

18.5

1945

23.9

1947

15.5

1949

38.2

1951
1953

83.2
81.5
76.1

84.5
61.8

8.5

91.5

14.7

85.3

past examples a high rate of menibership
change was an indicator that
the previous alignment of political
forces in the House was under

pressure.

In the 1940's the 1946 election, as
later discussion will

more clearly illustrate, undercut the
alignments that originally
elected Rayburn and McCormack while the 1948
election tended to restore the pre-1947 coalition.

Hierarchy.

By 1941 the great flood of freshmen into the
Demo-

cratic party had subsided.

Freshman classes between 1941 and 1955

were small, as Table 14 shows, except for 1949 when freshmen
composed nearly one- third of the Democratic members in the
House.

Pre-

viously, in seven out of nine cases, such a large freshman class
had

been a harbinger of leadership conflict but in 1949 the transition
to majority status was peaceful.
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TABLE 14

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND
SENIORITY, 1941-1955

Year

"L

1941

Freshmen

12.3

1943

16.2

1945

20.2

1947

15.0

1949

30.5

1951

7.2

1953

13.7

% Sophomores

% Seniors

15.3

26.1

13.1

30.6

14.0

30.0

13.9

35.3

16.0

26.0

25.1

30.2

10.4

33.6

Sophomore classes during most of
this era were also small,

further evidence that the Democratic
party was settling down after
the upheavals of the 1930's.

The lone exception was in 1951,
when a

large chunk of the 1949 freshman class
was re-elected.

Wi,en

the three

youngest classes are checked, the Democrats
leaned strc-jly in a
junior direction only between 1949 and
1953, when

appro:.:

[mately half

of the membership had served in the House
for under six years.
no fight occurred even in those Congresses.

But

Thus, a party with a

sizeable body of junior members is not necessarily
beset with leadership conflict.

As would be expected from the data on freshmen and
other junior

members, the Democrats were becoming a more senior party
in the 1940 's

238

and early 1950^.

The only earlier
Oonsresses In which the Be^crats
had had such a large pool
of veterans occurred
between 1925 and 1931,
v*en there were also no
leadership strusgles. Yet
the relationship
between rising seniority ani
leadership harmony is not
,uite so
'

straightforward as the overall
statistics suggest.

The Congress in

which the proportion of senior
Democrats was highest between
1941
and 1955 was in 1947 when
Northern

liberals and Southern conserva-

tlves were on the brink of a battle.

The 1947 exaMple Indicates
that

although a high percentage of senior
laembers is often a correlate
of
leadership stability, it alone does
not prevent controversies from
arising.

R£gi2E^ factionalism.

The regional structure of the party
had

changed from the heyday of the New Deal.

merically dominated the party.

The North no longer nu-

Instead, between 1941 and 1955, the

North and South alternated as the largest
geographical section in
the party.

In 1941, 1945, and 1949-all Congresses
elected in years

in wiiich the Democrats captured the Presidency—
the North had the

upperhand whereas in 1943, 1947, 1951, and 1953 the
South was the
stronger contingent.

The only Congress, however, in which the South

actually had a majority was in 1947, as Table 15 indicates.

Con-

sequently, 1947--more than any other Congress in this fourteen
year
span- -represented a significant shift in the regional underpinning
o f the party.

Historically, in the Democratic party, a major change

in the regional composition of the membership has forecast increased

leadership conflict.

For example, at the turn of the century a rise
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TABLE 15

REGIONAL FACTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRATIC CONFLICT, 1941-1955
Year

% from South

1941

37.3

1947
1949

1951
1953

% from North

14.6

48.1

12.2

41.4

13.2

44.0

11.8

33.7

14.1

46.6

43.8

13.6

42.6

46.9

12.3

40.8

1943
1945

% from Border States

46.4
42.8
54.5

39.3

in Northern representation preceded
each of the contests and in the

1930 's the rapid swing from a
predominantly Southern to a strongly

Northern party coincided with the spurt of
battles.
pattern was about to be repeated.

In 1947 the

At the very time the membership

was becoming more Southern, Rayburn decided to
retire.

The newly

resurgent Southern delegation was ready to fight
rather than allow a

Northerner to succeed Rayburn as leader.

Ideolp^al

_f

actional ism.

The polarization between liberals

and conservatives that began in the mid-1930 's continued
into the

1940 's and 1950':.

Rural conservatives, mainly from the South, were

pitted against urban liberals, mostly from the North, on a broad
range of domestic issues although civil rights was the most emotional
and controversial subject.

Turner's roll call study shows that the
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cratic disunity.

Only In X948 did the
D^oc.ae. exhibu skater coheslvenes. *en their score
reached 63.5. largely
because ^ny
Northern liberals had been
supplanted by Republicans
in the 1946
election.
Thus, the data fro. 1944
and 1953 argue that the
Dcmocrats can n^intain leadership
stability-as Peabody recognized
between 1955 and 1966-in face
of deep ideological
cleavages. However,
shifts in the ideological
balance of the party-even
if thev tend to
make the membership more
unified on issues-apparently
can bring pressure for leadership change.

Con^uence.

From 1941 to 1955 the South was
the largest regional

bloc within the Democratic
House membership four times and
the North
three times. The leadership
carefully reflected the Democrats'
di-

vision into two strong and nearly equal
regional camps with Rayburn
and McCormack sharing the leadership
duties as Speaker and Majority
Leader or as Minority Leader and MUp.
The Majority Whips were also
recruited from the two dominant regions
although the South had the
edge with three Southern Whips to one
Northern Whip.
To overcome the deep split on policy,
the Democrats seemed to

pick leaders who ranked near the center of
the party rather than on
the ideological extremes.

Turner, p. 21.

Both Rayburn and McCormack had reputations
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for .oderaUo„=' and
relied .po„ persuasion
and personal friendship
to sway the dissidents.
The whips also appeared
to be selected for
their ability to bridge the
ideological gap. Aside fro„
Boland who™
Rayburn inherited as Whip,
Rayburn consistently chose
Southerners who
showed so,ne aloofness fro. the
arch conservatives for
Majority whip.
V. 0. Key, Jr., in Soutl^
Politics observed that urban
Southerners

»ere more likely to desert the
conservative coalition to side
with
Northern De^crats than their rural
counterparts.

Ramspeck, who

represented Atlanta, would "stand out
in the list"'" of Southerners
who voted with the North, according

to Key. and Priest, who was
fro.

Nashville, was one of two House Democrats
who showed up

m

both wings

of the party in David Truman's analysis
of roll call votes in the
81st Congress.

6

Sparkman also was considered

a

moderate in the

Southern wing and was enough of a party man
to be Adlai Stevenson's

running mate in 1952.

Summary of the Variables

,

1941 -1955

The conditions that tended to be associated with
the leadership

stability of this period were

1)

majority status; 2) election down-

turns; 3) membership stability; 4) rising seniority;
5) alternating

59

David B. Truman, The Congressional Party;
York: John Wiley, 1959), p. 206.

A Case Study, (New

^^V. 0. Key, Jr.
Southern Politics in State and Natio n, (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 378.
,

61

Truman, pp. 145-167.
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regional dominance between
North and South;

6) sharp' ideological differences between liberals
and conservatives,
perhaps best symbolized
in presidential politics
by the Dixiecrat walkout
from the national
convention in 1948; and
7) the recruitment of moderate
leaders from
both major regional wings of
the party,
short, the structure of
the party closely resembled
what Peabody had observed
between 1955 and

m

1966.

It is hard to argue, however,
that all of these variables
in-

hibited conflict.

Majority status, for example,
was associated with

the upheavals of the 1930 's as
well as with the stability in
five of
the Congress between 1941 and
1955.
Election losses coincided with
the lack of competition only slightly
more often than election upturns
did.
Seniority also seemed of doubtful value
since a fight loomed in
the Congress in which veterans were
strongest.

What does seem important is the
interrelationship between membership stability, factionalism, and leadership
congruence.

From 1941 to

1947 there were no dramatic fluctuations in the
composition of the

Democratic party, which meant that the regional
and ideological cleavages, though deep, were stable.

Since the leadership probably repre-

.sented the best deal either wing could realistically
achieve, there

was no pressure for leadership change.

In 1947 defeat reduced the

Northern wing but left the Southern bloc untouched.

As the membership

moved to the right, there was a chance that the leadership would
move
leftward if Rayburn retired.

Southern conservatives found this situa-

tion intolerable and were ready to challenge McCormack's advancement

with one of their own informal leaders.

McCormack was still

a

The combination of Rayburn and

compromise acceptable to all party factions so

a

"
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fight was averted.

i„ :,49

.

there .as a large influx
of new „e.bers

but since .ost of the
newcomers were Northerners,
the effect of the
turnover was to reinforce
rather than undercut the
Incumbent leadership.
After 1949 there was a
gradual decline in Northern
strength hut
the erosion was not large
enough to underline the
basic factional aliignment In the House, since the
leadership continued to .irror
the MaJ or
division in the party, no fights
developed.

Conclusions

.

I93I -1955

Between 1931 and 1955 the Democrats
clashed seven ti.es over the
leadership,
six of the struggles occurred
when the Democrats were
winning, undergoing rapid growth and
membership turnover, and changing
into a Northern reform party.
The seventh contest developed
after the

factional alignments had stabilized but
the sharp disparity between
the South

-s

domination of the leadership posts and
the North's numerical

supremacy created tension.

The Congresses free of leadership
conflict

tended to show greater membership stability,
more stable factions, and

leadership that better matched the new regional
and ideological structure in the House.

What is particularly intriguing about the Democratic
pattern between
1931 and 1955 is how closely it resembles the pattern from
the minority

Congresses.

Before 1931 most Democratic fights also occurred
when the

party did well in elections, was undergoing extensive
membership change,
and when the North's share of seats was increasing.

Another similarity

was that a leadership compromise that pulled the wings of the party together seemed to be important in bringing the wave of fights between
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the Bryanites and che
conservatives to a close.

The earlier equivalent

of Rayburn and McConnack
had been Cha.p clarU
of Missouri, who was
popular with the Bryanites,
the Tann^ny organisation,
and the Deep
south.
When Clark became Minority
Leader and then Speaker,
the contests stopped despite the vast
membership changes in 1911 and
1913.

Overtime one conclusion that
can be drawn about the
Democrat,
:s is
that leadership fights are
as likely to develop when
the party is in
the majority as when it is in
the minority. Another is
that although
both election defeats and victories
can be associated with
conflict,
in the Democratic party contests
usually followed electoral
upsurges.

Because of the Civil War and
reconstruction, the Democrats have
historically had a solid southern flank,
particularly as a minority party,
and the House leadership has reflected
this membership bias.

Consequent,

ly, victories were more likely to
upset this equilibrium than defeats

because a victory was needed to bring
Northerners into the party.

The

victory did not cause the conflict but was
the vehicle that produced
enough membership change to alter the regional
and ideological structure of the party.

After the Northern gains in the 1930 's proved last-

ing, a major defeat or several smaller but
cumulative losses could just
as easily upset the new factional alignment by
returning the South to

power.

The amount of membership change does not always appear
to be

as important as the impact of the turnover on the regional
and ideologi-

cal balance in the party.

Shifts in the factional structure of the

party that weaken the incumbent leaders' or an heir apparent
in the party can bring pressure for leadership change.

's

position

Sometimes, of

course, there can be a delay
between the shifts in the
factional align
meats and the pressure for
leadership change. A junior
faction, for
example, nnast wait until its
members gain seniority to
challenge a mor
senior faction, but once there
are capable, senior aspirants
in the

underrepresented faction, a battle
seems likely.
Tl.ere is also a feedback element
involved.

Democratic leaders

have tried to keep the potential
conflict in check by appointing
Whips
who would add regional variation to
the hierarchy and who were mod.

erates.
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m

addition, the Democrats have moved
toward institution-

alizing the leadership succession although
the 1947 example-when the
conservatives opposed McCormack's advancement-suggests
that the
'

leadership ladder may be more fragile than it
looks on paper.

Promo-

tions may have come easily because the factional
alignments have en-

dured without a great deal of variation from
Congress to Congress in
the last three decades.

One condition that would seem capable of dis-

rupting the leadership would be a massive infusion of
Northern liberal

who found the incumbent leadership too moderate.
bers elected in 1974 fit this description.

The Democratic mem-

Although most of their

effort has been directed at ousting conservative or senile
committee
chairmen, there have also been calls to replace Albert.

The second

circumstance that might be conducive to leadership unrest in the future
would be a severe reduction in the Northern wing and a corresponding
increase iu the Southern wing.

Sullivan, pp. 25-44.

With no Southerner holding office in
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the present leadership line-up-the
only near ally is the Speaker from
a Border State,

sentation

.iust

the South would likely demand more
adequate repre-

the way the Northern wing did in the
1930's.

CHAPTER V

CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLICAN
HIERARCHY, 1931-1955

Leadership Fights

.

1931-1941

After the 1928 landslide that
cut deeply into Democratic
fortresses
even in the South, the future
of the Republican party
looked bright, but
by 1930, with the depression
deepening and Hoover's recovery
programs
faltering, the Republicans were
barely able to hold onto
the House of
Representatives.
In this atmosphere Speaker
Nicholas Longworth of Ohio
faced his first challenge since
winning the Speakership in 1925.
The

Progressives, who held the balance of
power in the closely divided
House, were determined to stall
Longworth 's election just as they had

delayed

GiUetfs

election in 1923 until the House rules
were liberal-

ized and unemployment and agriculture
bills were considered.^

The Pro-

gressives, composed mainly of Wisconsin and
Minnesota representatives

who had long participated in insurgent
uprisings, were not the only
band of restless Republicans.

The Kansas and Oklahoma delegations in-

tended to boycott the Republican caucus
unless the Ways and Means Com-

mittee reopened debate on the oil embargo bill.

Eastern legislators

wanted the bill shelved because its passage would
raise oil prices in

New England.

2

m

order to ensure his own re-election, Longworth was

^New York Times (hereafter NYT )
1931, p. 1; and Nov. 21, 1935, p. 5.
2

,

Feb. 25, 1931, p.

34-

Ibid., Feb. 25, 1931, p. 34; and Feb. 26, 1931, p. 4.

Oct

28
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ready to bargain with thee disside^nfc
aissiaents.

He favoredj reconsidering
the oil

bill and he was willing to permit
amendments to the rules.
in February, 1931, the Republican
caucus renominated Longworth
for
speaker and John Tilson of Connecticut
for Majority Leader.
T^e absence
of eighteen Republicans, however,
signalled that the Republicans
would
not have a majority on the floor of
the House and would have
trouble
.

.

maintaining control of the House.

3

In April, 1931, Longworth died.

Since 1925 Longworth, Tilson, and

Bertrand Snell of New York, the Rules Committee
Chairman, had ruled the

House of Representatives together.

After Longworth's death, Snell and

Tilson waged a long, bitter fight to succeed
Longworth to the Speakership.

In the last session rifts had begun to develop
among the "tri-

umvirate" as Tilson sided with Hoover on issues
such as the tariff.
Prohibition, drought relief, and the veterans bonus while
Longworth
and Snell started to carve out more independent stands.'^

Consequently,

although Hoover never publicly endorsed Tilson, most Republicans
assumed that Tilson was Hoover's favorite for the office.

Snell was strong in New York and Pennsylvania and appeared to have

inherited Longworth's coalition or power base, which was built around
the large Eastern states and Ohio.

Snell was weak in the Midwest and

among Progressives, who disliked the autocratic way he had operated
the Rules Committee, but Snell was prepared to barter for votes.

He

advocated lowering the tariff--a popular issue in the Midwest--and he

^Ibid.

^

Ibid

.

,

Fc^. 27, 1931, p.

,

Apr. 12, 1931, p. 22; Dec. 1, 1931, p. 4.

1.
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favored reducing the „un*er of
signatures needed on a discharge
petition
from 218 to 150-the very issue the
insurgents had struggled to win
in
1923, only to have overturned in 1925
with Snell's aid.^ nison,

m

turn, chided Snell for relying so
heavily on a few large states for
his
votes. Tllson's strategy was to put
together a broader based alignment

consisting of votes from New England and
a cross section of other Re-

publican states.
Neither Midwesterners nor the Progressive
faction were entirely
satisfied with the choice of two Easterners for
Speaker.

Fred Britten

of Illinois briefly entered the race as a rallying
point for Mid-

westerners and states like Michigan and Kansas leaned
toward favorite
sons.

The Progressives were busy rounding up a bipartisan
alliance of

liberals to combat the depression and bring sweeping rules
changes.'^
By November, 1931, the Democrats had picked up enough seats
in

special elections to win control of the House of Representatives.

As

the Republican leadership battle switched from electing a Speaker to

choosing a Minority Leader, tactics changed.

Tilson began to argue

that a new caucus was not necessary because he had already been elected

Republican floor leader in February, 1931, when Longworth had been nominated for Speaker.

Snell disputed Tilson 's position by claiming that

^Ibid. Apr. 13, 1931, p. 3; Apr. 14, 1931, p. 12, Apr. 18, 1931,
Jordan A. Schwarz The Interregnum of
p. 7; and Nov. 16, 1931, p. 5.
Despair
Hoover Congress and the Depression (Urbana: University
of Illinois, 1970), p. 59.
,

,

:

,

SyT, Nov.
Ibid
p.

3;

Oct.

.

28,

,

1931, p. 5; Nov. 30, 1931, p.

Apr. 16, 1931, p.
28, 1931, p. 1.
,

6;

3.

Apr. 17, 1931, p. 5; Oct. 25, 1931,
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the Republicans needed to
chooso
Choose a= new candidate
for Speaker to oppose
Garner on the floor of the
House.

At the December caucus,
eight ballots were needed
to pick

a new

by the third ballot Snell
had captured the lead,
seventy votes to sixtyfive, with carl >^pes of
Michigan and Ho.er Hoch of
Kansas splitting the
rest of the votes. At the end
of the seventh ballot.
Tllson noted that
he was not able to attract the
favorite son vote to his camp
and ^ved
that Snell 's nomination be ».de
unanlnK,us.

not concede defeat as floor
leader.

Nevertheless, Tllson would

He admitted Snell had beaten
him

for the Speakership nomination but
argued that only "affirmative
action"'
could depose him as floor leader.
Enough Republicans acknowledged
the

validity of Tllson's position to postpone
a final decision until after
the organizational vote on the House
floor.

When Congress opened, the Progressives'
plan to delay the election
of the Speaker was thwarted by the
Democrats' clear majority,

m

the

end only four of the sixteen dissidents who
had been meeting together

deserted Snell to support George Schneider of
Wisconsin for Speaker.
Afterwards, possibly because Snell had the votes, the
caucus was not
reconvened to consider Tilson's position that affirmative
action was
ne eded to oust him so Snell remained as Minority Leader.

g

:

rl

Bachmann

Ibid., Nov. 14, 1931, p. 2; Nov. 26, 1931, p. 20.

^Ibid.

,

Dec. 1, 1931, p. 1.

^^John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy
Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 240.

,

1921 - 1933

,

(New York:
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Of We=t Virginia replaced
Albert Vestal of Indiana
as Whip.
Ho explanation was Offered for the change,
but Vestal died a few
.onths later so
he may have been too sick to
carry on his duties as
Whip.
In 1933 Snell was unani^usly
re-elected Minority Leader and
Harry
Englebright of California succeeded
Bach^nn, one of the casualties
of
the 1932 De«>cratlc landslide,
as Whip.
By 1934. as the Kew Deal
was
passed into law over the vigorous
opposition of the minority
Republicans.

Sneirs ultra-conservatlsm came under

fire.

w. Kingland Macy, a former

New York Republican Chairman, urged
House Republicans to elect a
new
Minority Leader because Snell was the
nation's "leading, if not the

most intelligent, reactionary.""

Macy's public attack on Snell was
re-

lated to a debate between the two men
in New York politics.

Macy, who

planned to run for Governor in 1936, wanted
to revitalize the Republican party by moving to the left, but
Snell, the head of the conservative

faction of the state party, scoffed at such
a notion.

After Macy's as-

sault. House Republicans closed ranks behind
Snell although Macy stated
that the replies to his telegrams indicated that,
even If there were

not enough votes to dump Snell, there was strong
dissatisfaction with

his leadership

.

1
9
''^^

In January, 1935, Snell was easily re-elected Minority
Leader and

Englebright continued as Whip.

•^"NYT, Nov,

p.

Before the caucus, Usher Burdick of

22, 1934, p. 2.

Ibid., Nov. 22, 1934, p. 6; Dec. 8, 1934, p.
21, 1934, p. 13.

4; Dec.

7;

Dec. 10, 1934,
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North Dakota had threatened a
revolt against Snell but
the atte.pt
fizzled when only three of his
colleagues joined the protest.

months later Snell's leadership
was again under attacU.

m

Two

a front page

story the New York Tinges disclosed
that younger .e.bers (who
insisted
upon anonymity) wanted to oust
Snell because of his passive
leadership
and his failure to develop an
alternative to the New Deal for
the party
to campaign on in 1936.
The reputed challenger was
Everett Dirksen of
Illinois, a second term member who had
taken more liberal positions
than Snell on issues like the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, the National

Industrial Recovery Act, and the National
Labor Relations Act.^"^
did not think such a junior member
could unseat him and Snell

's

Snell
ally,

Joe Martin of Massachusetts, suspected
that the insurgents had over-

estimated their strength.

Martin guessed that only "half a dozen"^^

Republicans were involved in the preliminary maneuvering
and headcounting.

When an unofficial meeting of the Republican
Steering Commit-

tee decided not to convene the caucus to review the
leadership, as the

insurgents wanted, the movement to depose Snell quickly
collapsed with
the rebels blaming "premature publicity" 16 for the
failure.

^^Ibid.

,

Dec. 23, 1934, p. 2.

14

Neil MacNeil, Dirksen
Portrait of a Public Man (New York:
World Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 48-49; NYT, Mar. 8, 1935, p. 1; and
:

,

Mar. 10, 1935, IV, p. 8.

^^NYT, Mar. 11, 1935, p. 4.
Ibid.

253

After the 1936 disaster that
reduced the Republican contingent
in
the House to eighty-nine members,
Hamilton Fish of New York warned
Snell to acknowledge that a more
"liberal platform"" „as needed
or face
a rebellion.
Although Snell countered by saying
that he was a "middle,

of-the-roader,"

there is no evidence that Snell
moderated his views,

but the threatened revolt did not
materialize.

Both Snell and Engle-

bright stayed in office.
In 1939, Snell, despairing of ever becoming
Speaker, retired.

The

front runner to succeed him was Martin, a
conservative, with close ties
to Snell, but also more approachable and
flexible than Snell.

In ad-

dition, as chairman of the Congressional Campaign
Committee, Martin had

received credit for the 1938 comeback.

James Wadsworth, who was even

more conservative than Martin, also announced his
candidacy.

A

patrician, Wadsworth did not relish rough and tumble
politics and disliked making deals to sway votes to his side.

His campaign manager,

Walter Andrews of New York, found little support for Wadsworth
outside

New York and within the New York delegation prominent members like Fish
had declared for Martin before Wadsworth decided to run.

^^Ibid.

,

Dec. 2, 1936, p. 11.

'^md.

,

Dec. 9, 1936, p. 15.

Fish also

19

MacNeil, p. 51; Joe Martin, My First Fifty Years in Politics
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 82.
20

,

Alden Hatch, The Wadsworths of the Genesee (New York: CowardMcCann, 1959), p. 245; Martin, p. 82; NYT, Nov. 16, 1938, p. 3; Nov. 26,
1938, p. 6.
,
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thought that Martin ..could
combine conservative and
liberals in the House
.ore effectively than any
other .ember...^!
.^rly Decen^er, 1938, a
canvass of House Republicans
revealed that Martin had the
support of 125
of the 170 delegates.
By the end of December,
estimates of Martin's
strength reached as high as
140 votes. Acknowledging
Martin's lead,
Wadsworth withdrew from the race
in early January, 1939.^2
^^^^.^
unanimously elected Minority Leader
and Englebright continued
as Whip.

Summary of the 1931 - 1941 Contests

Leadership discontent was common among
House Republicans during the
depression decade. In 1931, Tilson and
Snell battled to replace Long-

vorth; in 1934, Macy called for Snell's
ouster; in January, 1935, Burdick

tried to foment a revolt against Snell;
in March, 1935, junior members

began sounding out their more senior colleagues
about the possibility
of replacing Snell with Dirksen; in 1937,
Fish warned Snell that he must

change his outlook in order to avoid a confrontation;
and in 1939,

Wadsworth and Martin maneuvered to succeed Snell.

Despite the amount

of rumbling and the number of threatened revolts,
only two fights

actually erupted--in 1931 and 1939--and both were over vacancies.
The number of fights seems low when compared with the Democrats
who
battled in every Congress during this same time span or with the Re-

publicans before 1931, when fights occurred in nearly every Congress

^•"NYT, Nov.

p.

28,

1938, p. 2.

^^NYT, Dec. 2, 1938, p. 2; Dec. 17, 1938, p. 4; Dec. 27, 1938,
1, 1939, p. 3.

10; Jan.
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between 1909 and 1925.

CSep
(.bee

t^kIo
Table

i

1

f
for
a summary of the conflict.)

Turnover was not extensive in
the Republican hierarchy.

Snell
and Martin handled the Minority
Leader responsibilities whereas
Bachmann and Englebright shared the
duties of Whip. The only leadership

change that might possibly be attributed
to membership dissatisfaction
was Bachmann's replacement of Vestal
in 1931 but even this change
can

probably be accounted for by the state
of Vestal's health.
leadership changes were prompted by
Longworth's death, Snell

The other
's

retire-

ment, and Bachmann's defeat in the 1932
landslide.

The Republicans appeared to be developing

a less rigid set of ap-

prenticeship steps for advancement to the top of
the leadership ladder
than the Democrats.

Snell jumped from the Chairmanship of the
Rules

Committee to Minority Leader, leapfrogging over
Majority Leader Tilson,
and Martin climbed from a seat on the Rules Committee
to Minority

Leader.

From 1919 through 1941 all Republican leaders, except the

Whips, had been a member of the Rules, Ways and Means, or Appropriations Committee prior to their election as a party leader.

Martin

regarded his appointment to the Rules Committee as "a long step forward.

I

was on the escalator now, so to speak, and

I

continued to

move as Longworth picked me as a member of his 'cabinet' as his steering committee was called."

23

Moreover, both Snell and Martin had b°en

informal party leaders before their elevation as Minority Leader.
Snell had been a partner in the Longworth triumvirate and Martin,

besides being a member of Longworth's steering committee, became

Martin, p. 63.
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TABLE

1

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION,
1931-1941

Minority Leader
1931

Vacant-Party became minority;
Speaker Longworth died.

Contest-2 major rivals
plus some favorite sons
from Midwest; decided
on 8th ballot at caucus
after Majority Leader
Tilson withdrew.

No vacancy

No contest

No vacancy

No contest-some talk of
revolt but no alternate
candidate publicly came
forward.

1937

No vacancy

No contest-more rumbling
but no organized action.

Snell re-elected

1939

Vacancy-Snell
retired.

Contest-2 candidates; one
withdrew before caucus.

Martin elected

1933
1935

Snell elected

Snell re-elected
Snell re-elected

Whip
1931

No vacancy

Whip changed, possibly
because Vestal was ill.

Bachmann
selected

1933

Vacant -Bachmann
defeated in 1932
election.

Whip changed.

Englebright
selected

1935

No vacancy

No change

Englebright
selected

1937

No vacancy

No change

Englebright
selected

1939

No vacancy

No change

Englebright
selected
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Snell's "unofficial assistant"

Hius, the Republican high

in 1933.

coramand was recruited from a relatively small circle whose members

were on inportant committees and had been given decision making responsibilities by the incumbent leadership.

Unlike the Democrats,

no one individual, such as the Majority Leader, wcs singled out for

future promotion, but a small pool of Republicans seemed eligible for

advancement.

Such a system provides flexibility but likely encourages

contests between equals.

Outside intervention, which had subsided during the Republicans'
last minority phase, again dropped off in the 1930' s.

Hoover, who

apparently leaned toward Tilson in his duel with Snell, never publicly endorsed Tilson and there is no evidence that any member of
the Hoover administration intervened on Tilson'

s

behalf.

The only

example of outside interference was Macy's barrage of telegrams de-

manding that Snell be replaced, but this proposal backfired as even

Midwestern Congressmen immediately pledged their support to Snell.

Analysis of the Variables

Majority - minority status

.

,

1931- 1941

Peabody hypothesized that minority

to the Republicans'
status was one of the conditions that contributed

spate of fights between 1955 and 1966.

During the 1911 to 1919 minor-

been more frequent in the
ity interlude, Congresses with contests had
interval before 1931.
Republican party than during either majority
a decline in the amount of
Between 1931 and 1941, however, there was

Ibid.

,

p.

73.
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conflict.

In the 1930's contests
developed in 40 per cent of the

Congresses, but in the preceding
majority phase, from 1919 to
1931,
leadership struggles occurred in 50
per cent of the Congresses.

Compared with the majority Democrats
in the 1930'
in the frequency of fights is
dramatic.

s,

the difference

The majority Democrats, ex-

pected to be less prone to conflict,
engaged in seven battles or over
three times the number of brawls waged by
the minority Republicans

during this decade.

Before 1931 the Democrats as both a majority
and

minority party had been less combative than
the Republicans so the
1930 's marked a reversal in the previous
pattern.

The size of the party seemed to be related to the
formation of
a contest.

As Table

2

indicates, the larger the Republican contingent,

the more likely the party was to compete.

In 1931 when the Republicans

were just shy of a majority and in 1939 when they held 38.9 per
cent
of the House seats, they quarreled over the Minority Leader.

The 1931

contest is particularly reminiscent of earlier Republican clashes.

Before 1931 contests occurred in five of the nine Congresses in

which the Republicans' proportion of seats hovered near 50 per cent.

When the Republicans were reduced to a tiny minority in the 1930'
s,
ranging from 20.5 per cent to 27.1 per cent of the House membership,
no leadership challenge was pushed beyond the discussion stage even

though there was a strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction with Snell.

Election returns

.

From 1930 until 1938 the Republicans suffered

a series of election defeats, with two of them large enough to meet

Peabody's thirty to fifty seat threshold criterion needed to trigger
a contest.

As Table 3 underscores, in 1931, after the Republicans
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TABLE

2

PARTY SIZE AND CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY, 1931-1941

Size of Party

# of Congresses

# of fights

40.0 to 49.9%

1

^

30.0 to 39.9%

1

1

Under 30.0%

3

q

TABLE

3

REPUBLICAN ELECTION RETURNS, 1931-1941

# of House Seats
Won

Change from Previous
Election

% of Republi
Seats

1931

213

-54

49.0

1933

118

-95

27.1

1935

102

-16

23.4

1937

89

-13

20.5

1939

169

+80

38.9

indicates a contest

lost fifty-four seats, a fight did ensue, but in 1933, after the whop-

ping loss of ninety-five seats, no challenge was mounted.

Moreover,

contrary to expectations, there was a contest following the 1938 comeback victory in which the Republicans gained eighty seats.

Thus,

260

Republican contests developed after
a

.oajor

defeat and a significant

victory whereas the three stable
Congresses all coincided with
election defeats, two of which were
mild, although cun^ulaLive,
setbacks
but one was the worst Republican
loss in history.

Membership chan^.

The two contests of the 1930
's occurred under

contrasting conditions, as Table 4
illustrates.

In 1931, when Snell

and Tilson clashed, the Republican
membership in the House was ex-

ceptionally stable and showed little change
from the previous Congress,
TABLE 4

REPUBLICAN CONFLICT AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1931-1941

^^^^

7o

New Members

7o

Incumbents

1931

9.4

90.6

1933

25.4

74.6

1935

26.5

73.5

1937

19.1

80.9

1939

49.1

50.9

indicates a contest

Over ninety per cent of the Republicans elected to the 72nd Congress

were incumbents.

On the other hand, the 1939 battle developed when

the Republican membership was undergoing rapid change produced by the

party's first election upswing in a decade.

Almost half the Republi-

cans elected to the House in 1939 were newcomers.

The three Con-

gresses without leadership fights were all characterized by moderate
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levels of membership turnover,
with new
cent to 26.5 per cent.

xnexnbers

ranging from 19.1 per

In short, conflict erupted,
as anticipated,

when the Congressional party was
unstable and fluid, but also when
the Republican membership was nearly
static.
Hierarchy .

A large freshman class was one of
the variables that

was expected to provoke leadership
contests.

As Table

5

shows, of the

two Republican battles in this period,
only the 1939 example cor-

responds to the theory.

In 1939 the largest freshman class
since

1915 was present in the Martin-Wadsworth fight,
but in the 1931 con-

test less than 10 per cent of the Republicans
were freshmen to make
it the smallest group of

1941.

Republican freshmen elected between 1895 and

Congresses in which the freshman class was in the
medium range,

TABLE

5

CONFLICT AND SENIORITY IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1931-1941

Year

Z Freshman

% Sophomores

% Seniors

1931

9.4

14.6

37.1

1933

22.0

9.3

37.3

1935

20.6

18.6

32.4

1937

16.9

16.9

36.0

1939

43.8

12.4

22.5

indicates a contest
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between 16.9 and 22.0 per cent,
were consistently stable.
with membership turnover, the

Thus, as

contests occurred at the two
extremes-

when freshmen were either very
plentiful or very scarce-whereas
the
stable Congresses clustered in the
middle of the scale.

Adding sophomores to freshmen did nothing
to clarify the relationship between junior classes and
leadership conflict.

With seniority, opposite sets of conditions
continued to be attributes of the contest Congresses.

In 1931, over one-third of the

Republicans had at least ten years experience
in the House.

Except

for 1933, there were more senior Republicans
in 1931 than in any

other Congress between 1895 and 1941.

The 1939 skirmish, in contrast,

developed when the proportion of senior members was
the lowest in this
decade.

The three stable Congresses coincided with large
senior

classes as expected.
In sum, in 1931 there was a large reservoir of senior members

and a small freshmen class but in 1939 the pool of veterans was
de-

clining and the proportion of freshmen was expanding rapidly.

One

possible reason conflict developed under such diverse conditions was
that the fights were very different types.
a

The 1939 contest was over

vacancy with no obvious heir apparent and would neatly fit into

Peabody's "open competition"

25

category.

The absence of a designated

successor along with a large, uncommitted body of freshmen made an

attractive opportunity for members with leadership ambitions.

The

Robert Peabody, "Party Leadership Change in the United States
House of Representatives," American Politi cal Science Review LXI
(September, 1967), pp. 677-678).
,

263

1931 battle, instead, was xnore of a
revolt.

Although there was a

vacancy, Tilson was son^thing of
an heir apparent since he had
been
re-elected Majority Leader only ten
months before his rejection
as

Minority Leader.

Moreover, because Tilson championed
Hoover's poli-

cies, his defeat was widely interpreted
by journalists and politicians

alike as a revolt against Hoover's inability
to cope with the de-

pression by rank-and-file Republicans.

Other revolts such as the at-

tempt to curb Cannon in 1909 or the effort
by the Wilsonian Democrats to depose Clark in 1917 also occurred
when there was a large

bloc of senior members.

Depth of seniority, instead of inhibiting

conflict, may actually encourage the formation
of contests when vet-

eran Congressmen sense their careers are in jeopardy
either at the
polls or inside the House because of the behavior of
their party
leaders

Regional factionalism

.

As Table

6

shows, both fights in the

1930 's took place when the Midwest was the largest
regional faction
in the House Republican party.

When Western representatives are added

to the figures for the Midwest, the two regions controlled over a

majority of the seats on the Republican side of the aisle each time
a battle materialized.

In the three Congresses free of conflict in

the 1930' s, the East, instead, was the dominant faction.

In 1935

the East was just short of a majority and in 1933 and 1937 the East

surpassed the other regions by a wide lead.

These findings are con-

sistent with the pre-1931 Republican pattern in which fights usually

broke out when the Midwest was either enlarging or the strongest
regional group within the Republican party.
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TABLE 6

REGIONAL FACTIONALISM AND
CONFLICT IN
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1931-1941
Year

% from Midwest

7/o

f-mm East
v^^tfrom

"infrom
West

% from South
and Border States

—
1931

41.3

1933

39.9

11.7

7.0

56.8

9.3

1.7

^7.2

49.0

8.8

4.9

38.2

51.7

5.6

4.5

42.0

7.7

32.2

"'^^
1937
1939

46.7

indicates a contest

Ideological factionalism.

When the decade opened, the Progressives

remained an important minority bloc within the
Republican party.
Table

7

for the details.

See

In 1931, in the early stages of the contest,

the Progressives held the balance of power in the
evenly divided House

and planned to use this leverage to force the adoption
of more liberal

policies.

As the Republicans' narrow lead dwindled away, the Pro-

gressives lost their bargaining wedge and after 1931 the Progressives
faded away as an important voice in the Republican party.

One reason

for the decline of the Progressives was that as the Republicans shrank
to such a tiny minority in the 1930's the Progressives could no longer

thwart the rest of the party by withholding votes on crucial organizational matters.

In addition, the Progressives were weakened internally

when the Wisconsin Progressives abandoned their ties with the
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TABLE

™

7

°^
PROGRESSIVE
^"^J^f
THE REPUBLICAN

Year

1931

1933
1935

1937
1939

# of Repub-

213

# of Progressives

16

118
102
89

169

BLOC IN
PARTY, 1931-1941

% of Progressives

"7

of VOtpR P
publicans short
of majority
ir

r~

7.5

5

17

14.4

100

10

9.8

116

12

13.5

129

14

8.3

49

indicates a contest

Republican party.

Moreover, as the old reformers retired
from the

House and died, they were replaced by
Democrats or by more conservative Republicans rather than by younger
Progressives.

Finally, as the

New Deal became more attuned to the
problems of the cities, some of
the few remaining Progressives turned
against the New Deal and began
to return to the conservative mainstream
of the Republican party.

By

the end of the decade, the locus of liberal
thought among Republicans

had shifted from the Midwest to the East.^^

Eastern liberals, how-

ever, were too few and too junior to influence
or shape the outcome

of leadership contests.

^^^arry W. Morris, "The Republicans in a Minority Role, 19331938," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. State University of Iowa
1960), pp. 315-323.

266

Julius Turner's research confirn^
that the ideological split
in
the Republican party became less
severe in the 1930's. House
Republicans registered cohesion scores of
71.7 in 1933 and 70.2 in 1937.
These
figures indicate that the Republicans
were more unified in the 1930
's

than they had been in the 1920 's or
than the Democrats were in the

1930's.^^
Thus, ideological fragmentation-one
of the key characteristics
of Republican leadership battles prior
to 19 31 -continued to be as-

sociated with Republican contests in 1931,
but by 1939 ideological

factionalism had ceased to be an important element
in the leadership
conflict.

Congruence.

Although the Midwest was one of the two strongest

regions within the Republican party in the 1930'
s, the Midwest had no

party leadership representation after Longworth's death
in 1931.

Both

of the Minority Leaders between 1931 and 1941 were Easterners,
which

mirrored the East's prominence in three of the five Congresses, and
the
Whips hailed from peripheral areas.

Bachmann came from a Border State

and Englebright was from California, which elected few Republicans to

Congress during the depression.

The only other period in which the Re-

publicans had failed to include a Midwesterner in the leadership hierarchy was between 1895 and 1899, when the leaders had been recruited ex-

clusively from the East.

One reason for the Midwest's underrepresenta-

tion in the 1930 's was that after the 1932 election there were few

27

Julius Turner, Party and Constituency
Pressures on Congress
Schneier, Jr., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951) p. 21,
:

ed. by Edward V.

,
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Mldwesterners with extensive seniority.

Table 8 presents the comparative

data for Eastern and Midwestern
veteran Congressmen, but even
these
figures over-estimate the realistic
nu„*er of potential leaders
from
the Midwest.

Several of the senior Mldwestemers
were Progressives with

pro-New Deal voting records, especially
In the earlier Congresses,
and
were not con^atlble with the overwhelming
majority of their Republican
colleagues.

TABLE 8

SENIOR REPUBLICANS CLASSIFIED BY REGION,
1931-1941

Year

# of Senior Republicans

# from East

# from Midwest

1931

79

33

32

1933

44

30

12

1935

33

20

8

1937

32

16

10

1939

38

19

13

In terms of ideology, the leadership more accurately paralleled the

membership in that all the leaders were conservatives.

In fact, the

leaders may have been to the right of the bulk of the memibership.

One

roll call study of the 1930 's places Snell, Martin, and Wadsworth among
the twenty most conservative Republicans or in the "ultra-conservative" 2!

^Morris, pp. 27, 90-91, and 227.
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faction of the House Republican
.e:^ership.

m

1939, there was a fairly

widespread feeling that Martin was
.ore of a moderate than either
Snell
or Wadsworth. Although he was
likely less conservative than
Wadsworth
who even voted against Social Security
when three-quarters of the
Republicans in the House voted in favor
of the act, llartin's overall
voting
record before 1939 does not justify a
xnoderate label. Martin,
however,
had a wanner, friendlier personality and
was better at listening and

working with members with whom he disagreed
than either Snell or Wadsworth. Consequently, at the time of his
initial selection, Martin's
reputation for moderateness, like Speaker Gilletfs,
may have rested
more on personal traits than on his voting record.

Summary of the Variables

,

1931 -1941

The contests of 1931 and 1939 developed under very
different circumstances.

In 1931 the Republicans had lost enough seats in the
House to

be demoted to minority status, there were few freshmen,
senior Congress-

men composed over one- third of the membership and incumbents accounted
for more than 90 per cent of the members.

In terms of factional align-

ments, the Midwest was the largest regional bloc and the Progressives,
at least in the early stages of the battle, wielded power beyond their

raw numbers because of the near deadlock between Democrats and Republicans.

In 1939, instead, the Republicans were still the minority party

29

"William E. Sullivan, "Criteria for Selecting Party Leadership in
Congress: An Empirical Test," American Politics Quarterly III (January,
1975), pp. 25-44.
,
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but had Just staged an eighty
seat comeback; the membership
was changing
rapidly; there was a large freshman
class; the proportion of senior

representative, had dropped substantially;
the Midwest was the predominant sectional faction; and the
ideological cleavage in the party
was no longer so deep. The only
conditions that were common to both
battles were minority status and the
prominence of the Midwest.

Minor-

ity status, as noted earlier, had limited
value in forecasting conflict
in the Republican party but factionalism
had been extremely useful in

predicting previous Republican battles.

Before 1931 there had been a

90 per cent chance for a fight when the Midwestern faction
was expanding
or when the Progressives (or other dissident
bloc) composed one-fourth

of the Republican membership or had the votes
necessary to jeopardize
the Republicans' organization of the House.

When none of these con-

ditions had been present before 1931, no contest developed.

Between

1931 and 1941 the pattern continued as factional variables again sep-

arated Congresses with contests from those without leadership conflict
exceptionally well.

In the 1930 's a fight erupted whenever there was a

large Midwestern delegation or the Progressives had improved their bar-

gaining position, but when neither characteristic was evident, the
leadership was secure.

Table

9

summarizes the strong association between

factionalism and leadership conflict in the Republican party between 1895
and 1941.

Table

9

first repeats the last table from Chapter III and then

adds the data from the 1930's.

There is a slight variation in the

measurement of the Midwestern delegation in the 1930 's for the contests
no longer coincided with a growing Midwestern contingent but with a
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TABLE 9

FACTIONALISM AND LEADERSHIP COOTLICT
IN THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1895-1941

1895- 1931

Rising Midwestern
Representation

Progressives Held
Votf^
i-n r>«r.^i«oi
voces to
Deadlock
^^o'^se

1899

Progressives
^^^oi-essives or Fam
Farui
Bloc Composed 15% of
Membership

.

1903

1903
1909

1911

1911

1913

1917

1917

1919

1919

1923

1923

1923
1925

1927

1927

Midwest Largest
Regional Bloc

1931 -1941
Progressives Held
Votes to Deadlock
House

1931

1927

1931

1939

indicates a contest

Midwestern plurality.

As Table 9 demonstrates, when one of the three

indices of factionalism was present between 1895 and 1941, a fight de-

veloped in eleven out of twelve cases.

When none of these conditions
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existed, the Republicans did not
wage a single leadership contest.

Leadership Fights

,

1941-1955

From 1941 until 1947 Martin was
re-elected Minority Leader by
acclatnation.

The only Congress in which a clash
seemed possible was in

The Republicans had gained heavily
in the off-year election and

1943.

the conservative coalition of Republicans
and Southern Democrats had

accordingly been strengthened.

Wadsworth was the leader of the con-

servative coalition in the House and there was
some speculation that
as the real power to lead and to shape policy
flowed from Martin to

Wadsworth, Wadsworth might try to legitimize or
formalize his informal
leadership role by challenging Martin for the Minority
Leadership.
spite of the rumors, no revolt was organized.

In

30

The only Leadership

change that did take place in this time span was the selection
of Leslie

Arends as Whip to replace Englebright, who died in May, 1943.
In 1947 the Republicans won control of the House of Representatives
for the first time since 1929 and the quarreling over the distribution

of the leadership posts began the morning after the election.

elevation to the Speakership was regarded as a certainty

Martin's

but a number

of candidates started campaigning for the Majority Leadership.

contenders were from the Midwest.

All the

The two chief rivals were Charles

Halleck of Indiana, Chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign
Committee, and Clarence Brown of Ohio, campaign director for the

30
'

nYI

,

^^Ibid.

Nov. 8, 1942, p. 12

,

Nov.

6,

1946, p. 2.

272

Republican National Committee.

Both were considered the
architects of

the 1946 victory and had "strong
backing within the party ranks. "32

Although both man were conservative,
they had ties to different
presidential contenders.
Brown was close to Robert Taft
whereas Halleck was
reputed to belong to the Willkie-Dewey
wing of the party even though
his voting record showed few signs of a
liberal bias.^^

Furthermore,

in personality Brown and Halleck were vastly
different.

Brown ran a

subdued campaign, after announcing he was "available,
but not campaign34

ing,"

and was popular with party elders who liked his
competence and

modesty.

Halleck, in contrast, was a more junior member,
aggressive,

and had a talent for irritating his colleagues with his
high pressure
tactics.

Other candidates for Majority Leader were Thomas Jenkins
of

Ohio, who spoiled Brown's chances by dividing the Ohio delegation,
and

Dirksen of Illinois.

Many Republicans speculated that Jenkins, who

had more seniority than Brown, had been flattered into running by

Halleck in order to neutralize Brown.

Dirksen was apparently a self-

starter, who waged a half-hearted effort with backing from only the

large Illinois delegation.

35

32
Ibid.

33

Ibid

.

,

Dec. 29, 1946, VI, p. 11.

^^Ibid.

,

Nov. 14, 1946, p. 32.

Henry Z Scheele Charlie Halleck
A Political Biography, (New
York: Exposition Press, 1966), p. Ill; MacNeil, pp. 77-78.
.

,

:
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In early December, 1946, Governor
Thomas Dewey provoked a storm by

endorsing Halleck for the Majority
Leadership.

Before the announcement,

Dewey had conferred with the New York
delegates, who planned to vote as
a bloc for Halleck and expected him
to win.
The furor erupted when Dewey
said Halleck "was entitled to the leadership
by seniority and ability.

Jenkins, who had ten years more seniority than
Halleck, quickly charged
that Dewey intended to "direct Congressional
activities in the House

through Charlie Halleck"^'' while other Republicans
interpreted Dewey's

endorsement as a move to stop the formation of a Taft-Ohio
combine on
the way to the 1948 presidential nomination.

After Dewey's entrance into the battle, the fight became a
heated,
bitter dispute pitting the Taft and Dewey forces.

Arguments

began to

rage over Martin's presidential preference as the Taft camp insisted
that Brown must be elected to offset Martin, who, in their view, be-

longed to the Dewey wing of the party.

On the other hand, an article

in the New York Times placed Martin in Taft's corner and predicted a

rift between Martin and Halleck--if Halleck should be elected--because
they would be pulled in opposing directions in presidential politics.

38

Finally, Clare Hoffman of Michigan thought the best way to resolve the

impasse was to select a compromise choice as Majority Leader and warned
those jockeying for presidential hopefuls to stay out of the fight:

^^NYT, Dec. 19, 1946, p. 1.
37

Scheele, p. 111.

Compare NYT, Dec. 27, 1946,
p.

11,

p.

5,

and NYT, Dec. 29, 1946, VI,
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Let me repeat: Let the
members of Congress
attend to their Congressional
duties- polltlci-„,

litiTsM'-

^"="-"^1

Toward the end of December,

m

test

-„didates'.^:p";t':r

Bro™

order to restore harmony.

that there was a connection
between

suddenly withdrew from thle
con-

Some observers, however,
believed

Taffs recent election

in the Senat
as Chairman of the Republican
Policy Co»ittee and Brown's
withdrawal.

With Taffs star rising in the
Senate, the Taft wing no longer
needed
the House Majority Leadership
to balance the Dewey adherents
and decided not to risk losing the first
test for 1948.

The morning of the

caucus Jenkins and Dlrksen also
withdrew so Halleck was elected without opposition. 40 Arends stayed
on as Whip.
In 1949, the Republicans were returned
to minority status and

Martin told reporters that he would have to
check with the members
before declaring his candidacy for Minority
Leader.
that the liberals might want to oust him.

Martin suspected

Governor Ernest Gibson of

Vermont called for a leadership change in the
House because of President Truman's success in exploiting the record of
the 80th Congress.

Young Republican associations at Eastern colleges urged
the party to
decide on the type of presidential candidate they wanted to
nominate
in 1952 and then elect Congressional leaders who would be
compatible.

^^NYT, Dec. 27, 1946, p. 5.

40
41
p. 41.

Ibid., Jan. 1, 1947, p. 6; Jan.

3,

1947, pp. 1, 4.

Ibid., Nov. 5, 1948, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1948, p. 23; Dec. 9, 1948,
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Despite signs of opposition to Martin
from spokesmen outside the
House
of Representatives, the New York
Tmes predicted that Martin would be
re-elected Minority Leader easily.

The Times' reasoning was that
most

of the Congressional delegation
consisted of "oldtimers" who had sup-

ported Martin before and that Martin "typif
ied-'^^ the House Republican

membership.

At the caucus Martin was elected unanimously
and Arends continued
as Whip.

Halleck, the former Majority Leader, of course,
was left with-

out a leadership title.

Halleck wanted a formal office but he was un-

willing to challenge Arends.

Arends' Illinois district bordered Hal-

leck 's Indiana constituency and the two men had developed
a strong personal friendship.

Instead, Halleck asked Martin to create a new post

of Assistant Minority Leader for Halleck, but Martin turned
down the

request.

Martin intended to "infuse new blood into the high command

by selecting half a dozen 'young and vigorous' members as unofficial
44
assistants"
and hoped Halleck would be one of these aides. Next Halleck asked Martin to promise to back Halleck for Majority Leader if

Martin should become Speaker again.

Martin refused "because there was

at the time considerable d is grunt lement with Halleck in the ranks.

Two

or three other men had intimated that they might want to run for leader

42

Both quotes are from NYT, Nov. 21, 1948, IV, p.

43

Scheele, p. 126.

44
NYT, Jan. 1, 1949, p.

I

2,

7,
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themselves.

""^^

From Halleck's point of view, Martin's
decisions left

his future as a Republican leader uncertain,
but Halleck made no effort
to mobilize a rebellion against either
Martin or Arends in 1949.

In 1951 Martin and Arends were again chosen
without opposition.
In 1953, with the Republicans capturing both branches
of Congress

and the Presidency for the first time since
1929, Martin's re-election
as Speaker was considered "virtually certain"^^ although
there were

rumors of a Halleck challenge floating around the House.

Martin and

Halleck, however, both brushed aside the gossip as newspaper speculation,

Dwight Eisenhower's memoirs seem to confirm that no revolt

against Martin was underway in 1953.

Eisenhower wrote that in 1955,

1957, and 1959, Halleck sought Eisenhower's acquiescence for a race

against Martin but that no such conference was held in 1953.
caucus, Martin, Halleck, and Arends

— the

47

At the

same three officers from the

last majority Congress --were elected without a dissenting voice.

Summary of the 1941 - 1955 Contests
As Table 10 indicates, 1941 to 1955 was the quietest period in the

Republican party, for only one leadership contest developed.

In 1947

four Midwesterners skirmished over the Majority Leader opening.

45

Aside

Martin, p. 14.

46

^^

NYT, Nov. 6, 1952, p. 21.

Nov. 11, 1952, p. 23; Scheele, p. 141; Dwight D. EisenThe White House Years, 1953 -1956, (Garden
hower, Mandate for Change
The White
City, New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 442 and Waging Peace
House Years 1956 - 1961 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1965), p.

Ibid

.

,

;

:

,

384.

,
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TABLE 10

REPUBLICM LEADERSHIP SELECTION,
1941-1955
Year

Status of Post

What Happened

Outcome

Speaker

1947

1953

Vacant -New Majority party.

No contest

Martin elected

Vacant-New Majority party

No contest

Martin elected

Majority Leader
1947

1953

Vacant -New Majority party.

Contest-four contenders; all but
one withdrew before
caucus

Halleck elected

Vacant -New Majority party.

No contest- former
Majority Leader
re-elected.

Halleck elected

Majority Whip
1947

Vacant-New Majority party.

No contest

Arends elected

1953

Vacant-New Majority party.

No contest

Arends elected

Minority Leader
1941

No vacancy

No contest

Martin re-elected

1943

No vacancy

No contest

Martin re-elected

1945

No vacancy

No contest

Martin re-elected

1949

V-icant-Party be-

No contest

Martin elected

No contest

Martin re-elected

came Minority
1951

No vacancy
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TABLE 10 (continued)

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION,
1941-1955

Year

Status of Post

What Happened

Outcome

Minorit y Whip
1941

No vacancy

No contest

Englebright reelected

a.

No vacancy

No contest

Englebright reelected

b.

Vacant-Englebright died.

No contest

Arends elected

1945

No vacancy

No contest

Arends re-elected

1949

Vacant-Party became Minority

No contest

Arends elected

1951

No vacancy

No contest

Arends re-elected

1943

from this battle, there was some talk in 1943 that Wadsworth might try
to capture the Minority Leadership from Martin, but there is no evidence

that Wadsworth took any concrete steps to rally support and in 1949 Hal-

leck was obviously upset over relinquishing his post when the Republicans returned to the minority.

His efforts to retain an office, how-

ever, were confined to pressuring Martin behind the scenes.

The leadership in this interval was exceedingly stable.

Martin

headed the House Republicans during both minority and majority phases
and after Arends' selection as Whip in 1943, he also continued in his
job whatever the party's fortunes at the polls.

Each time the Republi-

cans became the majority party, Halleck won election as Majority Leader.
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I-lKe the

De^crats with Sa. RayWn. the
KepuhUcans shuttled Mattln hac.

and forth between the
Speakership and the Minority
Leadership, but unlike the arrangement for John
McCor^ck. the Republicans :..de
no con.parable provision for moving
uving Hallprk
Haiieck f^-^T,,
from Majority Leader to
Minority
Whip.
•

One interesting point noted
in the 1930 's was that
in contrast to
the Democrats the Republicans
seemed to groom a circle of
eligible cax.didates for the top party leadership
posts rather than concentrate
on a
single individual such as the Majority
Leader. Younger members with

leadership potential were co-opted into
the hierarchy by being tapped
for party assignments like the
Steering Committee, the Campaign Committee, or unofficial assistant to the
floor leader and by being appointed
to the most prestigious House committees.

Before his initial election

as Majority Leader Halleck had gained
experience via this route as the

chairman of the Campaign Committee and as a
member of the Rules Committee

whereas his chief opponent, Brown, had served on
the Rules Committee also
and on the campaign committee of the Republican
National Committee.

Martin apparently wanted to continue this type of loosely
structured recruiting arrangement when he decided to pick six aides to
assist him in
1949, but Halleck wanted to establish a more definite pecking order along

the lines of the Democratic leadership ladder.

Outside intervention in the Republican struggles, which had reached
a low point during the depression, was rekindled in the mid-1940'

s

as

the Republicans began winning Congressional elections and as their

chances for taking the Presidency looked brighter.

Both Taft and Dewey

as candidates for the Presidential nomination were keenly interested and
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involved in the outcome of the 1947
Majority Leadership contest, and

after the unexpected Republican defeat
in 1948 various moderate and

liberal voices, ranging from an Eastern
governor to Young Republican
clubs, began examining the interrelationship
between the Republican

convention platform and the Republicans' voting
record in Congress.

In

1953 Eisenhower did not participate in the House leadership
election,
but after 1953 Eisenhower's counsel was sought at
the start of each new

Congress.

Eisenhower's involvement after 1953 was not unusual
in Re-

publican politics since Roosevelt, Taft, and Coolidge had
also been

drawn into Republican battles and rumors about McKinley's and
Hoover's
choices had been common.

Analysis of the Variables

Majority - minority status

.

,

1941 - 1955

Minority status had been expected to

produce increased conflict, but in the five Congresses in which the Republicans were the minority party between 1941 and 1955, no fights materialized.

Instead, the Republicans' only quarrel developed in one of

the two Congresses in which they won control of the House.

The long

range statistics indicate that from 1895 to 1955 the Republicans battled over the leadership in twelve Congresses~-seven times while in the

majority and five times while a minority party.

In sum, as with the

Democrats, majority-minority status was not of value in predicting

leadership conflict in the Republican party.
As Table 11 shows, the 1947 contest occurred when the size of the

Republican party was at its peak.

This pattern was somewhat unusual for
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TABLE 11
SIZE OF PARTY AND REPUBLICAN CONTESTS,
1941-1955

7o

of Republican Members

# of Congresses

# of Contests

1

1

45 to 55

3

0

Under 45

3

0

Over 55

the Republicans for only two other Republican
contests had occurred when
the Republicans held over 55 per cent of the seats
in the House.

The

more typical pattern was for contests to develop when the
Republican
share of seats clustered around 50 per cent.

After 1931, however, this

relationship disappeared probably because the Progressives, who had

strategically used a narrowly divided House to win concessions from
the regulars, had faded away as a significant faction within the Re-

publican party.
Election returns

.

"Strong victories," according to Peabody, "pro-

moted good will" and severe defeats caused "pessimism, hostility, and a
search for scapegoats."

The data in Table 12, however, show that the

lone Republican fight between 1941 and 1955 followed the party's biggest

victory in nearly two decades.

On the other hand, the Republicans'

worst defeat in this period occurred in 1948 when Dewey lost the Presidency and House Republicans dropped seventy-four seats and reverted to

Teabody, pp. 687-688.
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TABLE 12

REPUBLICAN ELECTION RETURNS, 1941-1955

Year

# of Seats

Change from Last
Election

"L

Republican Seats

1941

162

-

7

37.2

1943

208

+46

47.8

1945

191

-17

43.9

1947

245

+54

56.3

1949

171

-74

39,3

1951

199

+28

45.7

1953

221

+22

50.8

indicates a contest

minority status.

Because the record of the Republican-led 80th Congress

had been Truman's trump issue, Martin expected a backlash against his
leadership.

Nevertheless, the anticipated revolt did not materialize.

Thus, the hypothesis that victory fosters leadership stability and defeat tends to contribute to conflict would appear to be invalid for the

Republican party for this fourteen year interval.

In the sixty year

period covered by this study, however, defeats were associated more
often than victories with conflict in the Republican party.

Of the

sixteen Congresses that followed an electoral downturn, contests broke
out in seven or 43.8 per cent of them.

Of the fourteen Congresses that

followed election upturns, contests erupted in five or 35.7 per cent of
them.
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iiSabershlE Change.

The leadership contest
of 1947 occurred ,*en

the Repuhlican party was
undergoing substantial
.e^ershlp change, as
Tahle 13 illustrates,
1947 slightly over 30 per
cent of the Republicans had not served In the
last Congress, but the
figures fro™ 1943
tend to undercut the significance
of this relationship,
1943 «hen
an equally large proportion of
the meri>ers were newcomers,
no contest
ensued.
Except for 1943, the Congresses
without leadership struggles
were associated with low (under 15
per cent) or moderate (15 to 26
per
cent) rates of turnover. The high
percentage of incumbents in 1949-

m

m

over 90 per cent -may provide some
Insight into why Martin was not

TABLE 13

REPUBLICAN CONFLICT AMD MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1941-1955
Y^ar

X New Members

7o

Incumbents

1941

17.2

82.8

1943

30.8

69.2

1945

12.0

88.0

1947

30.6

69.4

1949

9.9

90.1

1951

25.1

74.9

1953

22.6

77.4

indicates a contest
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challenged in 1949 although he would
have been a convenient scapegoat
to blazne for the 1948 debacle.

Such a high rate of incund,ency
meant

that there were few Republican members
who had not ratified or con-

tributed to Martin's unanimous election
as Speaker two years earlier.
In addition, if indeed the voting record
that Truman attacked so suc-

cessfully had really hurt Dewey's chances,
then these same incumbents

shared Martin's blame for the defeat since they
had helped compile the
record, but in their view Dewey rather than
Martin was the culprit.

Hierarchy.

In 1947, when the fight over the Majority
Leader took

place, the proportion of freshmen was high--over 25
per cent, but in
1943, when no battle occurred, the percentage of freshmen was even

higher.

As Table 14 indicates, with the exception of 1943, the stable

Congresses had smaller freshmen classes, particularly in 1945 and 1949

when Republican freshmen dropped below 10 per cent of the membership.
If freshmen and sophomores are combined, 1947 represents the mid-

point in junior members.

The Congresses without leadership clashes be-

fore 1947 tended to have higher rates of junior members than the stable

Congresses that followed the 1947 skirmish.
Seniority was lowest in 1947 when Halleck won the Majority Leadership, which does tend to support Peabody's thesis that a pool of ex-

perienced members can stabilize the party but the absence of a large
bloc of senior representatives can be conducive to conflict.

In ad-

dition, in 1949 when Martin feared that he might be ousted, the pro-

portion of senior Republicans jumped dramatically from 19.2 to 36.8
per cent because the large freshmen class of 1939 had come of age.
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TABLE 14

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND SENIORITY,
1941-1955
Year

7o

1941

Freshmen

°L

Sophomores

% Seniors

16.7

35.2

22.8

27.4

14.9

21.1

9.9

24.1

25.1

25.3

10.6

19.2

8.2

19.3

36.8

1951

19.6

9.5

31.2

1953

21.7

17.6

34.4

1943
1945

1947
1949

indicates a contest

In 1949 not only did Martin benefit from a high incumbency
rate but

over one- third of his colleagues had been in the House since Martin
was

initially elevated to a party leadership post.

The very group from

which a rival candidate would have to be recruited consisted of the Republicans who had helped elect Martin to the Minority Leadership four
previous times.
One note of caution should be added here.

A stable membership,

top heavy with senior people seems to have helped prevent a revolt

against Martin in 1949

,

but in 1931 these same conditions had been as-

sociated with the revolt against Tilson.

That similar conditions

should appear to produce opposite results seems paradoxical.

points up this anomaly in Republican contests.

Table 15

From 1895 to 1955
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TABLE 15

SENIORITY AND DIFFERENT TYPES
OF CONFLICT IN
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1895-1955

Republicans

No contest

iq

Contest over vacancy
or to inqjrove committee
assignments or rules.

Revolt

9

24.5

^^'^

49

26.4

seniority was lowest on the average in
contests over vacancies or over
the rules.

Seniority was higher on the average in both
Congresses with-

out any type of conflict and in Congresses
with revolts.

A large bloc

of senior members apparently can be a mixed
blessing to the incumbent
leadership.

If there is little disenchantment among the
senior repre-

sentatives, as in 1949, it may be hard to start a
revolt because there
is no effective challenger, but if the senior
members feel the incumbent

leader or heir apparent is a hindrance to the party, then
there is a
large reservoir of potential candidates from which to pick a new
leader.

49

The three revolts involved leaders who symbolized or were identified with a discredited policy- -Cannon, Mann (who was charged with
Cannonism) and Tilson, who became the scapegoat for Hoover. Some of
the fights classified as contests over rules had elements of revolt
but they were not serious attempts to oust the incumbent leader or
heir apparent.
Instead, they were efforts to improve the Progressives'
bargaining position in the party.
,
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Regional factionalism.

The 1947 struggle occurred
when the Midwest

was the largest geographical delegation
on the Republican side but
declining in strength, as Table 16 depicts.
Neither condition seemed

significant in forecasting conflict because
the Midwest was the largest
delegation in every Congress in this time
span and Midwestern power decreased in three of the seven Congresses.

Thus, the old Republican pat-

tern, in which contests would usually follow
a rise in Midwestern

strength from 1895 to 1931 or a Midwestern plurality
broke down beginning in 1941.

from 1931 to 1939

For the first time since 1895 regional

factionalism did not appear to be related to Republican
conflict.

TABLE 16

REGIONAL FACTIONALISM AND CONFLICT
IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1941-1955
Year

7o

from East

7o

from Midwest

% from West

% from South
and

Border States

1941

36.4

50.0

9.3

4.3

1943

35.1

45.7

11.1

8.2

1945

36.6

46.6

9.9

6.8

1947

36.3

41.2

13.1

9.4

1949

36.8

43.9

14.6

4.7

1951

34.7

45.2

13.6

6.5

1953

33.4

40.7

17.2

8.6

indicates a contest

,

288

Ideologic al factionalism.

The Republicans were highly cohesive

on roll call voting between 1941 and 1955
with scores of 70.8 in 1944,
76.7 in 1948. and 69.9 in 1953.

These scores equal the high level of

unity achieved in the mid and late 1930 's.

The 1947 contest developed

at the beginning of the Congress in which the
Republicans reached their

greatest unity between 1921 and 1967 according to Turner's
updated
50
study.
David Truinan argued that in the 81st Congress the
Republicans,
in spite of their overall level of accord, were frequently
fragmented

into state blocs.

Unlike the Progressive-regular cleavage that endured

from Congress to Congress for nearly three decades, the dissenting
groups observed by Truman did not persist even from issue to issue and

were difficult to label as liberal or conservative because the differences between the dissidents and the majority of the party were not

very great.

Truman concluded that the Republicans' cohesion was built

upon a constantly shifting or "kaleidoscopic"^^ conservative base.

Like the 1939 fight, the 1941-1955 period represented a break with
the past.

Without the Progressives or other stable dissident faction,

ideological factionalism no longer was associated with Republican disInstead, the sole contest of this interval erupted when the

cord.

Republicans were exceptionally unified.

Congruence

.

Even though the Midwest was the largest regional bloc

within the Republican party, the 1941-1955 period opened with the Midwest

50,

Turner, p. 21.

A Case Study (New York;
^'•David B. Truman, The Congressional Party
John Wiley, 1959), p. 185 for the specific reference to kaleidoscopic;
pp. 172-190 for the information.
;
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again excluded f.o. the
leadership hierarchy as
Martin of Massachusetts
and Englehright of California
continued to hold office.

Xn 1943
of Illinois replaced
Englebright as Whip, which
gave the Midwest
first leadership voice since
Longworth's death in 1931.
1947
1953 the Midwest gained further
representation with the election

m

Halleck as Majority Leader,

m

Arends
its

and
of

1947 all four contestants
for Majority

Leader were Midwesterners which
aMost seemed to be a recognition
,
that
the Midwest was entitled to
the post. After 1943 the
leadership better
paralleled the membership in terms
of region, particularly in
the majority Congresses, than in the
previous decade.
In terms of ideology, all the
Republican leaders -Mart in, Halleck,

Englebright, and Arends-shared the
membership's conservative outlook.

Although Halleck was identified with Dewey
in the 1947 race, on policy
Halleck was much closer to Taft than to
the Eastern liberals.
His
alliance with Dewey was likely strategic.

Dewey wanted regular allies and

Halleck thought a moderate Republican had a
better chance of winning
the Presidency than Taft.

Additionally, James Patterson, Taffs bi-

ographer, believes Halleck was fishing for the
Vice Presidency, which
he knew Taft would never offer to a fellow
Midwestern conservative.^^

Truman thought that Martin played a middleman role by
mediating disputes between the various Republican groupings in the House.

However,

52 James

MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy
Four-Party
Politics in America (rev. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
1963),
:

,

p.

;

191.

53

James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican
A Biography of Robert A.
Taft, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), pp. 412-413 and 415-416.
;

Truman, p. 206.

290

since the Republican frag^aentation
was not as severe or as
durable as
the De„«cratic cleavage In
this tl^ span, Martin's
role cannot be compared with the type of leadership
compromise that Rayburn and
McCormacU
symbolized in the Democratic party.

Summary of the Variables

,

1941 -1955

A number of conditions previously associated
with Republican contests no longer coincided with the
conflict of this period.

For ex-

ample, parties evenly balanced in size,
rising Midwestern representation, and a large or tactically important
dissident faction were not

evident when the 1947 fight started.

Instead, the one contest of this

period developed when the Republicans were the
majority party, victorious at the polls, and undergoing considerable
membership turnover with
a large freshman class and low seniority.

Additionally, the Midwest

was declining in strength and the Republicans were
strongly unified on
roll call votes.

The only variable, however, that sorted the single

Congress with a brawl from the six stable Congresses was low seniority.

When the Congresses from the 1930 's are included in the analysis,
a new Republican pattern begins to emerge in 1939.

The 76th (1939-

1941), 78th (1943-1945), and 80th (1947-1949) Congresses can be dis-

tinguished from the rest of the Congresses in this twenty-four year
interval by four interconnected traits.

In these three Congresses, the

Republican proportion of House seats surged forward by a

min5.miim of ten

percentage points; membership turnover was high with new members accounting for at least 30 per cent of the Republicans; freshmen composed one-

quarter of the membership; and seniority declined to its lowest levels.
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in two of these three Congresses
leadership battles developed
and in
the third case Martin ndght have
been vulnerable if Wadsworth
had pressed
ahead with a challenge. Thus,
beginning in 1939, extensive
.e^bership
change and a more junior
party-variables that had not systen,atically

coincided with Republican contests from
1895 through 1931-started to
show up regularly as a correlate of
Republican conflict and in the
1940 -s and 1950 's appeared to
supplant factionalism as the key
con-

ditions associated with leadership battles
among Republicans.

Conclusions

,

1931 - 1955

Between 1931 and 1955 the Republicans clashed
three times over the
leadership, but no single condition or cluster
of traits tied thes
ise contests together.

The reason for the absence of a consistent pattern

m

this period was that the realigning elections of the
1930's altered the

structure of the Republican party as strikingly as the Democratic
party.

When the decade opened the Republicans remained divided into
two powerful and competitive regional blocs, the East and the Midwest,
and into
two ideological wings, the regulars and the Progressives, that were un-

able to reach an accommodation on issues or the leadership.

By the end

of the realigning era, not only had the Republicans been reduced to a

nearly permanent Congressional minority but the Republicans had also
been transformed into a more monolithic party in terms of region and
ideology.

Without the Progressive wing, the Midwest turned into a con-

servative bastion that had few differences with the East.

The few

Eastern liberals who began to be elected in the late 1930 's lacked the
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had done.

A. the co^osi.ion and
.t.uct..e o£ the RepubUean

chansed.^didU.,03,^^^^^
1931 battle was the last fight
of the old regime
regime.

pa«.

nv. every previous
Like

Republican contest since
1895, the 1931 clash
followed a factional
Change that bolstered the
Midwest's or the Progressives'
in the party.

position withThe 1939 contest coincided
with both rising Midwestern

representation, which linked the
struggle to past battles,
and with
extensive membership turnover, a
large and expanding freshman
class,
and lower seniority, which
tied the fight to the 1947
fray and also to
the conflict of the late
1950's and 1960's according to
Peabody.

m

1947 the break with the past was complete.

Factional antagonisms no

longer were associated with leadership
discord,

instead, the fight

developed when new members and freshmen
flowed into party and veterans
declined in strength. In short, although
there was no uniform pattern
for predicting conflict between 1931
and 1955, the contests did not

occur randomly.

Rather, the contests fell into two
distinct patterns.

In the 1930's shifts in the factional
balance that favored the Pro-

gressives or the Midwest continued to foster the
formation of contests,

but in the 1940's and 1950's-wlth 1939 marking
the transition-membership
turnover, more freshmen, and proportionately fewer
veterans provided the
Impetus for leadership clashes.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS
in this chapter, we return to our
original questions.

What con-

ditions were conducive to leadership
conflict in the House of Representatives between 1895 and 1955? Do
the 1895 to 1955 results
support,
contradict, or suggest modifications in
the hypotheses about party

leadership conflict presented in Chapter
I?

is Robert L. Peabody cor-

rect in asserting that minority status,
election defeats, a junior
party, and a cohesive party in terms of
region and ideology may be the

key determinants of intra-party conflict?

Or do other variables and

interpretations such as the size of the party, the
amount of membership turnover, and changes in the regional and
ideological composition
of the party offer more insight into the causes of
leadership conflict?
To help answer these questions, the statistical data
from Chapters II

through V have been aggregated into Summary Table

Tables

2

1.

In addition,

and 3 provide summaries for each party individually from

1895 to 1955.
'Pa.vty .

Peabody has hypothesized that Republicans are more likely

to be beset by conflict than Democrats

but between 1895 and 1955

Democrats and Republicans were almost equally prone to leadership fights

The Democrats battled in eleven different Congresses or just a shade
less than the Republicans, who fought in twelve Congresses.

Although

Robert L, Peabody, "Party Leadership Change in the United States
House of Representatives," American Political Science Review LXI
(September, 1967), p. 693.
,
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TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF UJADERSHIP CONPLIOI
AND CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED
AS
PRODUCING CONGESTS FOR BOTH
PARTIES,

189™

Condition

# of Congressional parties

# of Congressional parties
with conflict

% of Congressional parties
with conflict

Party
Democrats
Republicans

30
30

11
12

36.7
40.0

Majority - minority
Status
Majority Status
Minority Status

30
30

12
11

40.0
36.7

Size of Party
Over 55%
45 to 557o
Under 45

19

7

20
21

10

36.8
50.0
28.7

Election Return s
Upturn
Downturn

30
30

14

16
11

7
6

Seats Added or Lost
+ 30 or more
+ 10 to 29
9 to + 9
-

-

10 to - 29
30 or more

Membership Change
Under 107„
10 to 19%
20 to 29%
30 to 39%
and over

407o

Freshmen
Under 20%
20 to 29%
307o and over

6

9

7

3

12
14

2

4
17
21
12

1
3
8

6

4

26
21
13

5

7

46.7
30.0

43.8
54.5
42.9
16.2
35.7

25.0
17.6
38.1
58.3
66.7

23.1
42.9
61.5
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TABLE

1

(continued)

SUMMARY OF LEADERSHIP CONFLICT AND
CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED AS
PRODUCING CONTESTS FOR BOTH PARTIES,
1895-1955

Condition

# of Congressional parties

Seniors
30% and over
20 to 29%
Under 20%

# of Congressional parties
with conflict

15

1

23
22

12
10

Regional and Ideological
Factionalism

See Tables

TABLE

% of Congressional parties
with conflict

6.7
52.2
45.5
2

and

3

2

SUMMARY OF CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED AS CONTRIBUTING TO LEADERSHIP CONFLICT: THE DL-MOCRATS, 1895-1955

Condition

# of Cases

# of Congresses
with conflict

% of Congresses with conflict

Majority - minority
Status
Majority status
Minority status

14
16

35.7
37.5

9

Size of Part y
Over 55%
1^5 to 55%
Under 45%

12

44.4
44.4
25.0

Ele ction Returns
Upturn
Downturn

16
14

56.7
14.3

Seats Added or Lost
+ 30 or more
+ 10 to 29

9

7
6

4
4

9

4

-

9 to
10 to

29

6

1
1

-

30 or more

7

1

-

-f
-

57.1
66.7
25.0
16.7
14.3
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TABLE

Condition

Membership Change
Under 10%
10 to 19%
20 to 29%
30 to 39%
40%, and over

Freshmen
Under 20%

# of Cases

(continued)

# of Congresses
with conflict

% of Congresses with conflict

2

11
7

7
3

14

20 to 29%
30% and over

9

Seniors
30% and over
20 to 29%
Under 20%

7
12
11

Regional Factionalism
Northern Increase
Southern Increase

16
14

Rise in North while
underrepresented
Rise in North vThile
adequately represented

2

7

0

18.2
28.6
57.1
100.0

14.3
42.9
66.7

0

50.0
45.5

56.7
14.3

77.8

28.6
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TABLE

3

SUMMARY OF CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED
AS CONTRIBUTING TO LEADER
SHIP CONTLICT: THE REPUBLICANS,
1895-1955

Condition

# of Cases

# of Congresses

with conflict

7o

of Congresses
with conflict

Ma i or ity - minor i ty
Status

Majority status
Minority status
Size of_ Party
Over 55%
45 to 557o
Under 45

Election Returns
Upturn
Downturn

16

43.8
35.7

14

10
11

30.0
54.5
33.3

9

14
16

5
7

35.7
43.8

9
5

3
6

3
2
2
1

7

4

33.3
40.0
66.7
16.7
57.1

Seats Added or Lost

+ 30 or more
+ 10 to + 29
9 to + 9
10 to - 29
- 30 or more
-

Membership Chang e
Under 10%
10 to 19%
20 to 29%
30 to 39%
40% and over

Freshmen
Under 20%
20 to 29%
30% and over

Seniors
30% and over
20 to 29%
Under 20%

2

50.0
16.7
42.9
60.0
33.3

6

14
5
3

12
14

4

8

11
11

4
6
2

33.3
42.9
50.0

25.0
54.5
45.5
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TABLE 3 (continued)

SUMMARY OF CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED AS
CONTRIBUTING TO LEADERSHIP CONFLICT: THE REPUBLICANS,
1895-1955
Condition

# of Cases

Regional Factionalism
Increase in Midwest*
Increase in East*

# of Congresses
with conflict

% of Congresses
with conflict

9
9

66.7
33.3

Increased Midwestern
strength while
under-represented

4

50.0

Increase in Midwest
while adequatelyrepresented

5

80.0

Ideological Factionalism
Progressives or Farm
Bloc comprised 25%
of GOP or could disrupt organization of
House
10

90.0

All other Congresses

20

15.0

These figures include only those Congresses in which the Midwest
or the East alone increased in size in the Republican party.
They do not include those Congresses in which both regions grew
in size.

the amount of conflict over time is comparable, each party went through

particularly stormy intervals as well as stable periods.

In the Republi-

can party 80 per cent of the battles clustered between 1903 and 1933 and
in the Democratic party over 80 per cent of the contests occurred in just

two decades, from 1897 to 1907 and from 1931 to 1941.

In the shorter

time span of 1955 to 1966, Peabody found the Republicans to be the more

combative party, but the important point is that in the broader historical
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perspective of .His study,
„o difference between
parties is found
The Republicans, however,
were .ore susceptible
to successful
leadership revolts than the
Democrats, as Peabod,
sugsested.^ Between
1895 and 1955 the Republicans
were battered b, three
revolts,^ two of
which were successful,
1919 Mann was denied the
Speakership and

m

in

1931 Tilson failed to win the
Minority Leadership although
Cannon survived the 1909 movement to
depose him
aepose
Tn the
fu
n
him.
In
Democratic party, however, both revolts were
failures.
In 1907 Williams turned
bade the
challenge to his leadership and
in 1919 Clar. regained
the Minority
Leadership over the protests of
the Wilson loyalists.

Another observation of Peabody's
that is supported by the
1895
to 1955 evidence is that the
Republicans are more inclined to
compete
over the highest party offices
than the Democrats."^

Although the list

of positions covered in this study
is shorter than the one Peabody
used,
the data presented in Table 4 show
that the post most frequently
con-

tested by Republicans was the Speakership.

Next in line was the Minority

^ibid.
3

^^^^ considered fights where there was a serious
effort
^J^?
office an incumbent leader or an heir apparent
who wished
move laterally. There are two types of heir
apparents- chose who wish
advance to a higher office from a lower post
such as a Majority Leader
who tries to climb to the Speakership and those
incumbent leaders who
try to retain their notch in the leadership order
when the party's majority-minority status changes. In other words, they
try to move across
the majority-minority gap rather than go upward.
to
to
to

A
.^^^f^^
drxve
from

4

Peabody, p. 693.
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tabij: 4

PARTY DIFFERENCES:

A COMPARISON OF CONTESTED

OFFICES, 1895 to 1955

Party

Nuniber of Fights over

Democrats

Republicans

Leadership.

Speaker

Majority Leader

2

5

6

Appointed

3

5

1

6

Minority Leader

Whip

In the Democratic party the highest number of
battles was

over the Minority Leadership, followed by the Majority
Leadership.

The

fewest contests were over the Speakership.
Both parties have historically been alliances of uneasy
partners.

The North-South cleavage in the Democratic party has been a continuing
source of friction and in the Republican party V. 0. Key once wrote that
the Eastern and Western wings could not "live for long in fraternity un-

tinged by fratricide."^

Since the potential for conflict is high in

both parties, it is not really surprising that given a long enough period
of time

— as

this study does

— the

amount of conflict should be about equal.

But what accounts for the differences in the nature of conflict in each

party?

Why are successful revolts and Speakership fights more prevalent

in the Republican party?

Part of the explanation is that in the Republi-

can party there is no clear line of succession within the party hierarchy.

No one individual is singled out as the heir apparent for the Speakership
or other top party post.

Instead, since the 1920 's senior Republicans

on the Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means Committees have seemed more
or less equally qualified to advance to the highest party leadership
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offices.

Both the absence of a clearly
designated heir apparent and
the presence of .ore than one
eligible aspirant have
appeared to encourage conflict over the
Speakership and Minority
Leadership. Further-

^re. Republican

leaders have been less tolerant
of internal dissent

than the Democratic leaders.

To further ideological unity
in the party,

Republican leaders have often disciplined
individual .embers and ent ire
factions for taking independent stands.
But the leaders have paid a

price for exercising such power.

As the highly visible syAols

of un-

popular policies, Republican leaders have
been more vulnerable to revolts and to efforts to curb their authority

to wreck careers than their

Democratic counterparts.
In contrast, the Democrats have gradually
recriiited more of their

top party leaders from the office one rung
lower on the party leader-

ship ladder.

As the promotion of the Majority Leader to the
Speaker-

ship became more firmly accepted and established
in the 1930'

s,

com-

petition was deflected from the Speakership to the Majority
Leadership
where the line of succession was not as settled.

Fights were also more

common over the Minority Leadership because, aside from the Speaker
to

Minority Leader transition, there was no definite, universally accepted
heir apparent.

In addition, Democratic leaders have been more willing

to seek coLrpromises between the wings of the party, to appoint Whips

from the minority faction in the party, and to recognize the demands of
an expanding faction for a greater leadership role.

their willingness to accommodate to

As a result of

and accept the existing cleavages

in the party. Democratic leaders have not aroused the hostility and ani-

mos ity that Republican leaders have generated and have not been as likely
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to become the target of
a successful revolt.

M^jorit^-Hinor^ status.

—

hypothesis
,

n^jcrit^.^^i^^

Also in contradiction to
a Peabody
status

little difference in the

of leadersM^ conflict a
,art^

.

.^cording to Peabody

^ninority status encourages
leadership conflict,' but
contests developed
in 40 per cent of the majority
Congresses and in 36.7 per cent
of the

minority Congresses.

When each party

is examined separately,

the Democrats skirmished slightly more
often as a minority party
whereas the
Republicans competed somewhat more
frequently when in the majority.

Not only does Peabody think minority
status will coincide with increased conflict, but he also suggests
that the longer the period of

minority status, the more frequent contests
will become as the frustrated
membership starts to blame the leaders for
the successive defeats.^

Yet,

from 1895 to 1955 more minority fights
developed at the beginning of the

minority cycle rather than toward the end.

On the other hand, Charles

Jones expects a decline in conflict with prolonged
minority status be-

cause the few senior leaders will become so thoroughly
entrenched that
it will be hard to turn them out of office without
a large influx of
8

freshmen.

The evidence supports Jones, but it should be noted that

contests also dropped off the longer a party remained as the majority.

Seabody,
^Ibid.

,

p.

pp.

693.

687-693.

8

Charles 0. Jones, The Minority Party in Congress
Brown and Company, 1970), pp. 16 and 18.

,

(Boston:

Little
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in other words, conflict was
™,re frequent when there wes a
transition

from n.,:orlty status to minority
status or vice versa and during
the
fiddle of a majority or minority phase

rather than toward the end of

a cycle.

Randall Ripley thinks fights will probably
be more common in the
minority party because of the greater
exodus of minority leaders from
the House in pursuit of careers elsewhere.^

With more vacancies, Ripley

expects the opportunities for conflict to
expand.
not supported by the 1855 to 1955 data.

This hypotheses is

Minority Leaders did seek

Senate berths and retire more often than the
Majority Leaders, but

vacancies and voluntary turnover were not greater
in the minority party
than in the majority party because Majority Leaders
abandoned their
jobs to seek the Speakership just as often as Minority
Leaders left

the House,

Size of Party .

Charles Jones suggests that a minority party that

is too small to have a realistic chance of winning a majority of the

House in the next Congressional election will behave differently from
a minority party that can win control of the chamber with the shift

of a few Congressional districts, but he does not predict how their
10

behavior will vary.

Between 1895 and 1955 conflict was most common

when the size of a party ranged between 45 and 55 per cent
in this size range quarreled 50 per cent of the time.

.

Parties

Parties with

9

Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives
(Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 32.
:

Jones, p. 34.

,
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over 55 per cent of the House
seats battled 36.8 per
cent of the ti.e
and s^ll parties or those
holding under 45 per cent
of the House seats

parties with the .ost severely
reduced minorities-that is,
under 35
per cent of the total seats,
the rate of conflict fell
even further to
16.7 per cent,

m

short, the s^llest minority
parties seemed the

least prone to conflict and parties
whose share of the seats hovered
around 50 per cent were the most
likely to wage a leadership
contest.

When the parties are compared, an evenly
balanced House appeared
to be a more important attribute
of Republican contests than of
Demo-

cratic fights.

Once the Democrats controlled a minimum
of 45 per cent

of the House membership, the chances
for a fight jumped from 25 per
cent to 44.4 per cent, but there was no
variation in the rate of conflict as the Democrats grew beyond the 45 to
55 per cent range.

In

the Republican party there was a fight in
approximately one-third of
the Congresses in which the size of the party
measured above or below

45 to 55 per cent, but in the 45 to 55 per cent category contests
de-

veloped in 54.5 per cent of the Congresses.

Because the preponderance

of fights in the 45 to 55 per cent range in the Republican
party oc-

curred between 1903 and 1933, the difference in parties seems
to be

related to the pivotal role of the Progressives, who took advantage of
a narrowly divided House to secure rule changes and better committee

assignments for themselves.

Election returns

.

According to a Peabody hypothesis, election de-

feats stiraulace contests,

Peabody, pp. 688-689.

but between 1895 and 1955 leadership co nflict
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was more likely to occur folj^win^ an
election upturn than a defeat

Winning parties battled in 46.7 per cent of
the Congresses whereas
losing parties fought in only 30 per cent of
the Congresses.
tern varies with party.

This pat-

All but two of the Democratic brawls followed

victories, but the Republicans were more likely to fight
after they had
lost ground in the last election.

seem to account for this contrast.

Historical and factional reasons
In the Democratic party the size

of the Southern contingent remained nearly constant regardless
of the

party's success at the polls.

A few examples will illustrate the

South 's imperviousness to national election tides.

In 1895 the Demo-

crats lost 113 House seats, but the Southern bloc contracted by merely

nine seats.

In the Hoover landslide, the South lost three seats while

the non- South dropped fifty-seven seats.

In 1933, when the non-Southern

contingent picked up ninety-three seats, the South actually lost two
seats.

Since most of the Democratic leaders between 1895 and 1955 were

recruited from the South, a victory was more unsettling to the incumbents since it weakened the regional congruence between leaders and
followers.

In the Republican party the relationship between defeat

and conflict is restricted to the 1895 to 1933 era.

During most of

the Congresses in which the Progressives were a significant voice in
the Republican party, the Republicans were the majority party in the

House.

Consequently, defeats which reduced the Republicans' large

majorities to below 55 per cent were more likely to give the Progressives leverage to disrupt the organization of the House than victories

which increased the Republicans' majorities to such a point that they
could safely ignore the Progressives.

But even in this limited time

period de^oa. .as not a
neces.ar, correlate of
eonHio..

wKen ..e

RepubUoan. were Che minority
pa«y during UUso^.s
Presidency

one

Of the two electoral
upswings that raised the
RepuhUcans' share of
House seats to the 4S to
^^.
55 per cent^ level
was associated with
a fight
Peabody has also theorized
that a thirty to fifty
seat loss
Is

the size of defeat .est
conducive to leadership

tur^u.

Martin
concurs that a massive defeat
ereat like iqs«
i
1958 -to
is ti
likely
to touch off a battle
but does not cite any specific
figures/^ The findings fro.
1895 to
1955 indicate that struggles were
.ost con^on when a party
added between
ten and twenty-nine seats.
In the Democratic party
there is almost a

perfect relationship between the
addition of more seats and
increased
conflict, and in direct contradiction
to Peabody the Democrats
fought
least when they lost between thirty
and fifty seats.

In the Republican

party there were more fights when
the party showed the least change
in
the number of seats added or subtracted
although reverses in the thirty
to fifty seat category did rank in
second place.

What appears to be

important in assessing the chances for a
fight is not whether the party

won or lost or even by how much but how
well each faction or clique

within the party came through the last election.

Elections do not

necessarily affect each wing of a party with equal
force.

Whether a

faction is strengthened or weakened by the election
results is more
critical to the formation of a contest than the
size of the defeat or
victory.

12

Joe Martin, M^;: First Fifty Years in Politics
McGraw Hill, 1960), pp. 4-9.

.

(New York

H-bershiH turnover.

Barbara HincKleys
hypothesis that ™e.ber-

.hlp stability leads to
leadership stability and
high »e.*ershlp turnover encourages leadership
ip instability
instabn ^^.r^3 is supported
by the 1895 to
1955 data. As .ne^^ersM^
•

shiE

fi^

also rose.

With the single exception
of the -under 10 per
cent me^ership turnover"
category, the trend was
striking, when the
rate of tnetnbership turnover
reached 30 per cent, there
was a better
than even chance for a battle,
and when the share of new
:ne:.bers exceeded 40 per cent, then conflict
erupted two-thirds of the
time.
In the Dexaocratic party the
pattern was even more pronounced.
There
were no contests when incumbents
formed over 90 per cent of the membership, but every time the proportion
of incumbents fell below 60
per cent and newcomers reached 40
per cent a fight developed,

m

the

Republican party the relationship between
membership change and leadership conflict was more erratic.

Except for the single contest in the

under 10 per cent category that may distort
the results since the number of cases was so small, the likelihood of
a contest was greatest

when membership change ranged between 20 and 40
per cent.

Once new

members comprised over 40 per cent of the Republican
membership, there
was a drop in the rate of conflict.
changed with time.

The Republican pattern, however,

If the Republican figures are divided with 1933 as

the separating point, the post-1933 Congresses showed a more
direct

13

Barbara Hinckley, "Congressional Leadership Selection and
Support: A Comparative Analysis," Journ al of Politics, XXXII (May,
1970), p. 270.
"
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relationship between
increased membership change
and leadership conflict than the
Congresses prior to 1933.

H^lliC.

The results support Jones
and Peabody's contention

that a junior party
is more prone to conflict
than a senior party
Between 1895 and 1955
as the pr^orti^ of
freshmen expanded, so did
the

likelih^

^ ^^^^^
,

^^^^

^^^^^^^

class was under
20 per cent, contests occurred
in only 23.1 per cent
of the congresses but
when the size of the freshman
class reached 30
per cent, the probability
of a fight jumped to over 60
per cent.
The
pattern in the Democratic
party was nearly identical to the
aggregated
figures, but in the Republican
party, although the same trend
was
visible, there was less
variation in the amount of conflict as the
in-

flux of freshmen grew.

When freshmen composed over 30 per cent
of the

Republican membership, there was
only a 50 per cent chance for a contest
The data particularly buttress
Jones's argument that freshmen in

contrast to other junior members
(with two to ten years service in the
House) are a key element in leadership
change and conflict.

Jones

thinks the socialization process in
Congress erodes differences between

freshmen and incombents too quickly for
other junior members to play
a vital role in challenging the
party elders.

emphasis ou the role of all junior members

Peabody places greater

with less than ten years

service in the initiation of leadership contests, but
between 1895 and
1955 junior members other than freshmen appeared to be a factor only

14

Jones, p. 18; Peabody, p. 689.
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during the Democratic battles of
the 1930' s.
Peabody's hypothesis that a large
body of senior members will
tend
to deter conflict^^ is amply
supported by the 1895-1955 evidence.
As
the percentage of senior members
increased

,

the chances for a fijht

also mounted until veterans comprised
30 £er cent of the part;^ ^ember
shi£.

At that point

,

battles became rare.

As the pool of experienced

congressmen expanded from under 20 per cent
of the party membership to

between 20 and 29 per cent of the membership,
the frequency of conflict
climbed from 45.5 per cent to 52.2 per cent.

But then as the proportion

of senior members rose to 30 per cent, the rate
of conflict dropped

sharply to 6.7 per cent.

Both parties followed this pattern.

In sum, membership stability and seniority tend
to assure leader-

ship stability just as membership turnover and large
freshmen classes

appear to stimulate leadership conflict.

These findings underscore

how costly leadership fights and leadership change can be to the
goals
and ambitions of incumbent House members, especially if they should
end

up on the losing side of a battle.

Congressmen who have devoted years

to slowly accumulating seniority, to getting better committee assign-

ments, and to developing good working relations with the party leadership are not likely to upset the proverbial apple cart unless their

own careers are jeopardized by the leaders' policies or decisions.
In contrast, freshmen, who have invested little time and energy into

getting ahead in the House, do not have much to lose by becoming in-

volved in a party brawl.

Peabody, p. 689.

If a freshman should be on the losing side.
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he may get a worse committee assignment
than if he had not participated,
but the chances are he would not have
gotten a very good one anyway.
If the victors should ignore or ostracize
him, he is still not especial-

ly worse off since he would have
received little attention or patronage
in his first term in any event.

On the other hand, by being part of
a

victorious coalition newcomers stand to gain a
great deal in terms of
greater access to the leadership and better
committee assignments.
For a freshman, the benefits may outweigh the
risks.

Regional factionalism

.

As Hinckley expects, changes in the

regional composition of a party bring pressure for leadership

change.''"^

Between 1895 and 1935 changes in regional alignment that favored
Northern

Democrats or Midwestern Republicans were far more conducive to conflict
than shifts that increased the size of Eastern Republicans or Southern
Democrats.

When Northern Democrats were expanding, contests occurred

in 56.7 per cent of the cases.

In contrast, when Southern Democrats

picked up seats, contests took place in only 14.3 per cent of the
Congresses.

In the Republican party, contests were waged in two-

thirds of the Congresses in which the Midwest was gaining but in

only one-third of those in which the East enlarged.

The relationship

between a growing Midwestern faction and conflict changed over time.
Before 1933, contests erupted 100 per cent of the time the Midwest

was expanding but after 1933 Republicans competed in only 25.0 per
cent of the Congresses in which the Midwest was adding seats.

The

role of conflict for the Eastern wing did not vary as much over time.

'Hinckley, p. 270.
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Before 1933. there were fights In
37.5 per cent of the Congresses
In
which the East was growing; after
1933 there were no fights when
the
East increased in size.

The reason an improvement in the strategic
positions of Northern

Democrats and Midwestern Republicans should
be more likely to produce
a fight is linked to leadership congruence.

From 1895 to 1955 the

South dominated the Democratic leadership in
the House.

The only

Northerner to serve as Speaker or Minority Leader
in the entire sixty
year span was Rainey of Illinois, who was Speaker
from 1933 to 1934.
Until the 1940-1955 compromise in which Rayburn and
McCormack filled
the top two leadership posts, there were only two other
periods in

which the leadership showed regional balance or seemed to be
a genuine accomir.odation between sections.

From 1908 until 1911 Clark of

Missouri served as Minority Leader and from 1931 until 1934 the
Speakership and Majority Leadership were divided between a Northerner
and a Southerner.

If one isolates those nine Congresses in which

Northern Democrats gained while underrepresented in the preceding
Congress, then the rate of conflict was 77.8 per cent.

In those

seven Congresses in which the expansion of the North occurred when
the leadership had been well balanced in the last Congress, the rate
of conflict, fell to 28.6 per cent.
In the Republican party the Midwest was more often underrepre-

sented in the leadership than the East but seldom before 1933 when
the correlation between Midwestern growth and leadership conflict ap-

pears.

Why the Midwest would challenge the leadership when it was
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already included can be explained by the
interrelationship between the
Midwest and the Progressives. The
Progressives were overwhelmingly a

Midwestern bloc, which meant that every time
the Midwest increased its
share of seats between 1903 and 1933 the
Progressives bettered their

tactical position within the Republican party.

Because the Progres-

sives were deliberately excluded from the Republican
high command,

they were usually ready to challenge the incumbent
leaders and their

rules when the opportunity arose.

In short, regional or ideological

changes that strengthened the wing of the party that was
underrepre -

se^ted or excluded from the highest leadership offices were more
like
IX to produce conflict than changes that bolstered the faction with

proportionate representation .

Hinckley has cautioned that there might be a time lag between the
emergence of a new majority or clearly predominant faction and the re-

distribution of leadership positions.

One of the interesting results

of this study is that although the actual leadership changes may be

delayed, leadership fights are not often postponed.

One reason an

expanding faction that lacks the votes or the seniority to force a

leadership change might nevertheless pursue a fight is that something
of value might be gained simply by organizing a challenge.

The Pro-

gressives, for example, were able to win rules concessions, wrestle

better committee assignments, and dislodge an occasional bill from
the Rules Committee through their contests.

The Democratic hierarchy

rewarded the Bryanites and Northern New Dealers with the office of
Whip in hopes of heading off repeated confrontations.

Another reason

contests follow closely behind regional and ideological shifts is
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that the battles that develop
do not necessarily pit
a contender fro.
the underrepresented but
enlarging faction against
a candidate fro. the
established but declining wing of
the party.
For example, in the Democratic party all the serious
challengers for Minority Leader
in 1923
and for Speaker in 1935 were
Southerners despite the Northern
advances.
The alteration of a party's composition
apparently creates more opportunities for ambitious politicians to
construct a new majority coalit ion

within a party.

Potential candidates who might
normally have stayed

m

the background if the composition of
the party had remained stablLe seem

tempted by the increased room for maneuvering
to try their hand at
forging a new alignment.

Ideological factionalism.

According to Peabody a monolithic party-

that is, a highly unified party on roll call
votes-is more likely to

engage in leadership skirmishes than a party that
is severely divided
over public issues.

Peabody's reasoning is that a united party in a

sense can afford che luxury of a leadership fight because
its voting

cohesion will not

sacrificed.

Parties with deep cleavages, on the

other hand, are uxider more pressure to reach an accommodation since

a

fight may accentuate and intensify the existing division."''^

The results

from 1895 to 1955 do not substantiate Peabody's contention.

The Republi

cans were most competitive when they were least united

.

In those Con-

gresses in which the Progressives or Farm Bloc held 25 per cent or more
of the party's seats or had the votes to disrupt the regulars' ability
to organize the House, contests flared 90 per cent of the time.

Peabody, pp. 689-690.

In
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those Congresses in which the Progressives vere
non-existent or in which
their power to block the regulars was receding, battles
developed only
15 per cent of the time.

With the loss of the Progressive bloc and the

increased cohesion that resulted, there was sharp decline in conflict
in the Republican party.

Between 1903 and 1933 the Republicans averaged

a battle in every second Congress, but after 1933 the Republicans waged

only one struggle in each decade.

Although the data are not complete, the Democrats also appeared to
become more embattled as they became more divided

The Bryanite- con-

.

servative fights tended to develop in Congresses in which voting unity
was falling on key issues and a number of the Southern conservative-

Northern liberal brawls during the 1930 's occurred when voting cohesion
was lower than in the last Congresses of the 1920's.

Unlike the Repub-

licans, however, the opposing wings of the Democratic party could peace-

fully co-exist for considerable lengths of time in spite of continuing
and deep ideological rifts as from 1908 to 1913 and from 1940 until 1955.
Perhaps the reason for this difference in parties can be attributed
to the Democrats' greater skill at devising leadership compromises that

pulled the disputing factions together.

The wave of fights touched off

by the 1896 election was halted by the selection of Clark, who was a

moderate acceptable to Southern conservatives, Bryanites, Tammany chieftains, and Northern reformers.

The spate of fights in the 1930 's ended

with the election of Rayburn and McCormack, moderates from the two major
factions in the party.

The Republicans, in contrast, never included the

been
Progressives in the leadership or selected moderates who might have

able to act as brokers between the rival camps.

The absence of the
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Progressives from the lpaf1oT-ei,,'«
leadership was not accidental
since most Republican leaders expended a
great deal of energy and
time In disciplining
the Progressives for their
independence. Mann alone
tried to entice
the Progressives back to narrv
party ^>-t-u^^
orthodoxy ^by giving them
desirable committee assignments. Cannon,
Longworth, and Snell preferred
to banish
-vericks from key co:™ittees or deprive
them of their chairmanships
or
committee seniority.
David Mayhew's concept of Inclusive
and exclusive compromise
seems
18
applicable here.
both parties ideological
cleavages appeared conducive to leadership contests, but
parties of inclusive compromise
were
more successful in curbing potential
conflict than parties that con-

m

tinually excluded intense and durable
minorities from
Parties of exclusive compromise wer^ more T_ikpT^

rr^

a

leadership role.

u^^^^^j^

^

fights until the ideological composition
of the £art2 became more mono lithic.

18^
David R. Mayhew, Party Loyalty among Congressmen:
The Differences
between Democrats and Republicans, 1947-1962,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 149-159. On roll call
votes dealing with
domestic issues, Mayhew found that Democrats were the
party of "inclusive compromise" in the sense that all different types
of Democrats,
i.e., Western Democrats, Urban Democrats etc., voted
for each other's
programs. The Republicans, instead, were labeled the party
of "exclusive compromise" because they typically voted against the special
interests and needs of a segment or bloc within the party. This concept can be extended to leadership conflict also. The Democrats
seemed
more willing to include opposing factions in the party leadership.
In contrast, the Republicans excluded particular groups and factions
from the leadership.
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Summation
Of the variables hypothesized as contributing
to leadership battles, three conditions stand out in explaining the
presence or absence

of conflict:

membership change (or the percentage of freshmen);

regional-ideological factionalism; and leadership congruence.

Two

other variables--the size of the party and election victories
correlated with conflict but on closer inspection did not seem to directly
or independently encourage conflict.

Instead, these variables ap-

peared to be associated with conflict only because of their inter-

relationship with two of the key conditions, membership change and
factionalism.

-

For instance, a closely divided House did not appear

to stimulate Republican contests except in the sense that the narrow

margin gave the Progressives a strategic advantage.

Likewise, an elec-

tion victory contributed to the fights only in the limited sense of

being more often the vehicle for membership and regional- ideological
change than election defeats, which sometimes served equally well in

altering the composition of a party enough to produce a struggle.
Finally, two of the conditions expected to produce leadership contests
can be eliminated altogether as determinants of conflict.

Over time

neither party nor majority-minority status seemed to affect the proba-

bility of a contest.

Between 1895 and 1955 when the membership of a Congressional party
was undergoing rapid turnover and the regional-ideological alignments

were shifting in favor of the faction underrepresented or excluded from
the leadership, the incidence of conflict was very high.

In the Re-

publican party both conditions were not needed in any single time
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period to produce a skirmish.

During the 1930's .e.bership
change dis-

placed ideological and regional
change as the key condition
capable of
triggering a battle.
In the Democratic party,
however, both membership
turnover ar^ regional- ideological
alterations tended to be necessary
before a contest took place although
there were variations over
time
in the emphasis that should be
placed on each condition.

Before 1931

extremely high men^ership turnover
was more characteristic of
Democratic
fights than afterwards while the
regional transformation in the
Democratic party during the 1930

's

probably assumed greater importance
in

creating tension than the smaller and
temporary Northern inroads before
1931.

There were ten Congresses in which new
Democratic members ac-

counted for at least 20 per cent of the
party membership and in which
the regional fluctuations favored the North
either while underrepresented
in the leadership or when the leadership
compromise of the previous Con-

gress had dissolved before the new Congress met.^^

nine of these ten Congresses.

Contests erupted in

There were fourteen Congresses in which

the regional- ideological equilibrium in the Republican
party shifted to
favor the Midwest or the Progressives before 1933 or in
which newcomers

comprised at least 30 per cent of the Republican membership after
1933.
Contests occurred in twelve of these fourteen cases.

Thus, of the

twenty-four cases which fulfilled the criteria outlined above, conflict

19 In 1933 and
1935 the North increased its majorities in the Democratic contingent.
In each of the preceding Congresses the North had
been represented in the leadership, but by the time the new Congress
convened the compromise had collapsed.
In 1933 the cause for the
dissolution was Garner's election to the Vice Presidency and in 1935

Rainey's death.
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flared in twenty-one of them or 87.5 per cent
of the time.

But of the

thirty-six Congresses that did not meet the conditions
usually conducive
to conflict and therefore would be expected to
be stable, clashes de-

veloped in only two instances for a 5.3 per cent rate
of conflict.
other words, in fifty-five of the sixty cases investigated

,

In

membership

change, regional-ideological variation, and leadership
congruence ac-

curately sorted or predicted whether or not a contest took place.
In analyzing the five deviant cases, reference will be made to the

skill of the incumbent and the intervention of the President--conditions

hypothesized as contributing to conflict but that have been treated as
residual variables in this project.

In 1913, 1927, and 1943 although

the characteristics of the Congressional party indicated a battle was

imminent, no fight developed.

In 1913 in the Democratic party the

North had become the dominant faction,

but,

because the only Northerners

with enough seniority to be considered eligible for a leadership post

were more conservative than the majority of the party, no one was available to run against Clark or Underwood.

In 1927 in the Republican

party the Progressives had the votes to deadlock the House but did not
press ahead.

LaFollette had died in 1925 and no other Progressive had

stepped forward to fill the leadership vacuum left by his death.

By

1931, however, La Guardia seemed to have replaced LaFollette as the

driving force behind the Progressives' strategy sessions and publicity
campaigns.

Longworth's harsh disciplinary measures against the Pro-

gressives in 1925 might be offered as an alternative explanation for
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the Progressives' behavior in
1927, but it does not see. as
persuasive
since the Progressives had never
before shied away from a fight
because
of the risks involved or the
penalties .eted out.
1943, when .e.-

m

bership change was extensive in the
Republican party, Wadsworth did not
try to topple Martin. Wadsworth
was an aloof, dignified man
whose

personality apparently acted as a brake
on his leadership aspirations.

A politician with a more aggressive, abrasive
personality such
leck's may have been eager to run under
similar circumstances.

fascinating pattern begins to emerge from these
exceptions.

as Hal-

A

Peabody

thinks that an incumbent's skill is one of
the key variables contrib-

uting to contested leadership change, but these
three examples suggest
that the availability and personality of a challenger
or key organizing

figure in the dissident wing (either the challenger or
a different in-

dividual like LaFollette) may be more important than the
competence of

an incumbent in producing a fight.

Changes in the composition of a

Congressional party that erode and weaken the leader's power base sets
the stage for conflict, but before a fight can actually develop a chal-

lenger is needed to take advantage of the instability.

The 1919 and 1940 Democratic contests took place under conditions

normally associated with stability.

In part these fights may have been

delayed reactions to the huge Northern gains of 1913 and 1931-1933.
In 1913, when the North surpassed the South numerically, the North

could not capitalize on its lead because there was no Northerner avail-

able to run for Speaker or Majority Leader.

By 1919 the North's pool

of potential leaders was sufficient to challenge the South 's domination

320

of the leadership, but the North's
bid to rectify the leadership
im-

balance failed because the North's
inajorities had vanished.
early 1930 's

.:he

m

the

North was not caught quite so short-handed
on eligible

leadership material and succeeded in electing
Rainey first Majority
Leader and then Speaker.

After his death, however, the handful
of

senior Northerners were no match for the larger
pool of extremely able,

veteran Southerners.

As a result, the North did not have a
leadership

role proportionate to its membership size between
1934 and 1940.

In

1940 when the younger Northerners with leadership potential
had matured,
the North moved to snare a greater number of leadership
posts.

This

time, although the South had increased its strength in
the last elec-

tion, the North still had the pluralities necessary to prevail.

These

two examples illustrate Hinckley's point that there can be a delay

between the regional-ideological change in the composition of the
party and the leadership changes.

Thus, by utilizing the time lag

concept, both of these deviant contests can also be classified under
the membership change, regional- ideological change, leadership con-

gruence rubric.
However, an equally plausible explanation for these last two deviant cases is Presidential or at least administration intervention.
In 1919 Wilson's cabinet and closest aides helped initiate the revolt
to unseat Clark because Wilson needed a leader more sympathetic to the

League of Nations and in 1940 Roosevelt was widely believed to have
insisted upon the immediate election of McCormack as Majority Leader
to offset the obstructionist tactics of the Southern conservatives.
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Presidential participation did not
systematically contribute to conflict
since nearly half the skirmishes occurred
in the party that did not control the Wtiite House.

But in particular cases, especially
when the

dominant leadership faction was being strengthened
by current membership
changes, Presidential involvement on the side of
the underrepresented

bloc appears to have been an important variable
in initiating contests.

Aside from the President, no other individual or group
outside the

House of Representatives seemed influential in starting a fracas
under
adverse conditions.

The national Progressive leaders like Roosevelt or

LaFollette intervened in an advisory capacity under circumstances favorable to their position, but the more typical response of other politicians or interest groups was to intervene on behalf of a particular

candidate after the contest was under way.
In conclusion, this study demonstrates the benefits of examining

leadership conflict over an extended period of time.

Concentrating on

a single decade or two--particularly when the conditions are stable--

can provide misleading results.

The 1930'

s,

for example, would clearly

indicate that the Democrats as the majority party were more prone to
conflict than the minority Republicans just as Peabody's slice of time
showed that the Republican minority tended to be more combative than
the Democratic majority.

Over time, however, these short term fluctua-

tions are balanced out and the more constant or permanent conditions

producing conflict become visible.

Furthermore, because the conditions

hypothesized as facilitating conflict varied considerably over this
sixty year time span, it was possible to control for one variable to
see the impact of another, which Peabody could not do.

As a result,
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this study not only shows which variables encouraged leadership contests
in each party between 1895 and 1955 but also identifies the conditions

that did not contribute to conflict.
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